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## LEADOFF

### Liebe Mitglieder,

die thematische Reichweite dieser Denkwürdigkeiten erstreckt sich von Chinas energiepolitisch bestimmter machtpolitischer Perlenkette im Indischen Ozean bis hin zu den terroristischen Herausforderungen in Afrika, hier insbesondere in Somalia. Der Kenner der Szene weiß um die energie- und rohstoffpolitische Bedeutung des schwarzen Kontinents für Chinas Prosperität. Eine Reihe von Wettbewerbern des Ausrichters der diesjährigen Olympischen Sommerspiele bewertet die Bedeutung Afrikas entsprechend. Der Kenner weiß auch die grundsätzliche Bedeutung erfolgreicher internationaler Bemühungen um eine handlungsfähige somalische Regierung einzuschätzen. Wenn es den afrikanischen Staaten mit internationaler Hilfe nicht gelingt, die Verantwortung für Ihre Bürger im Sinne einer Good Governance erfolgreich wahrzunehmen, finden hier nicht nur Terroristen ein Biotop zur Vorbereitung ihrer Anschläge. Das Phänomen der Stellvertreterkriege könnte schon bald ein munteres Revival feiern. Afrika verdient Aufmerksamkeit und erfolgreiches Engagement.

*Ralph Thiele, Vorstandsvorsitzender*

## THEMEN

### Militarisation of China's Energy Security Policy

Defence Cooperation and WMD Proliferation along its String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean

This paper provides an assessment of the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation from China, and highlights a link between China's energy security policy and WMD proliferation. It puts forth the suggestive argument that China's energy-driven foreign policy is taking a form of a "String of Pearls" grand strategy that aims to achieve resource and maritime security along its energy supply routes stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean to the Malacca Straits. Having established key "pearls" of WMD client

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states of Iran in the Middle East, Pakistan in South Asia, and DPRK in East Asia, China is procuring additional pearl nodes along the Indian Ocean (e.g., Sri Lanka, Burma, Bangladesh, etc.) and establishing naval ports, electronic surveillance, military cooperation, nuclear technology and bio-chemical weapons cooperation with these nodes.

This "arms for oil" trade policy with resource-rich countries in the Persian Gulf, and military concessions as well as defence cooperation for forward-bases with countries along the Indian Ocean littoral, have serious international security implications for the E.U., U.S. and her allies in Asia. With China's rapid military (especially naval) modernisation and perceived declining U.S. influence in the region, concerned Asian

powers such as Japan and South Korea in northeast Asia, ASEAN countries in southeast Asia, and India in South Asia, might be spurred into a competitive arms race and WMD proliferation in the region – especially India which fears strategic encirclement by China. Nonetheless, these challenges provide cooperative opportunities for the EU, U.S. and Asia to harness the underlying competitive drive and engage India and China via multilateral organisations such as IEA, APEC, ARF to address the collective common goals of energy security and economic growth.

### Introduction – Militarisation of Energy Security Policy

China's dramatic emergence as an economic power house and its burst onto the world oil market in 2004 caught many by surprise. With oil consumption rising by 900,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 6.43 million bpd, it accounted for roughly one-third of the growth in oil consumption that year.<sup>1</sup> The IEA forecasts a fivefold increase in China's oil imports from 2 million bpd in 2002 to almost 11 million bpd by 2030<sup>2</sup>, which means China will have to continue importing some 80% of oil supplies. Currently China imports 80% of its oil through the Strait of Malacca, which is just 1.5 miles at its narrowest point and at risk for collisions, piracy and terrorist attacks.<sup>3</sup> China recognises this threat to its energy security – which underpins the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) goals of economic growth and regime survival – and has developed a "String of Pearls" strategy involving military bases and diplomatic ties to protect its oil and strategic interests.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Robert E. Ebel, "China's Energy Future", January 2006, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), <http://www.chinabalancesheet.org>.

<sup>2</sup> IEA, *World Economic Outlook 2004* (Paris, France: OECD, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> Robert, Ebel, "China's Energy Future".

<sup>4</sup> Admittedly coal will continue to be the dominant fuel in China's energy mix for the foreseeable future. However, concern with pollution, climate change, rising costs due to closure of mines from accidents/deaths of miners, inefficient transport of coal in the rail system which only meets 35% of demand with attendant frequent electricity blackouts, coupled with rapid growth of oil-dependent trans-

### Energy Insecurity – Energy as a weapon and Resource Nationalism

In the years ahead, economic security, energy security and national security will be inextricably linked. Over the last decade there has been an increasing trend of weaponisation of energy, of authoritarian governments using natural resources as bargaining chips in international diplomacy. This is evidence by Venezuela's 'cold feud' with the U.S. and nationalisation of energy sectors in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Russia. Disturbing trend of Russia's petro-politics is illustrated in the disruption of natural gas to Ukraine and Georgia in January 2006, of oil to Lithuania and Belarus in 2006, and of gas to Georgia again in January 2007.<sup>5</sup> State-owned Gazprom and the wider clique of Russian mineral oligarchs are inevitably influenced by – and influence in turn – the wider strategic purpose of the Putin and Medvedev administration, with much of the energy sector dominated by the so-called *siloviki*, former intelligence officers.<sup>6</sup>

This trend of volatility and insecurity of energy supply as well as dependency on the U.S. for protection of SLOCS (Sea lines of communication) that connect vital energy resources in the Middle East and Africa, seemingly prompted China to adopt a "String of Pearls" strategy which is a manifestation of China's rising political influence through efforts to

port sector and China's strategic ambition for regional power projection, is propelling them on the trajectory towards obtaining oil security. Robert E. Ebel, "China's Energy Future", p. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Keith C. Smith, "Russian Energy Policy and its Challenge to Western Policy Makers", *CSIS Commentary* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2008), p.1.

<sup>6</sup> Speech by Dr. Liam Fox, MP, Shadow Secretary of State for Defence, "Energy Security and Military Structures", *Chatham House*, 22 May 2006. *Siloviki* in the Putin administration and in Russia's energy companies have a strong role in determining national energy policy. Former KGB and GRU officers sit on boards of most of their energy companies, and President Putin's use of Matthias Warnig, a former East German Stasi officer and now Dresdner Bank executive, to put together the financing and management of the Baltic undersea northern Europe gas pipeline, Nord Stream, added to suspicions the project is more strategically than commercially motivated. Keith C. Smith, *Ibid*.

creates access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces that extend from the South China Sea through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and onto the Arabian Gulf.<sup>7</sup>

### String of Pearls Strategy

Broadly speaking, each "pearl" in the "string of pearls" is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical or military presence.

Several things are needed in a string of pearls:

- *Access to airfields and ports.* This may be accomplished by building new facilities or through establishing cordial relations with other nations to ensure access to these ports. In some cases it involves heavily subsidizing construction of new port and airfield facilities in other countries with the understanding that these facilities will be made readily available as needed.
- *Increase diplomatic relations.* This is to ensure shipping lanes and airspace remains free and clear and may also be used to establish mutually beneficial trade and export agreements. Since a string of pearls may rely on linking a series of pearls, it is important to ensure that each pearl is also safe and not be threatened by neighbouring states.
- *Modernising military force.* A modern military can move effectively to maintain/hold individual pearls. It will also be prepared for various actions and exercises on the part of a parent nation.

These pearls extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and onto the lit-

<sup>7</sup> Christopher J. Pehrson, *String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China's Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2006)

<sup>8</sup> The phrase "string of pearls" was first used to describe China's emerging maritime strategy in a report titled "Energy Futures in Asia" by defense contractor, Booz-Allen-Hamilton, which was commissioned in 2005 by the U.S. Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment. Christopher J. Pehrson, *String of Pearls*.



Source: Adapted from Juli MacDonald, Amy Donahue, and Bethany Danyluk, *Energy Futures in Asia*, Booz Allen Hamilton report sponsored by the Director of Net Assessment, November 2004, 17.

Figure 1: reproduced from IntelliBriefs, "China's String of Pearls Strategy", 1 April 2007

torals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing naval forward presence along the SLOCs that connect China to the Middle East. The list of pearls include the following: upgraded military facilities in Hainan Island; upgraded airstrip on Woody Island located in the Paracel archipelago about 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam; container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh; construction of a deep water port in Sittwe, Burma; construction of navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan; pipeline through Islamabad and over Karakoram Highway to Kashgar in Xinjiang province that would transport fuel to China itself; intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal near the Malacca Strait, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka.<sup>9</sup>

However, these pearls pose serious challenges for the international community with its attendant negative externalities of heightened competition between India and China for regional influence, China's WMD proliferation and military ties with rogue states, and its aggressive military modernization that increases tensions with Japan, across the Taiwan Straits and onto the broader Asia region.

<sup>9</sup> "US is Threatened by 'Aggressive Chinese Sea Power'", *Al Jazeera*, 14 September 2005; Christopher J. Pehrson, *String of Pearls*, p.3; Jennifer Chou, "China's 'String of Pearls'", *The Weekly Standard*, 5 November 2007.

### WMD Proliferation along the String of Pearls

The collapse of the Soviet Union facilitated the growth of China's influence and presence along the String of Pearls in and Asian littoral by allowing China greater strategic latitudes. The Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia removed pressure on China's north and western border, lack of Soviet support prompted Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia which relieved pressure from the southeast, and China sought to relief pressure from India by providing Pakistan with missile and nuclear weapons technologies.

In addition to China's well-documented WMD proliferation to Pakistan, it is also leaving a trail of WMD along the Indian Ocean SLOC for its energy imports in its quest for defence cooperation in exchange for military bases and port access. Underlying Sino-Indian tension and competition for regional hegemony further drives China's "arms for pearls" strategy. This in turn feeds India's insecurity regarding China's regional intentions – especially its strategic alliance with Pakistan.

### China's Strategic Encirclement of India

China's military tie with Pakistan has always been a thorny issue in Sino-Indian relations,<sup>10</sup> and China's naval port in Gwadar,

<sup>10</sup> Yuktishwar Kumar, "Hu, Pakistan and the 'String of Pearls'", *Rediff.com*, 28 November 2006.

Pakistan, further fuels India's sense of insecurity and fear of Chinese strategic encirclement of India. Gwadar is a key pearl within the "String of Pearls" and China's first strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea. Along with Beijing's onshore and offshore assets in Burma, Gwadar is enlarging Chinese footprint on both Oceanic flanks of peninsula India.<sup>11</sup> Located just 72km from the Iranian border and 400km east of Strait of Hormuz, a major conduit of global oil supplies, China's massive involvement in the Gwadar project has provided Beijing with a listening post from where it can monitor U.S. naval activity in the Persian Gulf, Indian activity in the Arabian Sea, and future U.S.-Indian maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean. This project in turn eases Pakistan's insecurity regarding Indian blockade of Karachi port, which handles 90% of Pakistan's sea-borne trade, due to its proximity to India. Indeed, a blockade occurred during the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and was threatened by India again during the Kagil conflict in 1999.<sup>12</sup> However, these pearls have instilled sufficient insecurity from India that they have riposted by devising a new naval doctrine.

India's Naval Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, expressed concerns that "Gwadar would enable Pakistan to take control over world energy jugular and interdiction of Indian tankers."<sup>13</sup> To counter the Gwadar port that is also called the Chinese Gibraltar by Washington, India has parried back with ties to Iran and Afghanistan by building Chabahar port in Sistan-Balochistan province of Iran – just adjacent to Gwadar.<sup>14</sup> It is also helping Iran to build a 200km road connecting Chabahar with Afghanistan that will provide access via land to the

<sup>11</sup> Brahara Chellaney, "China Covets a Pearl Necklace: Dragon's Foothold in Gwadar" in *Asian Age*, 7 April 2007.

<sup>12</sup> Sudha Ramachandran, "China's Pearl in Pakistan's Water", *Asia Times Online*, 17 March 2005.

<sup>13</sup> *The Times of India*, "Pak's new port has strategic implications for India: Navy Chief", 22 January 2008.

<sup>14</sup> Abdus Sattar Ghazali, "India Alarmed as Chinese-Built Gwadar Port of Pakistan Become Operational" 8 February 2008, *Counter-currents.org*.




Figure 2: Reproduced from "China Garland India with String of Pearls", <http://www.marinebuzz.com>

port for their trade with Central Asia. As China increases maritime links with Burma, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius and Madagascar, India counter-parries by seeking defence cooperation with coastal Africa such as Mozambique, Madagascar and Mauritius.<sup>15</sup> It is modernising military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and pursuing closer military ties with the U.S., stressing in its new naval doctrine the need to protect energy routes and responding to Beijing's inroads into the Arabian Sea.<sup>16</sup>

China seems to garland its "String of Pearls" around India as it continues its defence cooperation and "arms for pearls" policy with countries surrounding India – establish a listening post in Gwadar, Pakistan, equip Bangladesh with Chinese military hardware in an anti-India defence cooperation, military agreement with Cambodia in November 2003, military ties with Burma and leasing Coco Island in 1994 for SIGINT installation<sup>17</sup>, and the latest pearl acquisition on 31 October 2007 to construct Hambantota port in Sri Lanka.

<sup>15</sup> Anthony Paul, "Asian Giants Game of Chess in Indian Ocean", *The Strait Times*, 16 May 2007, Yale Global Online.

<sup>16</sup> Abdus Sattar Ghazali, "India Alarmed".

<sup>17</sup> Coco Island and the northern tip of the Andamans are separated by 18 km of sea only. This is efficient for monitoring Indian naval and missile launch facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, tracking movements of Indian navy and other navies in the eastern Indian Ocean, and in 1992 Great Coco Island station began with emplacement of 45-50 m antenna tower, radar sites and other electronic facilities forming a comprehensive SIGINT (signals intelligence) collection facility.

From China's perspective, there are four strategic corridors around India that they are fastening.<sup>18</sup>

- (1) *West of India* – Trans-Karakoram Corridor from western China stretching down to Gwadar, at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40% of world's oil passes. This is a way for the western province of Xinjiang to access oil from the Strait of Hormuz through Pakistan and bypass the Malacca Straits completely.
- (2) *East of India* – Irrawaddy Corridor from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal involving road, river, rail links through Burma, including to the Chinese-built harbours at Kyaukypu and Thilawa. This corridor brought Chinese security personnel to Burmese sites close to both of India's eastern strategic assets and to the Strait of Malacca.
- (3) *North of India* – East-West axis in Tibet across India's northern frontiers, a \$6.2 billion railway from Gormu to Lhasa that significantly boosts China's offensive military capability against India. Once the railway, which branches southward from Lhasa to Xigatse is completed, the Chinese PLA (People's Liberation Army), located at the roof against Indian forces at low levels, would have logistic capability to intensify military pressure at short notice by rapidly mobilizing up to 12 divisions. Moreover, as part of the East-West

<sup>18</sup> Barbara Chellaney, "China Covets a Pearl Necklace: Dragon's Foothold in Gwadar" in *Asian Age*, 7 April 2007.

corridor in Tibet, China has built new military airfields along frontiers of India. An airport will be set up in Ngari, southwest of Tibet, and a new railway allows China to rail-base in Tibet some of its inter-continental ballistic missile such as the DF-31A, a rail-mobile weapons.<sup>19</sup>

- (4) *South of India* – Gwadar, Pakistan – corresponds with China's nuclear-weapon / missile capabilities to Pakistan by linking Gwadar with Karakoram Highway and by planning to build oil pipelines from Gwadar to restive Xinjiang Province.

Gwadar has key strategic naval implications. Firstly, one component of China's plan is to make Gwadar a major hub transporting Gulf/African oil by pipelines to the Chinese heartland via Xinjiang and bypass Strait of Malacca – the piped oil would reduce freight costs, supply time, lower China's reliance on U.S.-policed shipping lanes through the Malacca and Taiwan Strait. Beijing is also setting up a similar energy corridor through Burma involving oil and gas pipelines in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine province.

Secondly, Gwadar is a forward-operating base for China, a central link in the emerging chain of Chinese forward-operating facilities around India. Not only is Gwadar a naval base, it also houses a modern air defence unit, military garrison, large Chinese-built refinery/petroleum-storage facilities, and a listening post.<sup>20</sup> Situated next to world's busiest oil shipping lanes, Gwadar is likely a port of call and refueling point for the rapidly modernising Chinese navy and potentially opens the way for the arrival of Chinese submarines in India's backyard in the near future.

For China, Gwadar is a key maritime outpost to monitor developments in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, and monitor Indian and U.S. naval patrols – including naval bases in western India and U.S. base in Diego Garcia. Based on these developments, we thus

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

see a suggestive trend of China's projects, originally touted as *commercial*, progressively assumes *strategic* and *military* colour. A case in point is the Karakoram Highway – which has served as passageway through occupied Kashmir territories for covert Chinese nuclear and missile transfers and other military aid to Pakistan.

### China's WMD Proliferation to its Pearls

As stated earlier, China's military incursions into the Asian littoral in order to secure pearls for energy security have resulted in WMD proliferation along its pearls. Since the 2004 disclosure of the A.Q. Khan network – a global clandestine syndicate of nuclear-related technology – Asia has become an epicenter of WMD proliferation. In Asia, many weak and failed states tend to become bases for human/drug-trafficking and illicit WMD smuggling, with Burma and North Korea (DPRK) as prominent cases. As China continues to give military concessions to countries it procures as "pearls", it leaves behind a string of dangerous pearls armed with WMD. China is a leading arms supplier to Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, including nuclear weapons technology proliferation to the Asian littoral. In 2006 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's offered to provide Dhaka with nuclear reactor technology in an attempt to replicate in Bangladesh the sort of military, nuclear, and missile collaboration it has with Pakistan.<sup>21</sup> In this aspect China appears to be replicating in Asia its WMD footprint in the Middle East, where it has WMD and ballistic missile cooperation with its main energy suppliers of Saudi Arabia and Iran.<sup>22</sup>

China's relationship with resource-rich countries in the Middle East and well-documented WMD proliferation to these countries<sup>23</sup> lend insights into its re-

peated patterns towards countries in Asia and Africa where it has energy-related interests. With Saudi Arabia, China launched strategic relationship in the 1980s and sold intermediate-range missiles. With Iran, China nurtured military cooperation during the war with Iraq in the 1980s, including exports of silkworm cruise missiles. Iran relied on Chinese expertise for WMD programmes and delivery systems in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war, which supports their clandestine chemical and nuclear weapons programme.<sup>24</sup> China's other WMD client states in the Middle East include Syria and Libya.

In Africa, China also has a pattern of arms proliferation to oil producing countries. The top six oil producers in Africa are Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of Congo. Of these six countries, China has provided arms to four of them – Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Equatorial Guinea. It has not thus far provided arms to the Republic of Congo due to an international arms embargo.<sup>25</sup> In Sudan, China has invested more than \$8 billion in joint exploration contracts in this country, including a 900-mile pipeline to the Red Sea, deployed thousands of military personnel disguised as oil workers, and provided arms to Sudanese government to support it in the country's 20-year civil war.<sup>26</sup> These patterns in Asia, Middle East, and Africa suggest that China tends to be aggressive in seeking defence cooperation with countries that provide the bulk of their oil needs, with attendant negative spillover of WMD proliferation to these very countries and "pearls".

### String of Pearls and Challenges to the U.S. and her Allies

As Lt. Col. Pehrson posits in his study at the U.S. Army War College, the "String of Pearls" is more than a naval or military strategy or a regional strategy.

Pehrson argues that it is a manifestation of China's ambition to attain great power status and secure a self-determined, peaceful and prosperous future.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, China's activities suggest it has greater strategic intentions in the Asian region. With the two flash points of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait in Asia, and China's view of DPRK as a buffer against the U.S., Japan and South Korea and her goal to reunify Taiwan, the risk of Chinese intervention and inter-state conflict involving WMD cannot be ruled out. It behoves the international community to closely monitor China's activities in this region and to weigh CCP's declaratory policy with the empirical evidence of their actual behaviour. The case of DPRK's nuclear programme lends insights to gauge and measure the underlying intentions of an ambitious power.

It should come as no surprise that the DPRK nuclear test on 9 October 2006 was a disaster for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime. Despite numerous signs and indicators suggesting DPRK's nuclear test was imminent, the international community failed to act in a timely, concerted and determined manner to prevent the nuclear tests. Past indicators of DPRK's actions consistently and explicitly pointed towards their aim of becoming a nuclear power:

- In December 2002 DPRK removed IAEA monitoring devices from Yongbyon nuclear power plant;
- In January 2003 DPRK withdrew from the NPT;
- In October 2003 DPRK announced it had reprocessed nuclear fuel rods at Yongbyon nuclear reactor;
- In February 2005 DPRK declared it had built up 'nuclear weapons for self-defence'.<sup>28</sup>

Despite these clear indicators of DPRK's nuclear intentions, incredibly no one heeded these red flags. Admittedly China played a

<sup>21</sup> Mohan Malik, "China's Strategy of Containing India", PINR, 6 February 2006.

<sup>22</sup> Richard L. Russell, "China's WMD Foot in the Greater Middle East's Door" in *The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 3., Article 6, September 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles:

Policy Issues", CRS Report for Congress, 13 December 2007.

<sup>24</sup> Richard L. Russell, *Ibid*.

<sup>25</sup> Gal Luft, "Fueling the Dragon: China's race into the oil market", Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, <http://www.iags.org>.

<sup>26</sup> Esther Pan, "China, Africa and Oil", Council on Foreign Relations, 26 January 2007.

<sup>27</sup> Christopher J. Pehrson, *String of Pearls*, 2006, p.2.

<sup>28</sup> Masako Ikegami, "Asia in Global Security", SIPRI 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary, Asia Session "Global Powers, Global Threats", in Stockholm, 13 December 2006.

constructive role in advancing the Six Party Talks to try to resolve the nuclear issue and provided the forum as well as leadership to engage DPRK, since China shares similar concerns with the international community of maintaining a nuclear free Korean Peninsula to prevent the downside of potential Asian nuclear arms race, as well as the flood of illegal migration of North Koreans across Chinese borders should the Korean economy fail to improve. However, despite others' best efforts, once an actor is intent on striving for a goal that it *perceives* as necessary for its very survival, its consistent actions and behaviour is then a good and credible indicator for the international community to take it seriously. Similarly, China's consistent pattern of behaviour in maritime Asia merits the international community's serious consideration of China's greater regional hegemonic intentions in the Indian Ocean littoral.

### China's Strategic Intention

In addition to China's acquisition of its "String of Pearls", it is coupling this strategy with rapid military buildup and modernization of the PLA. Despite its rhetoric of a "defensive posture" and narrow aim of peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Straits, the PLA is acquiring military capabilities that extend beyond a Taiwan contingency. For example, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is procuring large amphibious assault ship with large stern helicopter flight deck and dock to accommodate four large cushion landing craft, also equipped with air defence and anti-surface weapons for self-defence which will improve PLAN sealift and power projection capabilities.<sup>29</sup>

Additionally, the PLA is also intensifying preparation for operations against Japan, which it assumes will provide logistic support to U.S. forces in a Taiwan contingency. In November 2004, PLAN nuclear submarine intruded into Japanese territorial waters and since August 2005, sus-

pected Chinese electronic warfare planes frequently violated Japan's designated air defence zones. Measured by cases whereby the Japanese Air Self-Defence Forces have scrambled against Chinese military aircraft, the frequency of air intrusions by PLA Air Force (PLAAF) have tripled from 13 occasions in 2004 to 107 times in 2005.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, in October 2006, PLAN submerged Song-class attack submarine shadowed undetected Japan-based U.S. aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk* in the East China Sea near Okinawa.

In May 2007 a fleet of Chinese warships departed for the Pacific Ocean via waters close to Okinawa, and in September 2007 Chinese Hong-6 bombers conducted military movements in the East China Sea within Taiwan and Japan's Air Defense Identification Zones which prompted Japan to scramble their F4 fighter jets.<sup>31</sup> Chinese bombers made more than 40 sorties in the airspace around the disputed Chunxiao gas fields, known as Shirakaba in Japanese, and SDF jets reacted by scrambling 12 times.<sup>32</sup> Clearly the strategic value for the Chinese of the area around the gas fields cannot be underestimated. This is followed in October 2007 of China's violation of Japanese territorial waters near Senkaku Islands that prompted an official protest by the Japanese government, and in November 2007 Chinese submarines surfaced in the middle of a U.S. Navy exercise in the East China Sea that caught the U.S. ships by surprise.<sup>33</sup>

China explains its military buildup as "deterrence" against Taiwan independence, but these repeated violations of Japanese territorial waters and designated air defence zone indicate more tell-tale signs of China's intention in

targeting U.S.-Japan security operations, which provides the only obstacle to China's ambition for forced reunification with Taiwan. Indeed, as Peter Dutton from the U.S. Naval War College testified, "China's efforts to alter the balance of maritime rights are part of its overall anti-access strategy that would have an impact on the perceived legitimacy of U.S. operations in the region, especially in times of crisis", such as in a Taiwan contingency.<sup>34</sup>

### Implications for U.S. and her Allies in the Indian Ocean

Given China's "String of Pearls" strategy and rapid military modernization, Japan, India, Australia, and the U.S. reacted by forming the "Quadrilateral Initiative" in May 2007 and engaged in a joint military exercise on 4 September 2007 in the Bay of Bengal.<sup>35</sup> Dubbed "The Quad", whose real architect is Japan's former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the inaugural meeting was held 25 May 2007 on the sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila to form "an Asian arc of freedom" stretching across the Indian and Pacific Ocean and providing a democratic bulwark against non-Democratic powers.<sup>36</sup> India partners with Japan in the concept of closer alliance among Japan, India, and the U.S..

In a recent article by Neha Kumar from Jawaharlal Nehru University, India is alarmed by China's aggressive naval modernization, especially nuclear submarines at Sanya on Hainan Islands that would affect three access points of the Indian Ocean/ China Sea region via the Straits of Singapore, Malacca, Sunda and Lombok, through which India has direct economic and strategic interests.<sup>37</sup> As such, Kumar echoes

<sup>30</sup>

<http://www.asahi.com/special/050410/Tky200604200260.html>

<sup>31</sup> Mark J. Valencia, "A Maritime Security Regime for Northeast Asia: Part I", *Policy Forum Online* 08-017A: 27 February 2008; Tsuyoshi Nojima, "China's sudden show of force sent SDF jets scrambling", *The Asahi Shimbun Taipei*, 2 January 2008.

<sup>32</sup> Tsuyoshi Nojima, *Asahi Shimbun Taipei*.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Peter A. Dutton, Associate Professor, China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "China's Views of Sovereignty and Methods of Access Control", 27 February 2008.

<sup>35</sup> Mahmud Ali, "New 'strategic partnership' against China", *BBC News*, 3 September 2007.

<sup>36</sup> Brahma Chellaney, "Quad Initiative: an in-harmonious concert of democracies", *The Japan Times*, 19 July 2007.

<sup>37</sup> Neha Kumar, "China's military power projection—a view from India", *World Security Network Newsletter*, 11 June 2008.

Shinzo Abe's call for "an Asian arc of freedom" and for the U.S. and India to develop strong alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia.<sup>38</sup>

However, China seemed to be threatened by this development and viewing "The Quad" as an "Asian NATO", demarched all four countries in the run-up to the joint military exercise. It did not succeed in changing Australia's mind under the Howard government, but nonetheless was able to cajole the incoming Rudd government to pull out of "The Quad" in February 2008 as well as reversed the Howard Government's policy of selling uranium to India.<sup>39</sup> All this has fuelled the underlying tension in Sino-Indian relations, as over the past few years India has repeatedly found herself pitted against China over issues in international organisation: China's worldwide campaign against India (and Japan) bids for permanent membership in the UNSC; disagreement over Iran's nuclear program in the IAEA; China's opposition to the July 2005 Indo-U.S. nuclear energy agreement and Indian membership in the Nuclear Supplier Group; Beijing's moves to confine India to periphery of the future East Asia community at the first East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur in mid December 2005; and emergence of pro-China axis with Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh at 13<sup>th</sup> SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) summit at Dhaka.<sup>40</sup>

Combined with Beijing employing economic and military means to draw India's surrounding nations into its orbit – Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and now seemingly Australia<sup>41</sup> – these tensions, coupled with India and China's rise as economic power houses in Asia, growing energy consumption, naval com-

petition for preeminence in the Indian Ocean pose risks for a potential military conflict.

### Conclusion

Despite the simultaneous rise of China and India in Asia, rather than being a challenge, this could provide a great opportunity for the West to cooperate and integrate both countries into a system of effective multilateralism.<sup>42</sup> It is important to mitigate tensions between Indo-China relations and integrate both countries into the international community. As two of the largest oil consumers, they need to be brought into international organisations such as the IEA, G8, OECD, as well as integrate them into a multi-lateral Asian regional security architecture. Constructive steps could include integrating China into global arrangements for collective oil stocks and reserve management with IEA, or even an Asian IEA as Japan has proposed. The U.S., E.U. and Asian countries could develop regional energy institutions to promote multilateral energy projects, and regional cooperation with APEC, SCO, ASEAN+3, ASEM, ARF – all of which could provide platform for a useful dialogue on energy.<sup>43</sup>

Without constructive engagement and dialogue, China may perceive a "containment" policy by the U.S. and others and thus use its growing energy influence to undermine Western foreign and security policies.<sup>44</sup> This would entail China's intensification to develop blue water capabilities in order to challenge U.S. control of energy SLOCs, expanding area of WMD proliferation, and additional acquisition of "pearls".

As Dr. Heinrich Kreft observes, this move would greatly concern Asian powers such as Japan, South Korea, ASEAN countries, India, and may propel them to an arms race and increased WMD

proliferation/clash in the Asia region.<sup>45</sup> It is thus imperative that the international community engages in constructive cooperation to address energy issues to realise a peaceful rise of both India and China, and not regress into an environment of mistrust, misperception, zero-sum mentality and competitive "beggar-thy-neighbour" policies reminiscent of 1930s that set the stage for World War II.

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## THEMEN

### Combating Terrorism in Africa

#### Political and Economic environment to 2015

The underlying structural causes of state weakness in sub-Saharan Africa – relatively low population densities, problematic population distribution and poor infrastructure will remain ubiquitous through 2015 and beyond, impeding the prospects of significant gains in broad based institution building and development. Much will depend upon two external drivers of development and growth – foreign direct investment (FDI) and aid flows – whose distribution across the continent will continue to be uneven, maintaining a situation in which nodes of promise sit side by side with zones of weak governance and in which some other countries stubbornly refuse to respond to external efforts to stimulate growth and development.

While it is relatively easy to forecast which countries will fall into these different areas, Africa's ex-

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Bhartendu Kumar Singh, "China, India and Australian politics of 'Quad'", *Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies*, 18 February 2008.

<sup>40</sup> Charu Lata Hogg, "India and its neighbours: Do economic interests have the potential to build peace?", A Chatham House Report in association with International Alert, October 2007.

<sup>41</sup> Dr. Mohan Mali, "China's Strategy of Containing India", PINR, 6 February 2006.

<sup>42</sup> Heinrich Kreft, "India and China—The New Drivers of Global Change", *Institute für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung, Berlin (ISPSW)*, 23 January 2007.

<sup>43</sup> Heinrich Kreft, "China's Energy Security Conundrum", *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Fall 2006, p.119.

<sup>44</sup> Heinrich Kreft, "China's Quest for Energy", *Policy Review*, October/November 2006, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

perience over the past decade underlines the extent to which there is no room for complacency. Likewise many of the new generation of African leaders hailed in the mid-1990s – those from Ruanda, Uganda and Ethiopia, in particular – have since become a source for disappointment, instinctively reverting to methods of authoritarian political and economic control provoked by weak institutions. Others such as Mozambique and Liberia have exceeded expectations and others such as Botswana, Ghana and Tanzania have quietly got on with the business of reforms.

The failures are most likely to include those countries in historically-rooted zones of weak governance such as the Central African Republic (CAR) or the Congo (DRC). Improved mechanisms for managing intra-state conflict should prevent the re-emergence of top-down conflict. However, social transformations connected to globalisation and local demographic pressures will continue to favour violence as the principle means for resolving disputes at a local level. This will be most felt in the Sahelian region, reaching from the Sudanese province of Darfur in the east, across the CAR, southern Chad, northern Cameroon, Mali and Niger. The tri-border area between Sudan, Uganda and Kenya is also at risk of developing into a zone of entrenched social conflict.

While certain continental trends, such as rapid urbanisation and the deepening of the HIV/AIDS crisis seem to imply a homogenisation of the African continent south of the Sahara, the assessment is that Africa will in fact become less homogenous in the medium term. The differences between countries will become more entrenched, despite enduring risks of cross-border destabilisation. The economic and political pre-eminence of Nigeria and South Africa will persist, though both seem set to undergo significant change. Nigeria will seek to strengthen institutions and mediate secessionist tendencies and South Africa will seek to moderate accusations of regional domination. Encouraged by this it is to

be expected that the international community will seek to empower the AU as a peacekeeping force and diplomatic broker, however political divisions between African nations will prevent the AU from developing into a truly effective force.

### **Failed and Fragile States in Africa**

According to the British government's Department for International Development, failed and fragile states are today home to more than 900m people, half of whom live in severe poverty. This poses a significant threat to international security as such states offer a safe haven for illicit trade, drugs-production and weapons-smuggling. Corruption presents an endemic problem and the global result is likely to be regional spill over of the effects of conflict, terrorism and a failure to manage epidemic diseases.

A high proportion of such countries are to be found in Africa. Highly fragile African States are the following:

- Central African Republic
- Chad
- Congo (DRC)
- Somalia
- Sudan

Those displaying signs of fragility are:

- Burundi
- Congo
- Eritrea
- Ethiopia
- Guinea-Bissau
- Liberia
- Nigeria
- Sao Thome and Principe
- Sierra Leone
- Yemen
- Zimbabwe

The problem of weak and failing states is significantly more dangerous than is generally understood as these unstable regions are a breeding ground for organised crime and terrorism. A case study is that of the greater Horn of Africa which includes Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya and Uganda. Two clusters of conflict emanating from specific states continue to destabilise the region. The first centres on inter-

locking rebellions in Sudan and affects northern Uganda, eastern Chad and north-eastern Central African Republic. The main culprits are the Sudanese government, which is supporting rebels in these three neighbouring countries; and those states which are supporting Sudanese groups opposing Khartoum. This conflict is driven by the Sudanese wish to prevent a fragmentation of the country. The second cluster links the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the power struggle in Somalia, which involves the secular government, anti-government clan militias and anti-Islamic warlords. Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in December 2006 temporarily secured the transitional government's position, but this appears to have sown the seed for a future Islamic and clan-based insurgency, with regional implications.

Such states offer terrorists space to train and recruit dissatisfied followers. Given that such countries are "no-go areas" for government troops, they are also a safe haven to retreat to between operations, much as northern Pakistan is today for the Taliban operating in Afghanistan. Furthermore, such states also offer the possibility of financing terrorism through the exploitation of natural wealth.

### **Terrorism in Africa**

The decision by the Pentagon to create a separate Africa Command is the clearest indication that the US Military and other branches of the US Government view sub-Saharan Africa as a growing Islamic terrorist threat. This decision was driven in the main by the realisation that the fragmented nature of the US military intelligence gathering and regional security training efforts were failing to meet the growing threat posed by expanding Islamic networks in East and Southern Africa, the strong presence of radical Islamic groups in Somalia and the growing presence of Iranian-backed groups tied to Hezbollah, at times cooperating with al Qaeda, in West Africa. An essay in Sada al-Jihad, an on line magazine which supports the global jihad, specifically



outlines al Qaeda's interest in expanding into sub-Saharan Africa as the general weakness of central government and high levels of corruption make it easier to operate in Africa than in countries which have effective security, intelligence and military capacities.

Further complicating the strategic situation in Africa are the vast cultural and ethnic differences across geographic boundaries making the gathering and interpretation of intelligence difficult. For example, the Sunni-Salafist groups are seeking to build a network of jihadist groups to establish an Islamic caliphate. Saudi Arabia has been investing millions of dollars in the building of Salafist mosques, often staffed by imams who repudiate the more tolerant Sufi version of Islam historically practiced in much of Africa. This tolerant form of Islam is being swept aside by the militant form of Islam imported from the Middle East with reverberations that will be felt throughout the region.

In contrast to the Sunni-Salafist groups, which are supported by al Qaeda, the radical Shiite Groups are tied to Lebanon and Hezbollah through family and business networks. This grouping is supported by Iran in order to expand its economic reach into Africa. Each year an estimated \$200m is collected from the Lebanese Diaspora in Africa and used to finance Hezbollah.

### Counter-Terrorism Strategies

Strategies designed to decapitate networks through removing key figures in the movement are unlikely to force real changes, particularly in terms of Islamic extremism as the ideology of the movement has been disseminated and absorbed to the extent that there is little dependence on individuals to spearhead and focus it.

The fight against terrorism is not a job which can be undertaken by one single agency, it requires team work and input from a wide range of national and international organisations including law enforcement agencies, the military, the intelligence services, the

financial sector, the diplomatic service and health organisations. The key to success is Organisation, Cooperation and Coordination.

A pre requisite for success is good governance. This is central to the effective administration of a state's resources, the rule of law, and the development of a strong civil society. Only if such a structure is in place can the war against terror, which is fuelled by dissatisfaction and ignorance, be won.

It is of interest to note that those countries which have good governance are successful in fighting terrorism. Whilst the threat of terrorism remains in Western Europe, it has been countered effectively by a multitude of interlocking measures and international cooperation. Numerous terrorist plots have been uncovered at an early stage thus preventing attacks on innocent citizens and deterring future attempts to create terrorist incidents. Intelligence is the most important tool in this battle, however being able to act in a timely and effective manner on intelligence gathered is equally important.

Diplomacy in the fight against terrorism should not be ignored. Whilst it might be too late for diplomacy in the case of fighting against al Qaeda, diplomatic approaches to other terrorist organisations, especially at an early stage of development can produce results. The IRA, after all, was not defeated solely of the streets of Belfast but in meeting rooms in Ireland and the UK.

Any attempt to fight terrorism in an effective manner must therefore take this into account. In the case of Africa this is probably the biggest problem as in too many instances terrorist organisations are based in regions or countries where good governance and functioning ministries are wishful thinking, in some cases it is the government itself which is a part of the problem.

### Possible Solutions

Possibly the concept of good governance is too opaque to be of practical use as many African

countries haven't had a widely held and detailed definition of what constitutes good governance. Otto von Bismarck reportedly stated that "politics is the art of the possible". However performance must be judged against objective criteria and these are missing. Thus in a first step it would seem necessary to initiate the drawing up of such criteria with the aim of creating an environment in which necessary cooperation between various agencies and ministries at national and international level becomes possible. This is very much a "hearts and mind" exercise aimed at the public sector and not an easy one.

Parallel to this it should be possible to organise meetings and workshops at a national level, involving the armed forces and security organisations and the Ministry of the Interior with the aim of practising cooperation. Such meetings would undoubtedly result in small but significant successes, thus further encouraging future cooperation. Foreign experts could play a role here by mediating and providing expert advice.

It must be realised that such a radical departure from the manner in which counter terrorist activities are being conducted will be a painful and long drawn out process. It therefore needs to be mentored by a neutral agency such as IGAD rather than the AU in the form of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism. It also needs to be backed by legitimate national interests with sufficient power to counteract turf wars.

The role model at a national level is the UK's COBRA (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) which is highly effective and able to take the necessary decisions to mitigate terrorist threats. It also cuts through red tape and has reduced time to action significantly, making COBRA probably the most effective crisis management organisation active in counter terrorism today. It is backed by a well functioning domestic and international Intelligence Service, a respected Diplomatic Service,

experienced Police and well trained Special Forces on stand by at all times. Emulating this might take time and a great deal of effort, but it would seem that the combination of good national governance and the ability to bring the power of the state to confront the terrorist threat is the only solution remaining.

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## INTERVIEW

### Countering Terrorism in Africa

Interview with Maxim Worcester by Dr. Peter Roell

*ISPSW: How do you see the terrorist threat in Africa?*

**MW:** The potential problems we are facing are compounded by the sheer size of the continent. If you just take sub Saharan Africa, which is larger than the US, Europe, India and China combined and include 34 of the poorest countries in the world then the problem is daunting.

Much of the subcontinent has a strong, traditional Islamic presence and the mosaic of societal structures is little understood. These factors combine to present a set of challenges for intelligence gathering and long-term policy setting. Add to this the number of failed and failing states in the region, many of which are experiencing civil war or serious unrest and the various agendas which the terrorist organisations are pursuing and you have a highly complex and volatile situation.

Osama bin Laden in a statement in July 2006 clearly singled out Somalia as an important jihadist front of the future and that is clearly the case today in 2008. In spite of the Ethiopian intervention the country is in the grip of Islamic fundamentalists and there is much reason for pessimism.

At the root of the problem is the continued failure of the intelligence community to understand the role of the clan, family and sub-clan structure that govern Somali life. The jihadists understand these structures and know how to mobilise, motivate and use these forces to their advantage, particularly in the urban area of Mogadishu. The Somali government thought it had defeated the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2007 when the fighters melted away into the bush in a classic terrorist move only to reappear once the government let its guard down.

Today anarchy rules the streets of Mogadishu and up to 20.000 people are fleeing the city every month. Due to the violence aid agencies upon whom the refugees depend are leaving the country and of the promised 8000 African Union peacekeepers only 2400 are in place and are to all intent spectators.

Ethiopia, well aware that further turmoil in Somalia could spill over into their country is trying to fill the vacuum which is resulting in resentment amongst the Somali population. This opposition to the Ethiopian presence has in turn led to the creation of the Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ALS), an unlikely alliance of the ICUs youth and military wing, the al-Shabab, clan heads, Members of Parliament and religious leaders. Whilst al-Shahab and the ICU deny that they have any al Qaeda links diplomats do not share this view and the US Government has placed al-Shabab on its list of foreign terrorist organisations.

Somalia very clearly illustrates the problems we are facing in Africa in the fight against terrorist organisations. We are not dealing with one single terrorist organisation but with alliances of groupings which also include terrorist organisations, some of which are Islamic. Thus the biggest problem we are facing is understanding the dynamics of the situation at a regional, national and international level. Understanding the enemy will become increasingly vital.

*ISPSW: In February of 2008 Henry Okah, a Nigerian activist, was extradited to Nigeria by the Angolan Government. He stands accused of delivering arms to at least 5 organisations in Nigeria. Does this represent arms trafficking or the support of a terrorist organisation?*

**MW:** Well, firstly Okah's extradition is probably illegal as no extradition treaty exists between the two countries. Besides the arms running charge he also stand accused of being a leading member of MEND, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. This organisation seeks to ensure that the ethnic minorities in the region benefit from the oil revenues, however more serious is the potential secessionist movement behind this demand.

Like in Sudan, the Nigerian Government fears a fragmentation of the country more than anything else. In the case of Nigeria this is even more significant than in Sudan as all the oil wealth is in this disputed area and memories of Biafra are still very much in the mind of the Nigerian politicians. At all cost do they want to prevent this happening again.

MEND have clearly stated that Okah is for a peaceful solution to the problem of unequal distribution of the oil wealth and consider him a hero of the rebellion against the Nigerian government and the oil industry which they accuse of usurping their oil wealth, destroying their environment and impoverishing the local population.

The Nigerian government makes no distinction between armed or peaceful opposition to the status quo, however, as the case of Ken Saro-Wiwa illustrates. He led a non-violent campaign against the oil companies and was hanged after a flawed murder trial. MEND cannot be compared to terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda. The latter are indiscriminate in their fight to achieve their aims. MEND, whilst violent, focuses its attentions on those who in their view exploit the region. In the eyes of the Nigerian government Okah is a terrorist and a gun run-

ner, in the region he is a Nigerian Robin Hood.

The example of Okah illustrates the problems we are up against in the fight against terrorism in Africa very well. He is very much in the mould of the colonial freedom fighters who ended up running the continent following the departure of the colonial powers in the 60s. Kenyatta was labelled a terrorist as was Mugabe and let's not forget Nelson Mandela. Today's terrorist often turns out to be tomorrow's respected leader, no more so than in Africa. The Nigerian government would be well advised not to make him a martyr but to use his influence in order to negotiate a solution to the real problems the country faces.

*ISPSW: You advise Governments in Africa in their fight against terrorism. Why do they turn to you rather than say the British or German Government?*

**MW:** Well, they don't turn to me; they turn to organisations and individuals who can give independent advice. African Governments also receive a great deal of support in their fight against terrorism from western Governments, including the UK and Germany. What independent consultants offer is advice which has no national baggage and which can therefore in certain cases provide more realistic advice than a Government can.

Sudan, for example, is still on the US watch list of countries which support terrorist organisations. Nevertheless, there is still cooperation between the two countries in the fight against international terrorism. It would however be very difficult for the US government, for domestic political reasons, to openly advise the Sudanese government. I also think that it would be quite difficult to provide objective advice in such a situation, I am also sure that any advice given would not be taken at face value as the underlying reason for the advice would be questioned by those in Sudan opposed to US Government policy.

A further reason is the wide spread perception that western societies do not respect Africa in general and Moslems specifically. Add to this the support for Israel by the West, the involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan and you will have some of the reasons why African Governments also turn to independent consultants for advice.

Western governments can and do provide support in training anti-terrorist units in the fight against terrorism and also provide relevant intelligence. At the same time, intelligence agencies in African countries also contribute to the flow of information. What is much trickier is to provide advice on necessary political reforms to prevent terrorism as this can be seen as an involvement in domestic political processes. Here consultants can provide a valuable service.

*ISPSW: Early warning of terrorist attacks is a challenge for all security services. You also make reference to the poor governance record in some African countries, inefficient ministries and lack of effective coordination between government agencies and ministries. How can security experts help resolve these problems?*

**MW:** Knowing what will happen in advance is obviously part of the solution. In Western Europe the security services have a good track record in uncovering attacks before they take place, as we saw in Germany last year in the case of the suitcase bombers. This however only works if one has informers or the manpower available to conduct discrete observation over a long period of time. This is not a skill which one can acquire overnight, nor is it easy.

It also depends upon cast iron security within the agencies conducting observations. That is not the case in many African countries where the Government itself has no clear agenda in fighting terrorism. In some instances members of the Government are a part of the problem thus making covert observation difficult at best. This is why good govern-

ance is a prerequisite for effective counter terrorist measures. There is no simple answer to this fundamental problem. If there were, we would have found it by now.

Good governance is central to the effective administration of a states resources (that includes the servants of the state), the rule of law, the creation of a functioning private sector and the development of a strong civil society. Without this in place there can be no really successful anti terrorist programme.

The lack of a well functioning civil service, armed forces and security services also means that crisis mitigation following an attack is largely uncoordinated and ineffective. This can conceivably lead to the response to an attack being more damaging than the attack itself.

Security experts can only help in continuously pointing this out to African governments and making clear what the economic, social and security consequences are of poor governance. They can help in training crisis response teams and also in the learning of basic security procedures. One can provide officers with the necessary command and management skills and the tactical knowledge to be in a position to counter a terrorist threat at the operational and tactical level. Soldiers can be trained to respond to terrorist attacks in a measured manner. Security services can also learn how to gather and interpret intelligence and how to act on such information. The chain, however, is only as strong as its weakest link and currently in Africa that weak link is weak or divided governments caused by a lack of sound governance.

*ISPSW: COBRA in the UK is a model which you believe works well. Could such an organisation work for an African country?*

**MW:** I see no reason why that should not be the case, in fact it makes a great deal of sense to use COBRA as a bench mark. However I would like to remind you of what I just said about the

lack of governance in many African nations, without that in place a COBRA like organisation could not be really effective. COBRA is a decision making authority which receives intelligence, interprets the intelligence and issues instructions to the relevant authorities such as the Police, the Armed Forces, the Security Services etc. It does not micromanage the event but depends upon others to act as it instructs. It depends upon having a range of well trained and loyal people from various organisations who will carry out its decisions.

*ISPSW: You mention the role the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) plays in resolving some of the problems you addressed in your article. How can European experts support this effort?*

**MW:** Firstly I believe that IGAD can and should play a strong role in bringing better governance to Africa. This to me is one of the most important challenges facing the continent today. As I have said, this lack of governance is the root cause of poverty, inequality, poor health care and many of the other problems which Africa faces today. Lack of governance is the main cause of terrorism and also a hindrance in the fight against terrorism. Africa must take ownership of this development and needs to set its own benchmarks which might very well differ from those set by European nations. European experts can play a supporting role in this process by passing on specific skills which can be used by African governments. In a free economy a corporation can either decide to make a product it might need or to buy it from another supplier or even competitor. Africa cannot buy good governance from Europe; it has to make good governance by itself. European experts can advise on how best to do so, but no more than that.

*Dr. Peter Roell, Berlin*

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## THEMEN

# The Al-Shabab' Al-Mujahidiin – A Profile of the first Somali Terrorist Organisation

## The Institutional Structure

The Al-Shabab' Al-Mujahidiin is an off-shoot of Somalia's recent Islamic Courts Union which evolved from a grass-roots community driven Islamic Jihad movement inspired by Somali Islamic scholars who were trained in Saudi Arabia as Wahhabi sect followers.

It is an active, armed, politicized fanatical group that nominally operates under the ICU flag. Over 95% of its leadership and rank and file are from the Central Regions. It is a very flexible organization with multiple cells that has no specifically written or declared program other than creating and imposing strictly Islamic Wahhabi doctrine in Somalia, and with the express aim of expanding it to the rest of the Horn of Africa in time, and eventually into various corners of the Africa continent (proper).

*Al-Shabab'* and a few other Islamic extremists in Somalia including the ICU have their roots in the former Al-Itihad Al-Islamiya which also evolved from Somalia's religious organization, the Al-Salafiya Al-jadiid in the early 1970's. Al-Salafiya Al-jadiid was defeated by the former Somali President (General) Mohamed Siyad Barre) in the late 1970's and Al-itihad Al-Islamiya in Somalia was defeated by Col. Abdulahi Yusuf, the present Somali president, during the early 1990's in the North East region of Somalia and later by the Ethiopian military in the Gedo region in Somalia.

## The new Al-Shabab' Leadership

The new Al-Shabab' Leadership is decentralized, often with loosely coordinated levels of leadership that revolve around local villages and religious leaders who are guided by these scholars for interpretations of the meaning

of the Jihad and the Qur'an in specific terms as well as for the guidance of the armed conflict against the TFG and Ethiopian security forces and other African peace keeping forces present in Mogadishu. In the past, they used to be in conflict with traditional religious leaders but the radicals seem to have overpowered them now.

In December 2007, the Al-Shabab' website announced that the group had designated a new leader, or 'Amir', named Sheikh Mukhtar Abdirahman 'Abu Zubeyr' – is one of the shabaab's better known, more radical figure Mukhtar Afgaduud (Isaq/Habar Jeclo). In practice, however, the Shabaab appear to function as several largely autonomous commands: *Shabaab* International/Benadir headed by Adan Hashi Ayrow, is active in Mogadishu and central Somalia.

Another, led by Shabaab spokesman Mukhtar Roobow 'Abu Mansuur' operates mainly in the Bay and Bakool regions, and a third group, led by Hassan Abdillahi 'Turki', operates mainly in Lower and Middle Jubba regions in the South. So far the following are most active and known principal leaders of the organization with some of the names and pictures of the Al-Shabab' leadership, where possible:



Sheikh Mukhtar Robow Ali, (Abu-Mansur) the spiritual leader and spokesman

## Summary of personal background:

Born in 1969, in Hodur, Bakool region of Somalia. 1996-Opened the first professional Islamic militant training camp in Hodur. 1998 – Lead the fight in Gedo region Islamic movement and the war against the Ethiopian military in the Luq and Gedo region. 2001-2002 – travelled to Afghanistan for military training and partici-

pated in the Afghanistan war against the American military. 2002-2004 – Rumoured to have been in Scandinavia as a refugee, probably in Finland. In 2006 nominated as the vice Chairman, internal security, Islamic Courts Union. In 2008 nominated as the main spokesman for Al-Shabab' Al-Mujaahidiin.

**Sheikh Aadan Haashi Ayrow**  
(Abu Muhsin Al Ansaari)

Adan H. Ayrow is the present supreme military commander of Al-Shabab'. He is currently involved in the ongoing conflict and leading most of the assassinations, car-bombing and other military operations of Al-Shabab'. Not much of his history is known other than to have undergone considerable Islamic teaching in Saudi Arabia and having travelled to Afghanistan, and possibly Chechnya, for Jihad in the past.

**Sheikh Fu'ad Mohamed Khalaf**



Fu'ad Mohamed Khalaf is key strategist of Al-Shabab'



Emblem Al-Shabab'

The Al-Shabab' Emblem is as above. A young man pointing an RPG, the Koran guarded by two guns with Somalia's map in the background. The map includes parts of Ethiopia and Kenya.

The Fundamental Nature and Objectives of Al-Shabab', its Ideology and Institutional Strategic Positions

*Strategic objectives*

Its principal objective is to establish a Somali Caliphate of the

Wahhabi Islamic sect in Somali-inhabited regions of the Horn of Africa through and by way of militarized intervention by taking advantage of the vacuum in Somalia's failed statehood and by using the Ethiopian and United States strategic interventions in Somalia as rallying points and a motivating element among Somali youth as a driving force for recruitment and national sentiment of discontent.

*Ideology*

Catering to the violent and often destructive methods of committing violent operations, the organization believes in creating a nucleus of Wahhabi sect stronghold in Somalia that would create an Islamic State of the Somalis in Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia.

*Inspirations*

The organization aspires to take over Somalia and spill-over it's ideology throughout the Horn of Africa and onwards to the Central, South and Eastern Africa at large. The organization aims to remove Western influence in the Horn of Africa and eventually in Africa while spreading Wahhabi Islamic beliefs and, in the process, liquidate all other forms of traditional Islam that has been the norm in most parts of east Africa.

**Methods of Recruitment and Publicizing of Islamic Extremism in Somalia by Al-Shabab' plus Al-Shabab''s Resources in Finances, Manpower and Review of it's Strategies to Generate Resources**

Al-Shabab' Al-Mujahidiin is closely associated, if not an integral part of Al-Qaida, militarily and ideologically, in the Horn of Africa. Trying to understand Al-Shabab''s financial means and resources without giving due attention how Islamic extremist at the global level is financed is simply not an applicable nor valid assumption in understanding how Al-Shabab' sustains itself financially and economically. To understand how Jihad sustains the spread of Wahhabism in the Horn of Africa through proxy organizations such as the Al-Shabab' Al-Mujahidiin of Somalia, one needs to understand the very fundamen-

tal doctrines of Financial Jihad in Islamic Wahhabism. This section of the paper concentrates on the general and specific aspects of this subject.

Generally speaking, global offensive against terrorism financing has only marginally succeeded in reducing the extent of global terrorism. Under the surface, the financial channels that are the arteries of radical Islamic movements continue to evolve, mutate and operate continuously, rapidly changing and morphing using both high tech and low tech survival mechanisms.

Global pressure has managed to force Islamic financiers to alter their pattern of operations, but the substance of their support persists – in a financial jihad that backs the wider global jihad against the "infidels", nations and people that do not believe or accept Islamic extremism and radical minded Jihadist ideologies.

Many terrorism experts often miss the point when hunting down terrorism financing, as they focus on external, high tech and organized financing. In most cases, and especially in East Africa, terror financing is mainly a "local loop", community based grass-roots support structure that help these elements to prevail. As for the Somali As-Shabaab Al-Mujahidin, the local mosques, local religious leaders, and local community networks provide the bulk of long term financial support for their logistical and operational needs. Mostly in kind, food, water, shelter, clothing and to some extent extensive sympathy among local communities as they bring some form of justice to the locals and do not abuse ordinary Somalis as does the TFG and other powers such as warlords and corrupt politicians.

The lack of TFG functioning institutions and incompetent officials often drives clan communities towards collective support for the Jihadists, thus secure a degree of continuing food and material support. Financing of military hardware is not a problem for Al-Shabab'. Soldiers defecting from the Somali government, due to ill treatment and abject neglect, of-

ten allow the insurgents to acquire extensive military hardware from the TFG security forces, which is supplied by the Ethiopian military. Hardware lost to the insurgents in many recent encounters confirms this.

The Al-Shabab' Al-Mujahidiin therefore do not depend on external financing for military hardware. In fact, they have surplus which enables them to replenish and supply new recruits. The Al-Shabab' civilian infrastructure is comprised of economic, educational, and social units that serve the group at the grass-roots level. The very nature of low tech combat operations serves them as an efficient and effective force. One of the major advantages of Al-Shabab' effectiveness is that they do not chew the corruptive Chat, or Qat as locally known. Qat chewing is the main cause of problems for the Somali military. And the main reason why Somali soldiers loot business, rob people and commit nightly raids against innocent business is to get money for Qat. Al-Shabab' does not have this problem which saves money and earns them a positive reputation and consistency as well as making them reliable and predictable in negotiations. To some extent, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states remain the most significant source of external funds flowing to Somalia's Al-Shabab' Al-Mujahidin and other radical Islamist movements in the Horn of Africa through Dubai. In most cases, "charitable foundations" linked to radical Islam in Somalia, as well as a careful examination of the radical Islamic funding, indicate a continuing flow of funds directly from official Saudi organizations to these Horn of Africa terror organisations. For example, The World Assembly for Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and Somali businesses in the Gulf States, Europe and the United States as well as Australia and New Zealand and as far as Malaysia and Singapore are active financiers of radical Islamic movements in the Horn of Africa's financial Jihad.

Intelligence services should devote more attention and re-

sources to uncovering how terrorist organizations avoid local and international control mechanisms by operating through "innocent" front groups.

Islamic Wahhabi scholars who are considered to be mentors of terrorist movements attribute great importance to "suicide attacks in the path of Allah," describing them as the highest level of jihad resource against the "enemies of Islam." And prominent radical Saudi scholars, routinely calls upon all Muslims to salvage their brothers in worldwide Jihad as "the pinnacle of jihad," and that "*The jihad of our Muslim brothers world wide is glorious jihad in the path of Allah, designed to defend the Islamic Holy Places, to remove injustice, and to restore their land and the Muslims' land into the Hands of Muslims.*"

Since the Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia, the unprecedented phenomenon of Al-Shabab' Al-Mujahidiin growth in Somalia has offered an inspiring new model of jihad for Islamic terrorist movements in the Horn of Africa.

Saudi scholars whose Wahhabi Islamic edicts were adopted by As-Shabaab Al-Mujahidin and global Al-Qaeda at large, determine that "*the highest and most exalted degree [in jihad] is the self-sacrificing jihad [martyrdom], as it is the most difficult for warriors, demanding of them the greatest self-sacrifice of martyrdom. According to Wahhabism, the reward promised by God to the martyrs is well-known [marriage to 72 virgins, the right to intercede with God to bring (sponsor) 70 family members to Heaven, and enjoying the pleasures of Heaven] and is based on the premise that [self-sacrificing jihad] brings about the decisive submission of the enemy...imposing "terror" on him and breaking his spirit. Thus, victory is achieved.*"

In fact, the recent United States designation of Al-Shabab' Al-Mujahidin as a terrorist organization was welcomed by the organization. Because, according to Sheikh Mukhtar Roobow, As-

Shabaab's spokesman and spiritual leader, "*terrorizing non-Muslims who come to your land (Somalia) is a religious obligation*". He was quoted as clearly enjoying the profile he believes As-Shabaab has been "promoted" as terrorizing as what he calls "American-backed Ethiopian invaders" and showed no regrets nor remorse but glorification of his organization in the eyes of God. He says "*while the greatest evil calls us terrorist, God calls us the undefeatable Mujahidiin*". He adds "*anyone America calls a terrorist is one step closer to God's glory and reward as a good Muslim who defends Islam and resources of Muslims world wide against America*".

This gave Mukhtar Roobow a strong profile to capitalize on at the local and among other Jihadists-to-be in the region and a call to solicit and justify that they need more financial and material support from the global Umma of Islam. Apparently, since the United States designated Al-Shabab' as a terrorist organization, many southern Somalis who simply don't like the Ethiopian military in Somalia joined the front including scores of heavily equipped government soldiers from the South.

Regardless of how moderate Muslims simplify the source of Wahhabi Islamic Jihad financing, the Islamic sources of financial jihad orders and instructions are found in the Qur'an, often intertwined with self-sacrificing jihad. The importance attributed to financial jihad in Islam is illustrated in some of the following Quranic chapters.

- A. "Go forth, light-armed and heavy-armed, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah! That is best for you if ye but knew." -al-Tawba (Repentance), Chapter 9, verse 41
- B. "Those who believe, and have left their homes and striven with their wealth and their lives in Allah's way are of much greater worth in Allah's sight. These are they who are triumphant." -al-Tawba (Repentance), Chapter 9, verse 20

- C. "O ye who believe! Shall I show you a commerce that will save you from a painful doom? Ye should believe in Allah and His messenger, and should strive for the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives. That is better for you, if ye did but know." -al-Saff (the ranks, battle arrays), Chapter 61, verse 10-11
- D. "The (true) believers are only those who believe in Allah and His messenger and afterward doubt not, but strive with their wealth and their lives for the cause of Allah. Such are the sincere." – al-Hujraat (the private apartments, the inner apartments), Chapter 49, verse 15.
- E. "Alms are only for the poor and the needy, and the officials (appointed) over them, and those whose hearts are made to incline (to truth) and the (ransoming of) captives and those in debt and in the way of Allah and the wayfarer; an ordinance from Allah; and Allah is knowing, Wise." - al-Tawba (Repentance), Chapter 9, verse 60

Islamic scholars are unanimous in their interpretation of these verses regarding the centrality and importance of financial jihad as part of Allah's jihad commandment to Muslims imbedded in the Quran. Some interpretations note the verses' internal order, in which "wealth" precedes "lives," as evidence of the significance of financial jihad and, in certain circumstances, its precedence over self-sacrificing of life for jihad. However much the West tries to impose or impress Saudi Arabia to stop terror financing, it is an edict and a Quranic order to finance Jihad. And this will continue as such. This also applied to Somalis and other Muslims in the US, the EU etc to contribute to Jihad.

Defining jihad in Qur'an and in Islam, is not confined merely to waging war with arms, but includes several other aspects of support for "holy war." Islamic scholars specify these as: Al-Jihad bi-al-Lisan-Jihad of the Tongue, and al-Jihad bi-al-Qalam

-Jihad of the Pen, namely preaching and calling for jihad. Jihad al-Nafs -Jihad of the Soul - the personal struggle to avoid sin and adhere to Allah's commandment Al-Jihad bi-al-Nafs – Self-sacrificing Jihad in the path of Allah Al-Jihad bi-al-Mal – Financial Jihad: fundraising for needy Muslims and supporting the jihad warriors – the mujahidin. This is all extreme Islamic doctrine which the simple minds cannot distinguish since their knowledge of Islamic teachings is limited.

Southern Somali communities contribute to Al-Shabab' in the form of Zakat for the benefit of Jihad in Southern Somalia against Ethiopians, TFG and other non violent Muslims.

Praising the merits of financial jihad, Muslim scholars also rely on Islamic tradition (hadith) attributed to the Prophet Mohammad, which assures Muslims who donate money for jihad the same reward in Heaven as the mujahidin themselves. According to hadith: "*One [Muslim] who equips a person on his way to raid [to the enemy's camps] in Allah's path [jihad] is considered to have the same status as the raider [mujahid]. One [Muslim] who substitutes [the raider] concerning his family and [taking care of their needs] with good deeds is considered to have the same status as the raider [mujahid].*" Technically therefore, whether we like it or not, Muslims (provided the council of learned Sheikhs approves) are required to participate in the Jihad. Al-Shabab' is only an armed operation. Others who contribute all the other resources mentioned above also believe they are in the Jihad. (In the case of Somalia, Jihad may be used euphemistically for clan cause).

As an example, the supporters of Al-Shabab' in the US and Europe find government resources in welfare, food stamps and other assistance such as income tax returns as easily convertible resource for Jihad in Southern Somalia. And it certainly does find its way into the Al-Shabab'.

In all practical terms, financial jihad is designed to sustain self-sacrificing jihad and enable it to

achieve its goals on the battlefield. Major Wahhabi Islam proponent institutions such as the Al-Medina University (Saudi Arabia), strongly teach Muslims, moderate or extreme, the duty to support the global mujahidin, determined that "*financial jihad applies to all Muslims in accordance with each person's capability. No excuse can dismiss anyone from donating money to the mujahidin and their families...as they are in urgent need of food, medication, clothing, weapons, and other [basic] necessities of life.*" Wahhabism views financial jihad as a vital means for the mujahidin in financing their military activity (purchasing weapons, etc.) and at the same time in securing proper social conditions for the families of the mujahidin, the widows and the orphans, who are willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Islamic Wahhabism.

Wahhabi Muslims are instructed that financial jihad is designed to assure mutual indemnity among Muslims and the commitment of Muslims to their warriors, the Mujahidin. Wahhabi Muslims are instructed to "*financially support the families of the mujahidin who joined the call for jihad and left behind them their women and children who are in desperate need of money and basic necessities of life such as food, drink, and accommodation.*"

Similarly, in Wahhabi Islam, financial jihad commandment given by God is intended "*to calm the mujahidin's [worries] by demonstrating that there are those [Muslims] who practice financial jihad and do not skimp on money for their families, even if they have fallen on the battlefield or their houses are damaged or destroyed.*" The Somali and Ethiopian military recently destroyed houses and property belonging to the Al-Shabab' participants. This generated massive influx of money and food as well as massive call to join the Jihad. This was and remains a serious strategic trap and mistake in the part of the Somali and Ethiopian commanders to target families and punish children, mothers and relatives of the Al-Shabab'. It had only created anger and massive

support for the Al-Shabab' movement.

Main principles that deal with Al-Shabab's financial Jihad for example as a doctrine to motivate local Somalis to contribute is:

- a) Financing the Al-Shahaab jihad – Somalis can join in jihad by donating to jihad through the As-Shabaab. The donation's value is determined by its quality and destination and not only by the amount of money given. Life (sacrifice) being the highest donation quality.
- b) Supplying the fighters' needs – Somalis who are unable to take part in physical jihad (for instance, women and the handicapped) can perform their duty by supplying food and temporary shelter to the As-Shabaab. By doing so, the donor is considered Al-Shabab'/mujahid and gets the same reward by Allah.
- c) Taking care of the Al-Shabab's warrior's family – Somalis who support the mujahidin's family is considered mujahid and deserves half of their reward in heaven. On the other hand, neglecting the mujahidin's family may bring them misfortune and death by the hand of God. These are edicts that tell Wahhabi Muslims do's and dont's in the course of Jihad and this applies to South-Central Somalis and how they relate individually to Al-Shabab'. It must however be clearly noted that all Somalis do not support Al-Shabab' as religious fanatics. There are a large number of South-Central Somalis who may genuinely believe Somalia is being occupied forcefully by Ethiopian colonial power and see the Al-Shabab' not as religious fanatics but as liberators. They, therefore, feel they are legitimately making political and financial contributions as well as moral support for Al-Shabab's. Operations against the Ethiopian military.
- d) Assisting the families of the fallen — by supplying the special needs of orphans and widows.

- e) Assisting the families of prisoners and wounded warriors - by supplying their necessities.
- f) Collecting funds for the Al-Shabab' – Money and materials is the lifeline of jihad. Its importance also stems from the action of gathering donations, which arouse the spirit of jihad in the hearts of Somalis. There are many ways to carry out this duty: In the West where Somalis live this is done at mosques, public venues, family gatherings, charity events, monthly donations, or by urging the Somali wahhabi leaning businessmen to open their hearts to the Al-Shabab' Jihad.
- g) Granting charity donations to the 'somali' wahhabi Jihad – who enjoys priority in Islam.
- h) Financing medical treatment for wounded mujahidin. Somali doctors inside and outside Somalia are encouraged to join the Jihad indirectly by supplying medical supplies and direct medical assistance in skills and treating the wounded.

Financial jihad includes many aspects whose common denominator is the direct and indirect support of self-sacrificing jihad, in this aspect the Somali Islamic holy war against the Ethiopians and the TFG of Somalia. The financial framework supportive of jihad is based on the perception that jihad can only achieve its goals if its resources in manpower and community support is guaranteed and if social and economic security is arranged for the warriors and their families through community networks. Thus the Jihad becomes community owned struggle that is undefeatable. All Wahhabi Islamic Jihadist organizations share the same outlook and vision in the aspect of financing Jihad. It intertwines with the grass-roots fabric of the community and links with external resources to maximize sustainable Jihad that can continuously expand through local community social infrastructures. For example, Sheikh Hassan Al-Turki provides military training bases and recruits for the Al-Shabab' through his Ogaden sub-clan lo-

cal communities, who support him.

### **Achievements of Al-Shabab' Al-mujahidiin**

The decisive defeat of the ICU in December of 2006 mainly by the Ethiopian military was a remarkable lesson for the ICU alliance. Learning from that, the organization made considerable adjustments in its military and strategic engagements. It has resorted to guerrilla warfare, successfully containing the Ethiopian-TFG soldiers' advance. The ICU organization has targeted for assassination local religious leaders who oppose them and individuals they know in the ranks of the Somali government, Somali administrative officials, Somali intellectuals, Somali musicians, traditional poets, and any one they see as being a possible service to peace process in Somalia and for the establishment of peace and security in Mogadishu.

Ethiopian sources suggest that nearly 1900 Ethiopian military personnel died since the incursion into Somalia. Also more than 3000 Somali soldiers have died. Targeted assassinations of military officers, intelligence officers and others of rank and order have been carried out by the movement.

In the last few years of more than a decade of civil strife, Somalia witnessed unprecedented levels of violence, wanton destruction of property, massive loss of life, revenge, human sufferings, displacement of persons and general economic destruction. This has led to diminished trust and confidence in the political leadership of Somalia together with the security agents for failing to display quality management of the rule of law, and it seems the security organs in Somalia lack the proper strategy to counter this.

This unprecedented level of violence and destruction that gripped the country has brought to fore some of the underlying deep seated issues carried over the years into the present Somalia.

Most of the success of the Al-Shabab' can however be attributed to the TFG failure to imple-



ment well meaning projects to build the TFGs own capacity to confront Al-Shabab'. These projects if implemented would have built the intelligence gathering capacity of the TFG and would have provided extensive infrastructure to build the administrative infrastructure of the Somali government.

During the last few months, Al-Shabab' was able to take advantage of the TFG weakness, the Ethiopian Military's fatigue and the general disinterest for Somalia in the international community and the Somali people's frustration with the TFG internal constraints of corruption and mismanagement as well as incompetence. This allowed the insurgents to capture and loot many towns in and around Mogadishu and wage numerous deadly attacks against the TFG, Ethiopian and AU peace keeping forces including suicide attacks and roadside bombings. The displacement of hundreds of Southern Somalis also served them as they could hide amongst the refugees.

#### **Al-Shabab's Public Relations and Advocacy as well as Internal and External Media**

The main source of power of Al-Shabab' remains at the village and community centres where they have cultivated close public relations in South-central Somalia. The main asset of Al-Shabab' is that they operate among their clans and wear no uniform. At the regional level in the Horn of Africa, the local radio stations and news papers remain the main sources and outlet of Al-Shabab' propaganda. At the international level, the BBC, the VOA and the internet remain major outlet channels of the Al-Shabab' news and public relations for global information dissemination as these sources report successive military gains of the Al-Shabab', taking good advantage of the TFG-Ethiopian blanket silence of the fighting. At some point, several main Al-Shabab' websites were operating – [www.al-mujahid.com](http://www.al-mujahid.com) and [www.heegan.net](http://www.heegan.net) but were later closed down. Currently [kataaib.net](http://kataaib.net) operates intermittently. The website appears to

have been supported by Shabelle Telecom in Sweden where it was believed to be have been updated on daily bases. Other remote servers are possibly in Malaysia and Singapore. The main contents are sent out of Somalia as email attachments. There is some possibility that Saudi Arabian based IT specialists at the Universities in Mecca and Medina are used to develop and update the website.

#### **Recommendations and the Nature and Potential Future of Somalia's Jihadist Movements**

The source of and support of Islamic Jihad is the prevalence of corruption, drugs, immoral activity and serious crimes by the Somali and Ethiopian military inside Somalia that motivates many young men and women to join Al-Shabab' movement. The problems and abuses in the Ogaden also contribute to a remarkable increase of young Ogadenis in joining the Al-Shabab' in Somalia. The national security capacity building projects that also incorporated anti-corruption measures should be funded and implemented urgently. Emphasis should be made to cultivate and promote role of traditional Islam in Somalia and in the region through the Ahlu-sunnah organization and other learned mainstream Ulema.

To address these issues a multi-sectoral approach by both the governments in the region, the international community and the civil society is of paramount importance. There is an urgent need to bring Somalis of all ethnic backgrounds (including the civil society and Diaspora) together and rebuild trust in the leadership and institutions of governance so as to promote national cohesion and minimize radicalism. This calls for visionary, transformative, disciplined leadership that would go beyond clan interests and embrace national needs to help re-define national goals and priorities.

Achieving political national dialogue at the political level is not enough and complete in itself without addressing the socio-economic (including religion and traditions) needs of the Somalis in

the region who some of them like the cases of Ethiopia and Somalia stood up in arms against the injustices and who continue to feel the effects of that political violence.

*Abdisaid M. Ali*

Abdisaid M. Ali is a former cabinet secretary in the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, is an independent consultant/analyst on Horn of Africa. This paper was presented to The Joint Kenya-Uganda Border Security and Management Workshop organised by IGAD Capacity Building Programme against Terrorism (ICPAT) held on April 28-29, 2008, Jinja-Uganda.

Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

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### THEMEN

## Literatureempfehlung

Der Verantwortungsbereich deutscher Sicherheitspolitik reicht heute weit über den gewohnten Rahmen europäischer Zusammenarbeit und atlantischer Solidarität hinaus. Er erfasst einen Raum, der von Sarajewo bis Kabul und Dschibuti reicht; denn auch das Horn von Afrika gehört zu jenen Regionen, in denen die Sicherung internationaler Verkehrswege und die Gefährdung durch den internationalen Terrorismus europäische und atlantische Präsenz erfordern.

Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es erfreulich, dass ein engagierter deutscher Nachwuchswissenschaftler einen gewichtigen Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis des somalischen Fundamentalismus leistet.

#### **pmg-Schriftenreihe Band 1**

**Dirk Spilker:**

*Mad Mullahs? Islamischer Fundamentalismus in Somalia: Geschichte und Hintergründe, Strategien und aktuelle Entwicklung*

Erhältlich unter [sturm@pmg-ev.com](mailto:sturm@pmg-ev.com)  
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Ohne eine genaue Kenntnis der historischen Grundlagen und aktuellen Entwicklungstendenzen dieser religiös-politischen Bewegung bleibt jeder Versuch der Konflikteindämmung und -bewältigung am Horn von Afrika zum Scheitern verurteilt.

Dirk Spilkers Studie über politischen Islam und militärische Konflikte in Somalia entstand am Otto-Suhr-Institut der Freien Universität Berlin. Sie sieht sich der klassischen Tradition historisch-realistischer Konfliktanalyse verpflichtet, fügt diese aber gleichzeitig ein in einen theoretischen Referenzrahmen zur Erfassung und Bewertung islamistisch-fundamentalistischer Bewegungen. Auf diese Weise werden die Erfolgsvoraussetzungen der islamistischen Ideologie, nämlich der Rückgriff auf die Tradition, die Nutzung vorhandener religiöser Organisationsstrukturen und die Instrumentalisierung theologischer Begriffe überzeugend erfasst und anschaulich präsentiert.

Inhaltlicher Schwerpunkt und wissenschaftlicher Wert der Studie liegen in der gelungenen Darstellung der aktuellen politischen Entwicklung in Somalia und am Horn von Afrika seit 1990. Es gibt wohl keine deutschsprachige Veröffentlichung, die in vergleichbar konzentrierter Form einen umfassenden Überblick mit überzeugender Bewertung verbindet.

Hervorzuheben ist vor allem die sorgfältige Differenzierung politischer Entwicklungstendenzen und Entscheidungsprozesse. Sie macht einerseits Kontinuitätslinien deutlich, die den gewaltbereiten Fundamentalismus Somalias mit intellektuellen Einflüssen aus Ägypten verbinden. Andererseits betont Spilker aber auch die politisch-historischen Zäsuren, die das unmittelbare Ergebnis des Eingreifens raumfremder Mächte waren.

Heute steht Deutschland mit Europa in globaler Verantwortung - nicht nur am Horn von Afrika. Daher werden weitere Veröffentlichungen der pmg-Schriftenreihe folgen, die zu einem besseren Verständnis der künftigen Aufgaben deutscher Politik und zu einer solide informierten sicherheitspo-

litischen Debatte in unserem Land beitragen wollen. Damit erweitert die Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft nicht nur ihr bisheriges Angebot an ihre Mitglieder, sondern hofft auch, Freunden in Politik, Wirtschaft und Publizistik bei der Meinungsbildung und Entscheidungsfindung zu helfen.

*Hans-Ulrich Seidt, Kabul*

Dr.phil. Dr.jur.h.c. Hans-Ulrich Seidt ist Gründungsmitglied und stellvertretender Vorstandsvorsitzender der pmg, seit 2006 Deutscher Botschafter in Kabul, Afghanistan. Der Beitrag gibt die persönliche Auffassung des Autors wieder.

## IMPRESSUM

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