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LEADOFF

Dear members,

from 30 November until 3 December the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung organised a couple of conferences and lectures in Tokyo on the issue of *Comprehensive Security*.



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The first venue was an international conference – a joint venture of the Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA), Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and Keio University – on the theme of *Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific Region* that examined Comprehensive Security from a comparative perspective that took into account the international, regional, transnational as well as state and institutional dimension. Another venue was a seminar with the Japan Institute of International Affairs on *Comparative Views on Foreign and Security Policy Issues in East Asia and Europe*. Among the members of the German delegation were Professor Dr. Axel Berkofsky (University of Pavia), Lieutenant. General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Olshausen (President Clausewitz-Gesellschaft) as well as pmg-members Dr. Peter Roell (President ISPSW) and Ralph Thiele (Chairman pmg). This edition of "Denkwürdigkeiten" reflects on their contributions/views of a week full of striking insights of a dynamic region heading towards enhanced prosperity while security issues keep challenging the effectiveness of a Comprehensive Approach to Security.



As we approach the holiday season I would like – on behalf of the pmg Executive Board – to thank all members and friends of the Politisch-Militärische Gesellschaft for the outstanding cooperation and support throughout the year. We wish to you and your families a Merry Christmas and a Happy new year – particularly health, happiness and all possible success.

Ralph Thiele, Vorstandsvorsitzender

In dieser Ausgabe

THEMEN

Comprehensive Impressions

Japan Conferences and Panels November 30th-December 3rd 2009

A German delegation invited by the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) traveled to Tokyo to participate in a series of conferences and panels related to international and Asian regional security, Asian regionalism and integration, and amongst others Japan's foreign and security policies. The first conference attended by the delegation, organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, The Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA) and Tokyo's prestigious Keio University had 'comprehensive security' as its leitmotiv.

The conference ***titled 'Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific Region'*** took place at Keio University on November 30 and December 1st and dealt with a range of issues and topics from civil-military relations, human security, Islamism, maritime terrorism, climate change, disaster relief in Asia, US-Japan security relations in Asia and other issues and topics which are (or could be, depending on the definition of them terms) part of what is being referred to as 'comprehensive security' in the academic and policy discourse. In essence, the term 'comprehensive security' expresses the notion that in the 21st century the term 'security' must necessarily compromise numerous concepts of so-called 'traditional' and 'non-traditional' security, be it in Asia and elsewhere.

The conference papers and presentations introduced the participants and contributors to numerous notions and interpretations of the term 'comprehensive security' which in the years ahead is likely to continue featuring in the academic and policy discourse related to security beyond 'hard' military security.

'Comprehensive security' in the Japanese context on the other hand meant back in the 1970 and 1980s an approach and a strategy towards regional and global security focusing on and above all on 'economic security', 'human security.' Japan utilized it economic and financial capacities and instruments to stabilize politics and security in its neighborhood, above China and Southeast Asia. Tokyo back then referred to such a strategy as 'comprehensive security' and would later (together with the European Union which pursued (and still pursue) similar regional and global security strategies) through economic and financial aid and support be in this context referred to as so-called 'soft powers.'

On the third day some members of the delegation were actively involved in a panel on EU-Japan relations at the Swedish Embassy in Tokyo. The panel-a group of European and Japanese scholars-dealt with the current state and prospect of EU-Japan relations in the areas of security, economics and trade. Currently, the EU and Japan are in the process of beginning to draft a new so-called EU-Japan Action Plan (the first one was adopted in 2001 and runs out in 2011) and there is a near-consensus that a new action plan would have to be much more focused and would have to cover fewer issues and envisioned areas of cooperation. The current plan covers cooperation in the areas of international security, economics and politics in more than 100 areas and the results, i.e. actual concrete and measurable cooperation in the areas of security and politics over the last decade are fairly limited. In other words, very little of what the EU and Japan were seeking to 'do' jointly in the areas of international security and politics were actually done.

On the same day, the members of the German delegation were involved in a panel discussing Japanese foreign and security policies. The panel was organized by the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo and the speaker (one member of the German delegation) gave a presentation on Japan's supposed 'new' foreign and security policies in general and Japan's policies and approaches towards the US.

Japan's newly-elected Japanese government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has yet to announce whether it does or does not seek to reduce the US military presence on Okinawa, home to 75% of the roughly 50.000 troops stationed on Japanese soil.

Throughout the election campaign, the Prime Minister who came to power after a landslide election victory in August, announced to revise a Japan-U.S. agreement reached in 2006 (after 13 years of negotiations between

Washington and Japan's Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) which ruled the country), which would re-locate the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in the residential area of Ginowan in the southern densely populated part of Okinawa would be relocated to the Henoko less densely populated area of Nago in the northern part of the island.

As part of the agreement (which was signed after 13 years of bilateral negotiations), Washington agreed to reduce the number of US military stationed Japan by re-locating 8.000 marines from Okinawa to Guam by 2014.

In mid-December the Japanese government decided to postpone a decision on whether it would stick with or seek to reduce February 2006 US forces realignment plan agreement until early next year. Even if Tokyo eventually (as it is very likely) will stick to the existing bilateral US-Japanese agreement, the very fact that Japan's new government (unlike its predecessors) seems unwilling to implement policies related to its national security on its own terms as opposed (as it was very often the case in the past) to under US pressure is remarkable and will continue to create headlines in the months ahead. Realistically, however, Tokyo will eventually have little choice but to stick to the existing agreement, but Tokyo's new 'assertiveness' with regards to its security relations with Washington has been a 'wake-up' call in Washington where policymakers have over the decades grown used to Tokyo's 'obedience' when US military presence in Japan and issues related to US-Japan security cooperation make it onto the agenda.

Furthermore, Tokyo's new government might in the months ahead seek to change the so-called US-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, which protects American troops from legal prosecution in Japan. It has also recently resumed the debate about reducing Japan's so-called Host Nation Support (financial support) for the US military in Japan, which currently stands at $5 billion per year.

On the last day of the German delegation's visit, the group contributed to a conference organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA), a Japanese think tank affiliated with and financed by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conference titled ***Comparative Views on Foreign and Security Policy Issues in East Asia and Europe*** taking place on December 3rd dealt with Asian regional security, Asian integration, issues related to Asian and global governance, European security and others.

As regards Asian integration and Asian regionalism, it was concluded (both by Japanese and European scholars) that Asian integration is above all centered around 'economic integration' as opposed to political integration (as e.g. in the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is very likely bound to remain unchanged in the years ahead in view of the still very different levels of economic, political and social development.

Furthermore, given that (at least from a European perspective) the main precondition for political (EU-style) integration are democracy and democratic structures amongst actors and states involved in what is to become a politically integrated and politically interdependent region, Asian political integration will in the years ahead continue to be very 'embryonic.'

On of the ways forward for European-Japanese cooperation in Afghanistan, it was voiced by European and Japanese participants, was to increase European-Japanese civilian, i.e. non-military cooperation in 2010, also in view of the fact that Japanese Prime Hatoyama has recently announced to increase Japan's financial contribution to the reconstruction and pacification of Afghanistan at the tune of $5 billion over the next three-four years. European-Japanese cooperation in Afghanistan (and possibly also Pakistan) has yet to reach its potential and if Europe and Japan are serious about increasing cooperation in international politics and security, Afghanistan is one country where such European-Japanese cooperation could be relevant.

Prof. Dr. Axel Berkofsky, Pavia

Professor Dr. Axel Berkofsky is Gianni Mazzocchi Fellow at the University Pavia, Italy. Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

THEMEN

NATO's Role in the 21 Century and its Potential Contribution for Peace and Stability in the Asia-Pacific Region

As the first decade of this century comes to a close many opportunities, chances, but also risks, threats and dangers might influence strategic stability in the coming decade. As many nations, International Organizations and different groupings are to define their primary objectives, so does the North Atlantic Alliance – as it starts into its 7th decade.

Before I can turn to the well known acronym NATO I will have to take you back to the foundation of the North Atlantic Alliance as the Washington Treaty of 1949. The understanding of the twelve founding members fixed in the treaty text put them together as

- a political alliance, created
- to protect their freedom, heritage and civilization and
- to strengthen the internal stability, prosperity and welfare.

It was with this broad political purpose that they decided to combine their individual efforts to preserve peace and security and

for collective defence. The elimination of conflicts within their respective economic relationships was as clearly an objective as the encouragement of enhanced economic cooperation between them.

At a time when the Alliance, i.e. NATO is often declared as a (purely) military alliance and at the same time the word of the enlarged, comprehensive security is widely spread, it seems quite enlightening, that the founding fathers had recognized the largeness and magnitude of the task within and for Europe then being in dramatic need of reconstruction of states, societies and economies and had committed themselves to common efforts.

This is not the place to trace the whole history of the Alliance. But it is worth mentioning, that between 1949 and 1989 controversial debates on security and defence issues played an important part for the liveliness of the Alliance throughout the decades of the turbulent events during the cold war era. And maybe it was this readiness to consult in open and frank, controversial but fair debates that made the Alliance as attractive after the cold war as it was for its members until 1990 or 1991.

The Alliance at 60

Looking at the Alliance, its member nations and the analyses and comments of the interested public domain in the months before and after the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009 you can find quite different observations and statements. There are those who say, that the Alliance presents itself as a reasonable entity in those uncertain and unsettled times. She was the only available framework for robust crisis intervention, command & control of multi-national forces and – not at least – was involving the U.S. as the remaining world power. Such an organization could almost by definition not become pointless.

On the other side of the spectrum one expects or even requests a fading away of the Alliance. She had lost her "raison d'être" already since 1990-1991 and all revival attempts have been unsuccessful. She could at best function as a reassurance asset for collective defence, since the new era requires a much more diversified set of instruments and a consensual decision for robust military intervention would become more and more difficult.

After the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit and in the middle of the work on the New Strategic Concept one can identify amongst the member nations three groups of different strength:

- The first comprises those who see the Alliance – like the EU – as a global player. That means the will, the readiness and the capability to confront transnational threats, crisis or conflict breeding developments preventively and timely in case vital interests of Alliance members are at stake.
- In the second you find those who identify a direct concern for their national security – not the least reinforced by the Russian war against Georgia in August 2008. They recognize a visible strengthening of the defence capability and defence readiness in the spirit of indivisible and equal security as vital for Alliance cohesion. They need this also in order to be open for any work on a cooperative option with Russia.
- In a third group are allies, who consider the commitment for collective defence as a lynchpin of the Alliance, but they do not see a strong need for additional contingency plans or measures for the defence in Central-Eastern Europe beyond the integrated air defence. They argue with the limited resources and a less critical assessment of Russian intents and capabilities. Beyond that, they are rather cautious in their appraisal whether, when and where the Alliance should engage in crisis prevention, resolution and post conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

If this presents a valid picture, it becomes obvious that the member states face an urgent task to find a meaningful consensus for the New Strategic Concept and future crisis response activities.

Challenges in the 7th Decade

In the coming years, the Alliance will have to decide and act in dynamic situations that are at the same time volatile, uncertain, highly complex and ambiguous. In this context, the diversity amongst the allies and their partners is equally essential as the very different kinds of opposing elements, be it states, non-state actors or a mix of both.

In his work "On War", Carl von Clausewitz offers helpful insights and principles for any continuous assessment, of those complex. complicated and dynamic situations and the decision making processes. The political purpose, the goals for different means and the available assets and capabilities themselves have to be reflected, clarified, decided and then put into action with determination and resolve.

Wars, conflicts and crises of the 21 century are still moulded by primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, the play of chance and probability and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy. This is accompanied by characteristics and requirements for personalities ('military genius') that tackle dynamic, complex problems; and, of course, some specifics and basic requirements for armed forces that Clausewitz studied extensively.

To create, build and maintain a Europe that is united, free and at peace is and will remain the essential political purpose of the Alliance for the foreseeable future. Following the letter and the spirit of the Washington treaty stability, prosperity, security and effective protection of all members will remain overarching political goals.

Thus, based on the potential international developments in the coming years, the detailed assessments of chances, risks, threats and dangers, the Alliance will define her contribution to ac-

complish this Europe whole, free and at peace.

Stability and security transfer will remain an important objective that can be pursued with a range of means. Under those auspices and geopolitically reaching beyond NATO territory, the Alliance will decide what kind of responsibility and active contribution she is ready to take on in the area of crisis prevention, crisis management and post conflict stabilisation and reconstruction in already existing conflicts or in potential crisis regions. In those deliberations, the vital interests will have to become the main theme to decide when and where action is advisable, necessary or even imperative – in standing up for our values, our civilization and our culture.

Two political notions from the conceptual work after the 9/11 attacks will fuel and frame the current debate as well:

- The lengthy and controversial debate over "out of area" engagements was overcome with the agreed formula: "as and where required".
- For the work on a concept for the defence against transnational terrorism the North Atlantic Council (NAC) established an essential guiding principle: "that it is preferable to deter terrorist attacks or to prevent their occurrence rather than deal with their consequences".

But the three groups mentioned above prove that both notions have not yet led to a consensus on an operationalized, manageable concept for concrete situations. If the Alliance wants to limit or mitigate ever more difficult and cumbersome discussions on each individual situation, it has to work for an agreeable position in the New Strategic Concept. An extended definition of deterrence including the required steps to make it work will be necessary. Even more urgent will be progress for a concept regarding intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance for both police and military action.

Thus, I strongly encourage the members of the Alliance to work with the well established "two side medal" as a key orientation for the 21st century:

1. **Cooperation & dialogue and**
2. **Collective Defense and crisis response operations**

This comprehensive guidance in an unsecure world requires within the Alliance to

- strengthen solidarity and for that aim
- Consult early and broadly and cooperate intensively and
- Decide in common and act with resolve, determination and steadfastness.

Cooperation with others

The dynamic, complex, complicated and very unpredictable situations in broad security terms have made it already a common place that the North Atlantic Alliance cannot and will not act in an isolated manner. Any New Strategic Concept that wants to accomplish the political purpose will require a multitude of non-military and military measures, assets and capabilities. Most are delivered by states or international organizations but also by non-governmental organizations tasked by those actors or independently.

Since I do not expect that consensus will be reached that nations make there non-military means available through NATO it becomes obvious, that – with 21 nations being member of the Alliance and the EU – the often declared complimentarity has to be put to work now.

A Western Compact for comprehensive security: EU – U.S./North America – NATO

Today, a "Western compact for comprehensive security" requires a close coordination and cooperation between the European Union, the Alliance and North America, i.e. U.S. – and Canada. This is needed, but not an end in itself.

EU-NATO-U.S. can build a security formation that is not uniform but understands that combining their different strengths and main efforts in the widely broadened field of security can create synergies for effects but also economy of efforts.

Based on the documents for NATO-EU cooperation from March 2003 and esp. the EU-U.S. summit declarations of 2006, there exist many opportunities to start with

- Evaluation of the strategy documents regarding political purpose and objectives to identify commonalities and – differences; the goal remains a "Long-term Vision" for the "Western Compact on security";
- Effort to commonly describe, analyse and assess the risks, threats and dangers that are to be faced, including close connectivity regarding early warning mechanisms;
- Describe and assess different courses of action to tackle them and identify how each organization or nation/state can contribute most efficiently and effectively;
- Development of military and civil capabilities and capacities through scenario driven planning processes, if not in one single process than with greater transparency amongst the organizations;
- Early consultation to assess potential crisis situations and develop coordinated actions;
- Develop compatible, interoperable military and civil command structures at the strategic and operational level;
- Identify functional and regional areas (i.e. defence against transnational terrorism, internet security, piracy or the Balkans, Afghanistan etc.) where closer coordination and cooperation is advisable and necessary, today.

Unfortunately, the unresolved Cyprus issue hampers, even prevents visible progress. Thus, all EU member states as well as Allies are urged to actively work for a resolution instead leaving it only to the U.N and the parties on the ground.

U.N., OSCE, AU

Of course, consultation and specific cooperation with the U.N. in general as well as the OSCE and other regional organizations, like the African Union in particular have to be enhanced and strengthened in concrete crisis situations or functional areas. The declaration between the Alliance and the U.N. which needed more than two years consideration at the U.N. can only be a starting point. The rather limited support of the AU in crisis response missions or training activities for peace support operations shows the reserve and restraint that still exists. In this area, a closer cooperation between EU and NATO could create added value for all.

Relationship with Russia

Based on a strong internal strategic consensus, a self-confident Alliance can build and shape a reasonable relationship with Russia where Russian interests are considered but cannot – esp. due to internal Alliance disunity – play a dominant role.

Until August 2008, war seemed to be no option for a Great Power to enforce its own interests. The return of this approach by the Russian military engagement and the direct and indirect consequences in the South Caucasus and beyond will most likely have repercussions on the future NATO Russia relationship.

The resumption of the NATO-Russia-Council meeting can hardly mean that the Russian actions – directed against the security in Europe – are put up with as "fait accompli" and followed by business as usual. Russia – as a strategic partner – cannot and must not be understood in a way that it can – step by step – force back strong principles and important interests of the "West" by the policy of "divide et impera". This would endanger the security fabric of Europe as a whole. The focus cannot just be what suits Russia but what ensures the independence and enables the free development of those states that gained their freedom in 1991.

None of them poses a risk, not to speak a danger to Russia – nor does the North Atlantic Alliance. Russia's cooperation in important issues, whether Iran, North Korea, terrorism or non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament is appreciated and required but not at all costs.

Partner on a Global Scale

The debate whether the Alliance could or should become global has led to the common understanding, that in a world of increasingly globalized issues of security the Alliance is well advised to build partnerships beyond its peripheries.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC, NCC back in 1991), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD, already since 1995) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI, started at the Istanbul summit 2004) are all based on the conviction to build relations, coordination and cooperation in order to forge coalitions for the "non-cooperative situations" of tomorrow. Under those auspices, the Alliance is well advised to work for regional and functional cooperation with Japan, a strong ally of the leading power in NATO.

In addition, closer political and military contacts with China as a growing economic and political player on a global scale should be on the work plan of the Alliance. Similar points hold true for India. This is all the more urgent as the Alliance is heavily engaged in Afghanistan, i.e. in the heart of Central Asia, for over six years.

There are several other countries in Latin America, Asia and Australia seeking contact with the Alliance. Many of them contribute to NATO led crisis response missions in the Balkans or in Afghanistan. This is prove of the attractive force of an Alliance that owns a structure that can lead armed forces of many nations in a united effort to reach a common objective and thus, contribute to the mandated political purpose. The spectrum of the potential engagements in very different crisis response operations extends from peace support and stability operations to high intensity conflicts. The means and capabilities of those partners can help spread the burden of operations on more shoulders – an effect that cannot be disregarded at times of limited resources everywhere.

An Alliance that has gained added strength through a newly built consensus on its "raison d'être" would be well advised not to turn down the contribution of those partners but rather look for ways to increase the consultation, training and employment opportunities with them. That serves not only an improved understanding and necessary interoperability but is building the coalitions of tomorrow, today.

All those regional a functional fields of cooperation and dialogue underline once again how urgently the consultation, coordination and cooperation of the Alliance with the EU and North America requires practical progress. The comprehensive approach in crisis management does not begin only after a UNSCR has been agreed or an Alliance decision mandating a specific mission has been taken.

The Alliance's Level of Ambition

Those reflections of the cooperation with the EU and other institutions and states form an essential element in order to frame and decide a realistic level of ambition of the Alliance that fits her political purpose.

Of course, a solid and detailed analysis and assessment of risks, dangers and threats is another critical parameter in this process. Besides the well known threats, it becomes more visible that the climate change carries also important security risks. The competition regarding available energy resources may not be limited to economic measures only. This clearly underlines that limiting our own security precautions against asymmetric threats and actions is not valid enough to prepare for "possible futures". In such a complex and dynamic

framework, the defence ministers will have to reassess and review the level of ambition they stated in June 2006.

As important will become the identification of all non-military requirements in the capability planning process. This is indispensable, even if – due to a missing consensus – their deployment and employment in crisis regions will not be accomplished through NATO. Thus, the Alliance will have to further reflect and widen its "comprehensive approach". A new version or at least a critical adaptation of the "Comprehensive Political Guidance" will become necessary. The Ministerial Guidance, the Basic Document of the Defence Planning Committee, will then have to be reconsidered, too.

Structures, Procedures, Capabilities

Besides a strong consensus of the overall political purpose and the objectives in concrete situations, a mighty and pro-active Alliance needs

- first the political will to decide and the resolve to see it through and
- second the required means, assets and capabilities, an efficient and effective multinational structure and well established and trained procedures from the strategic to the tactical level of command.

Since the nineties, the Alliance has identified a number of critical capability gaps. But all the initiatives, like the 1999 "Defence Capability Initiative" (DCI), the 2002 "Prague Capability Commitment" (PCC) have not resulted in closing those gaps in the structures of the European allies. Budget constraints and insufficient cooperation in research and development and armament acquisition processes are two important obstacles. Strategic air and sea transport, compatible capabilities for command and control and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and improved tactical and theatre missile defence are just a few areas where both in NATO and the EU the gaps remain essentially the same.

A look at the NATO Command Structure (NCS) does not present a satisfying picture either. Since the 1990ies, each reform of the NCS was overtaken by the next before it had been properly implemented. This gave reason for the impression that many nations called for reform because they could neither assign the adequate number and quality of personnel nor provide sufficient funding for modern and effective equipment. The distance from an effective and efficient structure grew and grows even further since all states want to find an element of the remaining headquarters or elements on their territory and those who own them don't want to give up one easily. The return of France to the NCS with about 400-500 personnel will not dramatically change these existing difficulties.

In addition, the 2006 level of ambition stated the readiness for 5-6 "smaller operations". This requires multinational division and brigade headquarters as part of the NATO Force Structure (NFS), manned and equipped by respective nations. Since the available personnel for multinational structures is a finite number in all nations, there will be again repercussions on the NCS. The nations will have to come to grip with the Gordian knot of mutually exclusive requirements, if they are not to permanently administer the shortage and will finally put the lives of employed soldiers at risk through suboptimal command structures.

An Alliance of 28 nations represents a great diversity, also in "military cultures" This impacts in many ways also on planning and employment procedures. Despite decades of standardization efforts and the many activities to bring doctrines and procedures in line with each other, it remains a permanent challenge in today's complex missions to build and ensure as best as possible the integrated leadership and acting of the national armed forces and services in an indispensable multinational framework.

Concluding Remarks

1. Under the circumstances described and in view of its political purpose, the political North-Atlantic Alliance cannot restrict herself to the territory of the member states in a traditional sense. Comparable to the EU it has to become a global player without playing a part everywhere.
2. Her political purpose will be best served,
   - If she uses co-operation and dialogue effectively – forging tomorrows coalitions today and
   - Maintains and improves adequate military – and in co-operation – non-military capabilities for crisis response operations (CRO) and collective defence.
3. She has to foster the internal consensus as critical basis for her political clout through determination and steadfastness under critical circumstances.
4. Since – in today's conflicts and crises – the passions between two nations have increased to many and the number of critical actors, be it governments, IOs or non state actors (friendly or opposing) have exponentially grown, the Alliance will have to reflect and decide in an unambiguous manner what her particular and peculiar contribution to a crisis management action will be before her consensual decision is taken.
5. It is hardly to argue that crisis prevention, crisis management and post conflict stabilisation and reconstruction can – from a Western perspective – most likely be tackled with a perspective of success, if the North Atlantic Alliance, and the EU as well as the EU and the U.S. can decide on a concerted approach. But today, for the most security policy challenges within the Alliance as well as within the EU "strategic unity" does not yet exist, i.e. relationship with Russia, Opening of NATO and the

EU, strategic missile defence, the regional concept for Afghanistan not to mention the wider Middle East or Africa.

6. A lot of efforts have to be taken. The Alliance should – like the EU – have the resolve to become "more capable, more coherent and more active". In addition it should master the upcoming challenges determined in close cooperation and indivisible solidarity.

The Alliance and the EU will have to overcome her smaller or larger disputes on broader security issues. Only if and as far they are achieving this and a reasonable EU-U.S. cooperation including security issues develops, the "West" can reach, maintain and might strengthen a geostrategic and geopolitical role in shaping the future world order for greater stability and peace. This will create a basis from which to reach out intensively to our Asian partners whom we need and who need us.

Dr. Klaus Olshausen, Bonn

Lieutenant General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Olshausen is President of the Clausewitz Association. In his last position he served as German Military Representative to the two Military Committees of NATO and EU, Brussels.

Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author. This paper has been presented at the International Conference on Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific Region, organised by Asian Political & International Studies Association (APISA) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in collaboration with the Keio University, 30 Nov - 1 Dec 2009, Tokyo, Japan. This contribution was first published in the ISPSW Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung Berlin, www.ispsw.de

THEMEN

Maritime Terrorism – A Threat to World Trade?

Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In my short lecture *Maritime Terrorism – A Threat to World Trade?* I would like to present three observations:

1. Maritime terrorism is reality, not fiction
2. „Choke Points" and mega harbours are in the focus of terrorists
3. In order to fight maritime terrorism and piracy cooperation between governments and the private sector is crucial

It is difficult to define *maritime terrorism*, particularly because the United Nations have so far not been able to find a binding definition for *terrorism*. The US Department of Defence defines *terrorism* as "unlawful use or threatened use or force of violence against people or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives".

It is obvious – if we have a look at the attacks by pirates at the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean – that monetary reasons prevail, acts of hijacking and blackmailing cannot be defined as *maritime terrorism* but as *Organised Crime.*

Let me now come to my first observation:

Observation 1:
Maritime terrorism is reality, not fiction

To analyse the maritime terrorist threats it is not enough to examine the capabilities and motives of terrorist groups, but also to examine the maritime industry, shipping practices, the vulnerability of trade shipping as well as countermeasures by the authorities and other institutions which are entrusted with the security of the shipping routes. Let me give some examples of planned or executed maritime terrorist attacks:

January 2000
Al-Qaida members carried out an unsuccessful attack in Aden against the USS Sullivans. But the boat, overloaded with explosives, sank before it could reach the target.

October 2000
Successful Al-Qaida attack against the US destroyer USS Cole in Yemen. 17 US sailors were killed, 39 wounded.

June 2002
Members of Al-Qaida, who had planned attacks against British and US ships in the Strait of Gibraltar, were arrested by Morocco's secret service.

October 2002
A terror group from Yemen, having connections with Al-Qaida, attacked the French oil tanker Limburg off the harbour of Ash Shahir. One crew member was killed, others wounded. 90 0000 tons of oil polluted in the Gulf of Aden. As a result the monthly container transshipment in Yemen declined from 43 000 to 3 000 containers. 3 000 dockers lost their jobs and the national economy shrunk by 1% GDP.

February 2004
Bomb attack by the Abu Sayyaf group against a passenger ferry in the Philippines. Over 100 people were killed.

August 2005
Israel's security service Shin Bet warned four Israeli cruise liners – on their passage to Turkey – about a possible terror attack and redirected the ships to Cyprus.

July 2009
Egypt's security authorities prevented an attack against the Suez Canal and the adjacent oil pipeline. According to sources in Cairo the terror group consisted of 24 Egyptians and one Palestinian.

Due to the knowledge of Western intelligence services some islamistic terror groups have declared, that it is their aim to interrupt Western supply lines. The 2nd man of Al-Qaida, Aiman Al-Sawahri: "We must stop the West plundering the oil of Muslims."

Often, people claim that terrorist groups could probably form alliances with organised crime groups and pirates. But there is no proof for such a claim. Islamistic terror groups isolate themselves extremely and are suspicious of outsiders, especially when they do not share the

same ideology. It is worthwhile to note that during the last 15 years only 2% of all terrorist attacks could be assigned to maritime terrorism. Although maritime terrorist attacks cannot be excluded in the future and should not be played down, special operational capabilities are required which the terrorists probably have not yet at their disposal. However, it could be that the pirates in Somalia are contributing to terrorist organisations by paying some form of protection money.

In this context we should not forget the plans of Al-Qaida chief planner for maritime terrorism, Abd Al Rahman Al Nashiri, also called the Prince of the Sea, who was arrested in November 2002 in the United Arab Emirates. Nashiri had developed a strategy including the following four elements:

- Ramming or blowing up medium-sized ships in the vicinity of other ships or in harbours;
- Attacking super tankers from the air with small planes, packed with explosives;
- Underwater attacks against ships using divers;
- Attacks against cruise liners and taking hostages

Observation 2:
„Choke points" and mega harbours are in the focus of terrorists

Terrorists will ask themselves at which locations they can decisively hit the infrastructure of the industrialised world because up to now the maritime terrorist attacks have not threatened world trade seriously. They will direct their attention to so-called *choke points* and mega harbours as 75% of the international ocean traffic with approximately 50 000 ships is processed in approximately 2 800 harbours.

As many of the biggest harbours in the world are located in East and Southeast Asia and most of the trade is directed via sea routes in this region, terrorists will pay special attention to this region in their target planning. These may include the following harbours: Kobe, Tokyo, Yokohama, Pusan, Shanghai, Kaohsiung, Hong Kong and Singapore. Of course, also mega harbours in the United States and in Europe may be in the focus of terrorists.

The strategically important Straits of Malacca is one of the critical *choke points*. It connects the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea and the Pacific. It is the most important trade route between the Far East, the Golf States and Europe. 90 000 ships per year pass the Straits of Malacca. One third of the world trade, 80% of oil imports for East Asia and two third of the worldwide liquid gas transports go via this route.

A terror attack, for example the sinking of a tanker in the Straits of Malacca, would block the straits. Ships would have to make a detour of 1 000 km via the Indonesian Strait of Sunda and Flores. The ships would have to be at sea for 2 extra days, which would result in 8 billion US dollars additional costs per year. Freight and insurance rates would increase and the market price for all transported goods would also increase in a short period of time with negative economic effects on the region and world trade.

Blown up container ships could block harbours for weeks – quite apart from an attack in one of the 20 mega harbours with a so-called *dirty bomb*. A closure of the Singapore harbour for example, would cost more than 200 billion US dollars per year. Also the terrorist attack of a fully loaded gas tanker in one of the mega harbours would have a devastating effect on the world trade and provide terrorists with an event comparable to 9/11.

But terrorist attacks can also be expected at other *choke points* such as the Straits of Hormuz, Bab al Mandat, the Suez Canal, Bosporus, Straits of Gibraltar or the Panama Canal. We in Europe should also not forget the English Channel.

In conclusion: Yes, world trade is potentially threatened by maritime terrorism.

Observation 3:
Fighting potential maritime terrorism and piracy cooperation between state institutions and the private sector is crucial

An efficient cooperation between states could improve the maritime security situation. This can also be seen in the more intensive and successful cooperation between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia over the last few years.

Pirate attacks in Indonesia have been reduced from 121 in the year 2003 to 43 in the year 2007 and in the first half year of 2009 to 2. In the Straits of Malacca we also could observe a positive development. In 2004, 38 attacks were recorded, in 2007 only 7 and in the first half year of 2009, 2.

The situation off the Horn of Africa is very different. In the first 9 months of 2009, 114 ships were boarded, 34 hijacked, 88 came under fire. 661 persons were taken hostage.

Also helpful is the Container Security Initiative (CSI), initiated by the United States in 2002. The aim of this programme is to identify – out of the 230 million containers which are transported by sea every year – those containers with weapons of mass destruction or dangerous nuclear substances which could be used by terrorists for their attacks. Containers, designated for the United States, are checked at the harbour of departure. At present, US officials are working in more than 46 harbours.

However, US plans to examine all US-bound containers are unrealistic and moreover, impossible. Timely intelligence is here the name of the game.

In cooperation with state organisations and the industry, technical means are also used to protect against potential terror attacks. For example, the scanning

of huge containers, the use of Long-Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD) which proved to be very effective when pirates tried to attack the cruise liner *Seabourne Spirit* on Nov 5, 2005. Furthermore, anti-boarding systems, such as 9 000-Volt-protective-fences for merchant ships make the boarding for pirates or terrorists more difficult. Also unmanned 'inventus systems' are used. Equipped with cameras, they are capable of searching huge parts of the oceans and transmit this data to a ship or to a ground station.

I also would like to draw your attention to a new trend. Due to the intensive attacks against ships, the loss of sea freight, the increase of insurance rates and the resulting losses of 16 billion US dollars annually, states are intensifying their cooperation with private security companies, which are specialised in maritime security. In this field, British and US companies are playing a leading role.

Given the configuration of modern naval warships, designed to counter the threat of other modern Navies, it becomes clear that such ships are unsuitable to counter terrorists or counter piracy operations. We can either resort to the private sector, which could protect cargo vessels by deploying guards on board, or governments need to build and deploy suitable naval vessels designed to counter this new threat.

If we understand security policy in a more comprehensive way, that means the political, economic, social, ecological and military dimensions must be considered together and must be brought together, then maritime terrorism can only be fought successfully in cooperation between state institutions and the private sector.

Let me finish my short statement with a motto that has guided NATO for many years and has provided peace, freedom and security to all of us: **Vigilance is the price of freedom!**

Dr. Peter Roell, Berlin

Statement by Dr. Peter Roell, President ISPSW Berlin, at the International Conference on Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific Region, organised by Asian Political & International Studies Association (APISA) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in collaboration with the Keio University,30 Nov - 1 Dec 2009, Tokyo, Japan.
Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

THEMEN

Europe's Security Policy – A long-term, comprehensive Perspective

"… key issues that we need to consider in taking ESDP forward into its second decade – policy, analysis of challenges, strategy, partnerships, structures and capabilities."
(Javier Solana, Brussels 28 July 2009)

Connecting Policies

As Europe's Security Policy needs to develop a long-term, comprehensive perspective in order to align efforts to advance domestic safety and security with those to promote international security and crisis response, a broad continuum of operations needs to be addressed. This continuum is ranging from societal protection, crisis prevention and crisis management to actual combat, humanitarian action and post-crisis recovery and stabilisation, that provides a general framework for contingencies at home and abroad and can be interpreted as a value chain along which each instrument of power can make specific contributions based on specific core competencies, thus providing an intertwined delivery of military and non-military capabilities. The logic of the value chain gives rise to a process-based and network-enabled organisation of interagency and international interaction that helps realign tasks, capabilities, processes and structures of the security apparatus. This paper takes a conceptual look at the Comprehensive Approach, focuses on the issue of prevention and highlights the requirement for a dedicated process of change management in order to strengthen Europe's Security Policy, analysis of challenges, strategy, partnerships, structures and capabilities.

The ratification of Europe's Lisbon treaty has been completed. European leaders have chosen their representatives for the top jobs being created by Lisbon: Herman Van Rompuy has become the President of the European Council. Catherine Ashton is the new high representative for foreign policy with enhanced responsibilities. Ashton, Barroso and Van Rompuy have become the new European Union (EU) "*Dream Team*". It is now predominantly in their hands,

- making it – after a period of introspective, institutional manoeuvres – work comprehensive and effects based,
- bringing together all the dimensions of its external action and making it more coherent,
- striking the right balance between security and other global governance issues.

Until today, the EU external policies have been largely disconnected from each other. Trade, Development Aid, the international dimension of policies such as Energy, Internal Market, Justice and Internal Affairs, have followed their own logic, with minimal attempts to ensure real coherence and to place them in a single integrated international strategy. This situation will now be challenged by the institutional modifications brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, institutional reform will not solve the problem by itself.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which entered into force in 1993, and was strengthened under the 1997 Amsterdam

Treaty, which entered into force in 1999. The objectives of the CFSP under the Treaty on European Union are to

- safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union;
- strengthen the security of the Union;
- promote peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- promote international cooperation, and
- promote better governance through the development and consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and the upholding of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Amsterdam Treaty created the operational arm for the CFSP, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)**,** with the potential for later creating a common defence structure. The first phase of ESDP development dates back to the period between 1999 and 2003, when institutional requirements were established and ESDP was set up by voluntary national contributions of traditional armed forces composed of up to 60.000 troops. The adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003 and especially its realisation gave start to a second phase in ESDP development that can be seen as an attempt to develop "transformed" rapid reaction elements and respective strategic assets, and to boost its willingness and capabilities to act cohesively and effectively in security and defence matters.

The ESS defines three strategic objectives

- to take preventive action at an early stage using all the instruments at its disposal.
- to focus on establishing security in its direct neighborhood with the aim of creating a ring of well-governed countries extending from the EU's eastern border to the Mediterranean region.
- to commit itself to a global order based on effective multilateralism, founded on international law.

From the very outset the ESS has been conceptually aimed at building relevance through capable structures, instruments, analysis, situational awareness, decision support and processes in a holistic approach. These objectives have not really been incorporated by all parts of the EU machinery. There has not been sufficient coordination between the different strands of foreign policy. Obviously the EU machinery requires changes. With the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon ESDP has been renamed to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).[1] Defense and security will become available to enhanced co-operation. The personal union of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations as well as the European External Action Service provided in the Lisbon Treaty will allow for the integration of the security, political, social and economic dimensions in all foreign policies, from the creation to the implementation and evaluation of policy.

Comprehensive Approach

The EU today faces security challenges entirely different from those at the time of its inception. The European Union and its Member States are part of a highly interdependent, dynamic and complex world. Europe is vulnerable. It has global interests. Europe's economic and financial interests, energy security, environmental protection, etc., require a global approach. The EU itself and various member countries are at the centre of the system of global governance and wish to maintain such a role.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries such as Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. To break this, both development assistance and measures to ensure better security need to be employed. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration are a key part of post conflict stabilisation and reconstruction. Failed states, border disputes, environmentally induced migration, and resource conflicts: all have increasingly intercontinental, if not global, repercussions.

The related security challenges range from money laundering and corruption to organised crime and violent terrorist acts to weapons of mass disruption, natural disasters and pandemics. The EU is obliged to cope with these external risks and threats – or their potential impact – on its domestic security. This is reflected in the growing involvement of its Member States and their militaries, police forces and civil protection institutions in peacekeeping and nation building across the world.

There are two interrelated dimensions to this challenge. The first is <u>security at home</u>. During the Cold War, "territorial security" was linked to a potential Soviet assault across the plains of Central Europe, and was thus primarily an issue for the military, whereas fighting terror was considered primarily within a domestic context as an issue of emergency response and law enforcement. Today societies face asymmetric threats that blur the distinction between internal and external security. When facing the potential for catastrophic terrorism, the concept of "territorial integrity" becomes inadequate, since the aim of such terrorism is not to acquire territory but to destroy or disrupt societies. As a result, we are witnessing a paradigmatic shift from Cold War total defence systems, which focused on the security of the territory, to

[1] Article 42 (ex Article 17 TEU) "*1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.*" CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, 9.5.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 115/13

post-Cold War societal security systems, which focus on the security of critical functions of society within and beyond the confines of a single state.

Antagonists wishing to inflict harm upon a society are interested in finding the key nodes where critical arteries of our societies connect. Terrorists equipped with weapons of mass destruction or mass disruption are not interested on seizing and holding our territory. They seek to destroy or disrupt the ability of our societies to function. Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groupings are acting as flexible and agile lethal networks, constantly able to reconfigure themselves, to address new challenges and seize new opportunities. They are networks that target other networks – i.e. vulnerabilities of our societies that accompany the free flow of people, ideas, goods and services. These range from global electronic financial networks, networked information systems, "*just-in-time*" supply chains and air, sea and land transportation to flows of fossil fuels or nuclear energy.

A security system focused on protecting the functioning of society needs to protect critical nodes of activity while attacking the critical nodes of those networks that would do us harm. A societal security approach would identify potential vulnerabilities linked to the technological complexity of the modern world and seek to transform them into high reliability systems. It would seek to anticipate and prevent possible "*cascading effects*" of a breakdown or collapse of any particular node of activity. It would develop processes to ensure that new vulnerabilities are not built into future systems.

Military forces may or may not be involved in this approach. Many of these challenges are not susceptible to military tactics. Instead, the key is to link the military as one key element of an all-societal mobilization. Moreover, it would be essential to integrate government response together with active participation of the private sector, which actually owns and controls most of these networks. The interdependent nature of complex modern societies makes civil-military and public-private collaboration essential to prepare a nation for peacetime crises in ways that may also benefit preparedness for catastrophic attack by a thinking enemy.

As – given rapid changes in technology and the growth of even more complex interdependent networks – societal vulnerabilities will change over time, revolutionary developments in science and technology could affect critical functions of society and consequently need to be permanently monitored and assessed. An integrated, networked system needs to align efforts to advance domestic security with those to promote international security and crisis response in ways that better enable Europe and its partners to relate the security and defence of nations to the safety of citizens.

This leads to another dimension of the challenge, and that is how to project stability beyond the borders. Tackling the vast majority of today's global problems requires a careful mix of hard and soft security instruments. Military response can be important, but it will often be but part of a wider campaign that includes diplomacy, law enforcement, international intelligence cooperation, and efforts to support civil society. Of course, military forces still have a particular role in interventions and defence. They are also important in complex emergencies when escalation dominance – the ability to revert to combat if other parties escalate violence – is essential.

Conflict resolution requires the application of all relevant security instruments. These need to contribute to addressing a continuum of operations ranging from societal protection, crisis prevention and crisis management to actual combat, humanitarian action and post-crisis recovery and stabilization, and which provides a general framework for contingencies at home and abroad. The continuum itself can be interpreted as a value chain along which each instrument of power can make specific contributions based on specific core competencies, thus providing an intertwined delivery of civilian and military capabilities. The logic of the value chain gives rise to a process-based and network-enabled organization of interagency and international interaction that helps realign tasks, capabilities, processes and structures of the security apparatus.

Experience not only from EU, but also from NATO operations, has demonstrated that coordination with a wide spectrum of actors from the international community, both military and civilian, is essential to achieving key objectives of lasting stability and security. This calls for structured, regular, network enabled coordination, consultation and interaction among all actors involved. A Comprehensive Approach is required to deal with most of 21st century security challenges.

The Comprehensive Approach is aimed at preventing crises, combating them once they have escalated, mitigating their impacts, and providing stabilisation in their aftermath. The relevant security instruments include diplomacy, information, military, law enforcement, and economic measures. The range of security tasks to be accomplished in this context includes conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict stabilisation. A systematic networking of all relevant security actors and levels of decision-making and implementation – from the international level within NATO, the EU and the United Nations to local levels of interaction – drastically improves situational awareness and understanding. It increases transparency, shortens decision-making cycles, and enhances the ability to employ instruments rapidly. It ensures a deliberate and superior exploitation of one's own possibilities and optimises – also in an interagency context – the cost-benefit equation through

speed, precision, selectivity and parallel, integrated action.

The Comprehensive Approach requires developing a sense of common purpose and resolve, the clear definition of strategies and objectives before launching an operation, as well as enhanced planning to support nations' contributions to operations. Civilian and military capabilities need to be embedded into a grand strategy, an "overall package" of governmental and/or international measures. The civilian and military actors involved in such operations need to agree on the political end-state and engage in the joint planning, execution and evaluation of their operational activities in order to achieve it. A strategic framework provides a clear structure for operations conducted by all actors. The elements to be considered include common and updated documentation, multinational training, closing interoperability gaps, awareness in cultural sensitivities, and standard terminology.

A Comprehensive Approach would enable the collaborative engagement of all requisite civil and military elements of international power to end hostilities, restore order, commence reconstruction, and begin to address a conflict's root causes. Early engagement of non-military instruments of power is essential. Often civilian agencies have presence in crises regions prior to military engagement. They provide continuity during transitions and are rather focused on long-term solutions Much expertise is resident within NGOs. These are particular valuable resources when it comes to design action and effects, methods for assessments and interpreting results. Consequently, a policy needs to be developed that facilitates participation of NGOs but honours their autonomy and neutrality.

Addressing the root causes and the consequences of new types of conflicts requires new types of operations. Thus, there is a need for operational concepts that help blending civil and military capabilities on the one hand and the integration of non-state actors on the other. Capabilities for interagency and joint planning are required as well as command and coordination capabilities, which ensure that the most appropriate means are employed.

The Comprehensive Approach requires new knowledge, which is to be based on a holistic analysis of the challenges to be addressed. Institutions, decision-making processes and command structures must be flexible and adaptable. In this context it is quite obvious that better information is needed, as better processes and tools to design and conduct network enabled operations in an interagency context, including international and non-governmental partners.

The core capability within the Comprehensive Approach is a superior, integrated command and control process which – based on a network of governmental and non-governmental expert knowledge and instruments of power – makes it possible to project all available instruments of power at an early stage and in an integrated fashion in order to achieve a maximum outcome. In order to get there, a systems approach is necessary. The key actors need to be analyzed from various perspectives, with particular attention paid to political, military, economic and social, information and infrastructure aspects. Providing relevant insights requires intensified cooperation with academic disciplines in terms of social, cultural, and regional studies. In this context, it is essential to take account of the knowledge requirements of all stakeholders in the broadened spectrum.

Priority for Prevention

EU Member States have accepted that they have a 'responsibility to protect' the innocent. The ESS refers to the need to develop a strategic culture that "fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention". This relates not just to humanitarian considerations, but also because instability, conflict and state failure have a detrimental impact on our own security in this interdependent world. Particular attention is needed with regard to the phenomenon of "small war". Its protagonists observe neither international standards nor arms control agreements. They make use of territories where they do not have to expect any sanctions because there is no functioning state to assume charge of such sanctions or because the state in question is too weak to impose such sanctions. This type of war does not provide for any warning time. It challenges not only the external security of the nation states and international community, but also their internal safety.

The fundamental idea of conflict prevention and preventive action corresponds to the general understanding that prevention is better than cure. In view of the expense of carrying out large-scale interventions and post-crisis rehabilitation, this understanding applies equally well to the prevention of conflicts, quite apart from the fact that great human tragedies such as famine, expulsion, war, and genocide could perhaps be prevented. Instability, conflict and deprivation lead people to flee their own countries. Integrating refugees and accepting economic migrants are difficult issues and pose huge challenges.

The challenge is to establish a dynamic stable international order within the framework of a cooperative, effective multilateralism based on the steadily increasing mutual dependence of national economic systems within the scope of globalization. It must ensure the advancement of good governance, which permits the satisfaction of the economic, social and cultural, needs of an ever-increasing number of people. The goal of the international order must be to prevent governmental and non-governmental protagonists from trying to influence this process by war. For this purpose, a comprehensive set of foreign and security policy instruments needs to be developed into a comprehensive strategy. It particularly needs to take

account of crisis prevention and the post-crisis period rather than focusing only on ending a conflict.

The essential elements of a 21st century security policy will be:

- further development of collective security,
- reinforcement of the states' exclusive right to use force,
- strengthening of good governance and
- containment of the phenomenon of "small wars".

Within the new security environment, prevention has priority in every respect. Because of the potential damage that may be caused in future conflicts and possible consequences for people, including economic and social development, the time dimension – there will be no sufficient warning time and no long-time implications – will only allow the authorities in minor cases to wait and see what damage is caused before reacting to a threat. In those cases with far-reaching consequences – e.g. in which there is a threat to the very survival of nations and to their economic and social development – priority must be given to preventive action. Moreover, a policy aimed at prevention will encourage economic development and reduce the overall costs. The advancement of the international order towards a world in which there is less force as well as the encouragement of civilization development and the containment of the phenomena of the small war are the fundamentals of such a prevention policy and instrumental in reducing the causes of violence and in establishing non-violent mechanisms for conflict management.

To achieve and secure a non-violent international order, the two most important strategic objectives of future security policy will be the establishment of a co-operative, effective multilateral world order and the prevention and containment of interstate and "*small wars*". Consequently, the development of the military instruments of the international community will head in the direction of enabling successful intervention. This approach requires military capabilities, which support deterrence by denial – i.e. the real capacity to deprive one or several states or non-governmental actors of the capability to wage war.

What are needed to influence developments on the ground and enforce the political purpose are both defensive and offensive military capabilities, which allow both military control of and the exertion of influence on the protagonists. Of course, the required capabilities are not only of a purely material nature. Legitimacy, for example, is of particular importance. Considering all the experience available, there will be two essential tasks for the armed forces in the future: One is to win a conflict militarily in a rapid and decisive manner – predominantly from a distance. The other is to consolidate the military success on the ground. Both tasks support the political purpose. There is no imperative sequence for them, so the focus of action between decision and consolidation can always shift in the course of an operation. It is determined largely also by the protagonists.

The military superiority of the intervention forces will probably prevent a conflict from escalating, especially when the political goals of all the parties involved are limited. If there are any doubts concerning the willingness or capability to intervene, the probability of the military decision phase being entered will increase distinctly. Priority should always be given to the goal of influencing the opponent's will not to make use of his warfare capability: either by stressing one's own convincing military superiority or by providing the enemy positive incentives to forgo force. If used cleverly, both elements can complement each other.

Especially in the case of "*small wars*", when the state has disintegrated or social, economic and government structures have to be rebuilt, new capabilities are required in the area of "*nation-building*", the armed forces notably being needed to support consolidation. Non-governmental and governmental protagonists will develop new areas in the course of asymmetric warfare. These will include: urban areas, the information area, the international media world, the different areas of social, economic and political life and perhaps even outer space. Every form of risk potential in societies and all forms of transition from non-violent to violent action – e.g. guerrilla action, terrorism, intifada, organized crime, migration, piracy, etc. – can be instrumentalized militarily. Especially urban areas, which will probably grow considerably in the decades to come, offer the protagonists a wide range of possibilities to use organized force and thus wage war in the grey area of organized crime with considerable financial backing.

Consequently, the security elements of the future should be designed as follows:

- Command and control:
  Interconnected complex of command and control, communications and information collection and processing as well as intelligence (C4ISR) at the disposal of the political and military leaders as well as an adequate logistics set-up for all civilian and military task elements used.
- Forward-based elements:
  Small modular task groups with a high C2 capability, the necessary situation picture, access to land-, air- and sea-based active options as well as strategic-operational mobility.
- Force multipliers and stand-off elements:
  Land-, air- and sea-based active systems which ensure that decisions can be brought about in a stand-off manner with or without the support of the forward-based task elements.
- Consolidation elements:
  Militarily organized and armed police or similar units with components for nation-building, economic and social intervention as well as for

countering international criminality/terrorism. This includes experts from the areas of administration, social affairs, infrastructure, judiciary, civil defence etc. as well as possibly support from and cooperation with non-governmental organizations.

All these elements must be able to participate in multinational coalition operations. Besides a small number of major nations, there will be few states left with war fighting capabilities with any prospect of success in an interstate war. This is in stark contrast to the emergence of more and more new and non-governmental protagonists prepared to wage war. But this is the rationale of warfare: While modern industrial states are interested in preventing war out of self-interest, there are states and non-governmental protagonists which use war as an economic or ideological factor leading to another cost-benefit calculation. Furthermore, information warfare offers the possibility to considerably affect especially those protagonists who depend on command and control systems and employ them hierarchically.

While the military decision is increasingly sought from a distance, the implementation of the political goals calls for forces on the ground. Based on the existing conflict analysis, these must as a rule have capabilities enabling them to win the hearts and minds of the societies concerned. In this type of operation, military power has the purpose of denying the protagonists of such failing states the use force and of helping to promote the stable development of a region by supporting political, social and economic development. This requires the build-up of a wide range of elements of self-organized units within these societies.

So purely military approaches are just as likely to fail as wholly civilian ones if the exclusive right to use force is left too early to the regional interplay. But the regional exclusive right to use military power is primarily a question of internal safety, i.e. the use of force by the police and police clearing-up methods in the sense of the adequacy of means.

The prerequisite for successful conflict prevention is a well-functioning early-warning system. As conflicts normally have a prehistory they can theoretically be recognized at an early stage and to a certain extent are also predictable. The crucial problem, however, is the correct assessment of a multitude of information and drawing timely conclusions. The criterion "timely" reveals the dilemma of early warning. Early warnings, which are not followed by direct actions, suggest a lack of credibility. A timely early warning does not necessarily imply that rapid and preventive action will be taken to hinder the outbreak of a conflict or war or to contain them, as the examples of Rwanda or the Balkans show. As direct national interests of states potentially intervening in international conflict prevention are often not at stake, it is often very difficult to justify the efforts which preventive action involves vis-à-vis the own population. Even if crisis prevention is successful, it may become a victim of its own success. Early action is not evidence enough that a war or a conflict did not take place just because of this. But if a warning is issued too late, there is no point in such a warning.

Manage the Change

Nothing can be achieved without the means to do the job. For the years to come, the primary policy responsibility is to make Europe function better, including its crisis prevention and crisis management structures and to enhance its collective ability to handle global crises. As Europe's ambitions are growing, there is a gap between the ambitions and the reality of European capabilities. To successfully engage in more complex and risky endeavours, it is essential to own the personnel and capabilities – both civilian and military, to back up the political decisions. To actually achieve this capability requires dedicated change management.

Change management is a structured approach to transitioning individuals, teams, and organizations from a current state to a desired future state. Change management is a well-established tool in the business world and is well suited to be applied in the field Common Security and Defence. Change management requires

- a clear vision,
- a plan that synergistically addresses
  - o people,
  - o organisation (both processes and structures/architectures) and
  - o technology.
- It includes the communication of objectives, progress and outcomes.

As the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide for a framework to strengthen the EU's capacity to address the upcoming challenges through an improved coherence, better institutional coordination and enhanced strategic decision-making, this opens a window of opportunity to introduce a change management process in order to building a Common Security and Defence in Europe that supports a Comprehensive Approach to Security. Taking the road towards a Comprehensive Approach the related vision should aim at a holistic, inter-departmental and multilateral approach that aims at effectively integrating governmental and non-governmental instruments for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-crisis rehabilitation to provide a sustainable overall strategy.

To this end the EU's needs improve its ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. Particular focus is needed to enhance cooperation between civil and military resources in order to make full use of the EU's enormous potential for conflict prevention and crisis management. This requires a concrete, practical approach that includes the exploration of possible synergies in the development of ca-

pabilities for use in civilian and military missions. This aspect of CSDP needs to be developed by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. The EU needs to plan and build appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters. For civilian missions, Europe must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. National contingents need to have full interoperability between each other.

Civilian and military leadership needs to be harmonised for interagency actions. There is an obvious need to establish policies, technologies, and procedures to enable multinational information sharing. The utility of the common knowledge base depends upon the ability to practically share data in a timely manner. It is especially in the field of stability operations that leadership and integration, synergy and rapid action are crucial factors. For military missions, EU members have to strengthen significantly their efforts on capabilities, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development.

The ways in which equipment is made available and procured needs to be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has been driving this process. There has been some success, but there is the need for much more. To ensure that dual-use technologies respond to military and civilian needs and provide more value for money the European Defence Agency needs to explore ways to connect Defence Research and Technology Investment with Technology Investment in the civil sector in order to increase interoperability.

The Comprehensive Approach builds on technology. Technology matters in the 21st century. Technological capabilities are key to the successful conduct of missions in conflict and human disaster environments. Of course this also requires a new mindset to enhance the cooperation of civil and military authorities that, in many instances, use similar organisations and equipment. Technology affects particularly the *value creation chain* of network-enabled operations, which is based on a common clear and thorough situational understanding and the networking of all relevant actors. Implementing the value creation chain makes it possible to effectively enter the decision cycle of criminal, terrorist or hostile actors and to prevent them from carrying out their plans or to limit the damage done immediately.

Network-enabling technologies play an ever-important role in the interdepartmental context. The inherent potential of affordable high-performance sensor, information and communications technologies opens up vast possibilities for a successful fulfilment of even complex, time-sensitive tasks. Networked security in interdepartmental, multinational and joint operations requires the staffs, agencies, forces and actors involved to fully cooperate across all echelons and on the basis of a common operational picture and situational understanding for the planning, command and control of operations. For networked planning and action, all parties involved need to be supplied with extensive information in near real time and without interruptions.

With both affordable and powerful state-of-the-art information and communications technologies – combined with knowledge management, modelling and simulation – and up-to-date sensors, it will be possible to generate an operational picture that reduces complexity in near real time, allows for higher-quality actions with significantly improved response time behaviour and, most importantly, significantly improves the integration of civilian and military coordination partners into operational decision-making processes. In addition to political requirements, profound findings from the work carried out by civilian actors can be included from the first planning stage. Decisions and actions are taken on the basis of a common situational understanding and implemented in a coordinated manner.

To be effective, the Comprehensive Approach must be complemented by sustained and coherent communication process. Maintaining public support for European global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining the commitments abroad. As the EU deploys police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world, governments, parliaments and EU institutions need to communicate how this contributes to security at home. Information campaigns should be substantiated by systematic and updated information, documenting progress in relevant areas. It is important to ensure that the information strategies of the main actors should complement and not contradict each other.

Engagement and Partnerships

Europe's neighbourhood is the world. Threats and risks to be confronted are clearly global. The strategic goals that will guide the political EU actions will also in future be based on three pillars:

- extending the "security belt" around Europe,
- strengthening the world order while observing current international law and promoting good governance by promoting democracy, fighting corruption, and developing cooperation, and
- proactively fighting old and new threats.

The guiding principles for future international EU activities need to build on an effective multilateralism under UN primacy and pre-

ventive actions in a comprehensive security sense.

While the political will for engagement may rapidly grow as global issues are becoming dynamically more threatening, the EU capabilities have to be built step by step and in close cooperation with partners. The Comprehensive Approach builds on partnership. Partnerships will be decisive factors in meeting tomorrow's security challenges, but to this end they need to provide for a solid foundation in order to successfully cooperate in a complex, dynamic environment. In sum, legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making, crisis prevention and crisis management in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions. This very fact highlights the necessity to spell out the Comprehensive Approach and to getting engaged in a dedicated change management process that enables the partners with regard to their people, organisations and technology to work closely together for common purpose and common objectives.

The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Over the last two decades, the premises on which this security architecture was built have largely vanished, and the roles and relative importance of the security institutions have undergone significant changes. NATO has taken on multiple functions. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) does not play the central role originally envisaged for it. The EU has developed its own security and defence dimension. Both the EU and NATO have enlarged. The altered roles of the EU, NATO and other institutions as they have developed need to be recognised. For example, NATO will have to be an essential element of any future architecture – but not the only one. The role of the OSCE could perhaps be strengthened. And what about Asia?

Without any doubt the geopolitical point of gravity has been shifting to the east. Europe needs to come to grips with that evolution. In terms of security, the first challenge is to define European interests in Asia. How much does Europe need to care about this region for its own stability? Europe has already deepened links with its Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, and security. China and India, both nuclear powers, are rising rapidly to meet Japanese economic, industrial and technological strength. All three have – respectively are rapidly acquiring – the capacities to challenge Europe and the United States in many fields. The future of international stability and security will largely depend on their ability and willingness to manage their respective growth without major conflicts and on their decision to share responsibility with regard to the challenges of global governance.

The relations with Japan are particularly promising, since it is a strong and stable democracy, an ally of the United States, and a long-term member of the G-8, clearly supporting international stability and security. Certainly there is potential to strengthen the relationship between the EU and Japan on the security policy level – for example by an enhanced, long-term cooperation in security issues, including peace operations and crisis management. In fact, the development of the European relations with the other Asian powers calls for further advances in the Euro-Japanese relationship. A couple of policy issues may be particularly promising, among those climate, non-proliferation, free trade agreement, and Afghanistan.

Twenty years ago the Berlin Wall fell and the world began to change. The time has come to make the Comprehensive Approach work – not only in Europe and for the European Union and NATO, but also beyond. The Comprehensive Approach is added value for everyone involved. The underpinning logic – the distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management – has proven its validity. It provides a sound basis not only for Europe's security policy on which to approach the coming fifteen years.

Ralph Thiele, Köln

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