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LEADOFF

Liebe Mitglieder,

das kommende Jahr wird für uns Deutsche aus mehrfacher Sicht ein brasilianisches. Dies ist zum einen der Weltmeisterschaft im Fußball geschuldet, bei der ein geneigtes deutsches Publikum „endlich“ von Jogi's Mannen erleben will, dass sie es nicht nur ins Endspiel schaffen, sondern dieses auch gewinnen. Auch unsere Bundeskanzlerin hat ein Endspiel in Brasilien vor sich. Sie reist samt Kabinett zu Ihrem strategischen Partner Brasilien, um ... ja worum geht es eigentlich in der beabsichtigten gemeinsamen Kabinettsitzung mit den brasilianischen Kollegen?

Bisher interpretieren Brasilianer und Deutsche ihre strategische Partnerschaft recht unterschiedlich. Für die Deutschen stehen wohlmeinende Gesten im Vordergrund; die Fortsetzung der jahrzehntelangen Entwicklungspartnerschaft: Amazonasschutz, Wissenschaftskooperation, Schwerpunktland auf der Buchmesse.

Die Brasilianer wollen dagegen mehr gemeinsame Aktion auf politischer, technologischer und wirtschaftlicher Ebene. Wer wird wohl dieses Endspiel gewinnen?

Die Beiträge dieser Denkwürdigkeiten bieten wichtige gedankliche Anregungen zu diesem spannenden Thema und lassen dabei auch China und die Türkei nicht aus dem Auge.

Der Vorstand der pmg wünscht Ihnen eine schöne Adventszeit, ein frohes Weihnachtsfest und ein gutes Neues Jahr!

Ralph Thiele, Vorstandsvorsitzender

IMPRESSUM

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“Think Different”: Building security partnerships for the 21st Century

The Case of Brazil and India

A major foreign policy priority for the United States over the next ten years is finding new security partners to help it meet global challenges. In the past the United States has been able to rely upon its European and Asian allies to supply diplomatic, economic, military, and logistical assistance for various U.S. efforts. The problem the United States faces today is many of its traditional allies are declining powers. The population of Japan and Europe are getting older and shrinking. The Europe area shares of global GDP continues to shrink falling from 21.3% in 1990 to a projected 11.9% in 2017.¹ Defense cuts in European NATO countries are eroding military capabilities calling into question their ability to conduct power

¹ International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2012, Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) share of world total 1990-2017. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx>

projection operations in critical regions such as the Persian Gulf.²

To fill this void, American security analysts have identified India and Brazil as two possible candidates the United States could form partnerships with. India and Brazil upon first glance appear to fit the criteria for forming effective partnerships. Over the last decade the Indian and Brazilian states have become increasingly effective in mobilizing their military, economic, and political resources to meet international and domestic challenges. In a general sense both countries have growing capabilities to address global issues. In addition, there appears to be a convergence of interests and values between India/Brazil and the United States. As democratic powers both countries share ideological principles with United States that theoretically should promote security cooperation.

Despite these high hopes and a great deal of diplomatic activity inside the United States government there is a degree of disappointment in the level of cooperation the United States has achieved with India and Brazil. India did not select an American fighter in its competition for a new medium multi-role combat aircraft and it has been reluctant to support economic sanctions against Iran. Brazil's SSN program with its intent to develop a full nuclear full cycle appears to undermine U.S. global non-proliferation objectives. Brazil also has adopted a different if not softer approach to revolutionary regimes such as Hugo Chavez government in Venezuela than the United States. Furthermore, the recent revelations about electronic espionage conducted by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in which the Brazil President was a target has cast at best a near-term pall over U.S. and Brazilian diplomatic relations. At worst the damage might be longer lasting and heighten Brasilia's suspicions of the strategic in-

tentions and objectives of Washington.

These recent events reinforce our analysis indicating that the failure to build more productive security relationship with India and Brazil springs from an inability by U.S. officials to "think different" about 21st century partnerships. U.S. officials are mistakenly trying to recreate the 20th century partnership models the United States had with European and Asian states during the Cold War. Instead the United States should develop security partnerships with India and Brazil that focus on four areas:

- Expanding their role and capabilities for maintaining regional stability and security
- Improving their ability to balance against capitalist authoritarian state powers such as China and Russia
- Enhancing their abilities to take a leading role in UN sponsored peacekeeping and stability operations
- Assisting them in maintaining better control over their territory

This article explores the potential and limitations of building partnerships with Brazil and India from three directions. First, it provides a framework for comparing the importance differences between 20th and 21st partnerships. Second, it analyzes the national security strategy and military modernization programs of Brazil and India and how well they align with the interests of the United States. It also briefly reviews the expansion of security ties between the U.S.-Brazil and the U.S.-India over the last decade. Finally, the article concludes with a series of policy recommendations about managing expectations for these partnerships in the short and long term and the specific areas the partnerships should focus on.

20th vs. 21st Century Partnerships

The United States initial alliance and partnership building efforts took place in the unique geo-strategic environment that occurred after World War II. The United States emerged out of the war in an extremely powerful and dominated position in global af-

fairs. All of United States allies and the defeated axis allies were badly physically damaged with their power much diminished. On the other hand the United States economy was at full employment due to wartime mobilization and its military expenditures were almost 75% of the global total.³ American preponderance was the fundamental strategic reality after the war and was an underlying factor in all of its post-war relations.

Another factor was the fear generated by the Soviet Union especially the Red Army occupying large portions of Europe and Eurasia. This direct strategic threat was the driving force in Western Europeans' explicit invitation to the United States to form a strategic alliance.⁴ After China's communist takeover and North Korea's surprise attack on South Korea, fears of communist aggression expanded to Asia.

A final factor was the United States direct military occupation of Western sector of Germany (in conjunction with Britain and France) and Japan. In these cases not only was the United States the dominant power, it was also a direct factor in the domestic reconstruction of the defeated axis powers. In these cases, the United States imposed a strategic orientation on these states and the terms of U.S. engagement with them.

The combination of these factors, which continued for at least the first twenty years after World War II, formed a particular style of international partnership. These were not relationships of equals. The United States was by far the dominant power although it openly consulted with other states ultimately it defined the terms of the engagement.

The underlying rationale for states seeking to engage with the United States was protection from the threat posed by the Soviet Union

² For a more complete analysis of the strategic and operational implications of NATO Europe's defense reduction see F. Stephen Larabee, et.al., NATO and the Challenges of Austerity, RAND Corporation, MG-1196-OSD, 2012

³ John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p.279.

⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997).

and communist states allied with it. Therefore, the form of engagement was an alliance, a formal/legal commitment of security cooperation between two or more states. The strongest form of United States commitment was laid out in Article V of the NATO treaty where it was agreed:

“that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked”

Other similar statements were made tying the United States to the defense of various states in Asia and the Middle East.

The direct military nature of the threat meant the United States’ measuring stick of an alliance was a state’s willingness and ability to conduct combined military operations. If the United States was going to be involved in the direct protection of state it wanted that state to allocate enough resources to its own and others defense and it wanted their armed forces to be ready to operate with the United States effectively. This meant on the security side interactions were dominated by exercises and training activity to prepare for potential combat. Acquisition of military equipment was done toward an eye of operating jointly and filling in potential military capability gaps.

The major challenges these alliances faced were two fold. First, the United States faced the difficulty of making security guarantees credible to allied nations when meeting its commitment might risk its own nuclear destruction. This also worked the other way around as allied nations consistently sought ways to ensure that the United States would come to their defense even if these measures endangered the United States. The second major challenge as discussed above was the

free rider problem. In an alliance where the United States had the preponderance of resources and capabilities what was the best way to encourage states to spend enough resources on their own defense.

support.⁵ Brazil and India therefore do not seek a formal military alliance with a firm commitment from the United States to defend them. Instead they are seeking looser strategic partnerships with United States in order to modern-

	20 th Century	21 st Century
Balance of Power	U.S. dominant	More a relationship of equals
Rationale for Relationship	Jointly address direct threat from Soviet Union/communism	Address global challenges/ balance against other rising powers
Style of Relations	Legally binding military alliance	Strategic Partnership
Measuring Stick of Cooperation	Ability to conduct joint military operations	Willingness to transfer sensitive equipment and technologies
Key Challenge	Maintaining alliance in the face of existential threat/ avoiding free rider problem	Disagreements over how to address critical security issues

Figure 1: Comparison of 20th and 21st Partnerships

As noted in Figure 1, there are likely to be profound differences between the United States 20th and 21st partnerships.

The first major difference is the international environment. While the United States is still an extremely powerful state it is not as dominant as it was immediately after World War II. India and Brazil are large proud nations who see themselves as important emerging actors on the international scene that has increasing multi-polar features. They are going to demand a fairly equitable relationship with the United States and will jealously guard their own sovereignty and strategic freedom of maneuver.

The most important difference between 20th and 21st century partnerships is the lack of an overwhelming direct security threat to either India or Brazil that compels them to seek U.S. assistance. While Brazil faces very modest and India faces moderate to severe security challenges, their leadership believe they can meet them without direct U.S. military

ize their militaries and to improve their global position while at the same time maintaining a high degree of strategic autonomy.

While the United States may desire the ability to conduct joint military operations, this is not on the top of Brazil and India priority list. They measure their relationship with the United States by its willingness to transfer sensitive equipment and technology to them. In their eyes this is a prime indication of the United States reliability and consistency as a partner.

A final difference between 20th and 21st century partnerships is the key challenges the partnership faces. As will be discussed in the next section U.S. and Brazil/Indian strategic interests have to a great extent converged over the last decade. However important disagreements still remain on issues

⁵ Brazil faces no meaningful military threat from its Latin American neighbors. India on the other hand does face the nuclear-armed rivalry of Pakistan and China but its leadership does believe its independent nuclear deterrent force gives it enhanced strategic autonomy.

such as how to combat nuclear proliferation and assure energy security. The challenge for both partners is maintaining the positive aspects of the strategic relationship in the mist of inevitable disagreements on particular issues.

One other thing to keep in mind with 21st century partnerships is their utility in preventing potentially negative developments. Two developments would be especially troubling for the United States. The first and the most likely would be India and Brazil emerging as major competitive rivals to the United States in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific. This rivalry would be spurred by nationalism and the desire by Indian and Brazilian leaders to show they have the capability to stand up to the United States.⁶ This would in essence be an extreme form of Gaullism which bedeviled U.S. security relations in Europe for the better part of two decades. The second possibility would be anti-Western rising power partnership between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). Although much less likely than the Gaullist scenario the BRICS do hold annual summits which call for a more multilateral international order and for institutional changes to the IMF and the World Bank.⁷ The BRICS also have jointly stated their concerns about the erosion of state sovereignty in face of Western desires to introduce a doctrine of armed humanitarian intervention when human rights abuses occur. Security partnerships with India and Brazil will be very useful in preventing these negative outcomes. Establishing positive relations with India and Brazil will weaken their strategic interest for joining an anti-Western partnership. The United States can dampen negative nationalist tendencies by demonstrating U.S.

⁶ Unfortunately the prospect of this scenario involving Brazil has been enhanced by the Snowden revelations about NSA's electronic surveillance of the Brazilian President.

⁷ BRIC Summit Joint Statement, Brasilia, Brazil, April 15, 2010

<http://www.cfr.org/brazil/bric-summit-joint-statement-april-2010/p21927>
and BRIC Summit Joint Statement, New Delhi, India, March 29th, 2012
<http://www.cfr.org/brazil/brics-summit-delhi-declaration/p27805>

support for the emergence of India and Brazil as great powers if not the dominant actors in their region. As was the case during the Cold War with French, a great deal of U.S. effort will be necessary to show the United States is taking into account the wishes and anxieties of its more nationalistic and independent partners.

Brazil

While Brazil's importance in the global economy has been widely discussed, less commented upon is the impact Brazil's economic take off has had on its national security policies and military modernization efforts. The discovery of large oil deposits off Brazil's coast, the continuing challenge Brazil faces in managing and controlling its vast territory, and its desire to become a global power have resulted in a new national strategy for defense. The adoption of this new strategy and the additional resources available to Brazil's security forces have resulted in a significant increase in Brazil's military capabilities.

Roberto Mangabeira Unger, who took leave from his position at Harvard Law School, where Barack Obama was once his pupil, to serve in the Brazilian government as Minister of Strategic Affairs, put forward a new blueprint for Brazil's armed forces in 2008. The plan included a continuation of the military's goal of mastering nuclear technology to power submarines, the role for Brazil in nation-building efforts such as the Brazilian-led UN peacekeeping force in Haiti, and an expanded role for the army in policing the Amazon.⁸

Building on Roberto Unger strategic blueprint the Brazilian government announced in December 2008 a new National Strategy of Defense. The emphasis of the strategy was on "national." In the Brazilian view, the new defense strategy was to be linked to development strategy and involve the

⁸ "Brazil politics: new roles for Army," EIU ViewsWire, January 16, 2009 at <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1637137791&sid=43&Fmt=3&clientId=61650&RQT=309&VName=PQD>.

society at large.⁹ The plan is focused on the medium and long-term modernization of the Brazilian military along three main axes: reorganizing the armed forces, restructuring the defense industry, and implementing a new personnel policy. The goal of the strategy is to develop the ability to monitor and control Brazil's air space, territory and jurisdictional waters, with priority on the areas that Brazilian strategists call the "Green Amazon" (the Amazon region) and the "Blue Amazon" (the territorial waters and exclusive zones where large new oil deposits have been found).

To accomplish this goal, the new defense strategy contemplates a repositioning of military personnel from the country's heartland to the North, West, and South Atlantic regions.¹⁰ The repositioning includes the establishment of new army brigades and three new air bases in the Amazon region, and of the 2nd Fleet and the 2nd Marine Division with headquarters on or near the mouth of the Amazon. In addition, the new Brazilian defense strategy prioritizes strategic mobility, monitoring and control. The reform of the armed forces contemplates establishing a joint staff and redefining the role of the Ministry of Defense to ensure that the Brazilian military services modernize in a coherent fashion.

Noteworthy is the strategic planning construct, the Hypotheses of Employment (HE) which allows the Brazilian Armed Forces to plan for their use in "*a certain situation or area of strategic interest in national defense.*" Unlike the more structured Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) in the United States, the Brazilian planners have designed the HE to take into account, "*the high degree of indetermination and unpredictability [of] threats against the country.*"¹¹ The U.S. decision to reactivate the 4th Fleet in 2008 has been cited by

⁹ As the letter from Defense Minister Nelson Jobim to the President stated, the strategy was "to be consolidated by means of the engagement of the Brazilian people." Brazilian Government, Ministry of Defense, "National Strategy of Defense," December 2008, at <https://www.defesa.gov.br/>

¹⁰ Brazil, "National Strategy of Defense," p. 13.

¹¹ Brazil, "National Strategy of Defense," p. 46.

senior Brazilian officials as a partial rationale for a more robust Brazilian national security strategy and defense modernization plan.¹²

Each of Brazil's three military services have large ambitions for their forces. A core strategic requirement identified for the Brazilian Navy is developing and deploying a "sufficient" force to deny the use of sea approaches to Brazil by any hostile naval force. In order to meet this objective priority was given to the building of a fleet of modern conventional diesel, electric, and nuclear-powered submarines. Current plans call for close cooperation with France in the development of both variants of France's most modern SCORPENE-type submarine. The development of the nuclear power system will be an indigenous Brazilian effort that will include the construction of a shipyard capable of building nuclear-powered submarines. This new shipyard will produce the new generation of conventional-powered variants of the same French design. In 2012, this effort has been consummated with Brazil and France committing to the creation of a Sociedade de Proposito Especifico or SPE consortium which includes Brizal's Odebrecht Corporation (50%), France's DCNS (49%) and the Brazilian Navy (1% "golden share,; with veto power). Further Brazil will build an naval facility south of Rio de Janeiro at Itguai capable of handling nuclear-powered submarines.¹³

Aside from this technologically ambitious flagship effort, the new National Strategy of Defense in 2008 called for a massive expansion of the Brazilian surface fleet over the next ten to twenty years. This plan includes a new fleet to protect the northeast coast of Brazil and calls for the construction of two new aircraft carriers, four landing platform helicopters (LPH), and a new generation of ASW and anti-aircraft frigates.¹⁴

¹² Sam LaGrone, "Beg, borrow, steel" reborn fleet fights the drugs cartels," Jane's Navy International, December 2009.

¹³ "Brazil & France in Deal for SSKs, SSN", <http://bacajela.blogspot.com/2012/04brazil-in-deal-for-ssk-ssn.html>

¹⁴ Victor Barreira, "Brazil puts price tag on new submarine fleet," Jane's Defence Weekly, Au-

Currently the Brazilian Navy has only one operational carrier, the ex-French Foch light carrier. Current plans include the long delayed Barroso corvette program. To sustain littoral operations, a new fleet of patrol boats, the CL54, are planned with two under construction. Currently, the Navy is in negotiation with both the French and Italians about acquiring their recently developed multi-purpose frigates, the FREMM program with its advanced air defense and ASW capability. Consistent with these objectives, the Brazilian navy will maintain sufficient attack and surveillance aircraft capable of operating off its carrier while maintaining a small fleet of land-based search and rescue helicopters, the EC 725 program.

The carrier aircraft modernization includes the acquisition of six modernized S-2T Turbotracer and the modernization of the A-4 Skyhawk fighter bomber fleet of some thirty aircraft. In support of Army sealift requirements, two ex-British LSTs have been acquired. The long-range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) fleet is maintained by the Brazilian Air Force.¹⁵

The Brazilian Army priority is to developing a capacity to deploy ground forces by air and sea to regions of Brazil that are not garrisoned during peacetime. This effort calls for the comprehensive modernization of Brazil's armored, motorized infantry, and light infantry forces. The armored force will acquire a new generation main battle tank optimized for sea movement, while the motorized infantry will acquire a new generation of wheeled armored fighting vehicles. This family of fighting vehicles is being developed with the assistance from the Italian AFV manufacturer, IVECO, the Guarani program. There is a tactical air defense program that includes the development of transportable surveillance radar, the M60 SABER that will evolve into

gust 24, 2009. If the Brazilian Navy reaches its very ambitious goals by the mid-2020s then it will have a force posture similar to if not superior to the Maritime Self-Defense Forces of Japan.

¹⁵ Jose Higuera, "Naval Programmes in Latin America," Military Technology, January 2009.

the more capable SABER 200. Finally, there will be a major effort to modernize the combat soldier ensemble that includes new night vision, navigation, and load bearing equipment. This equipment will be optimized for the unique and demanding operational environment characterized by Brazil's geography and climate.¹⁶

A high-priority program is the continued modernization of the Brazilian Aerospace Defense System (SISDABRA).¹⁷ This program, consisting of a mixture of land- and air-based radar, will be expanding through the exploitation of a new generation of space-based surveillance satellites. The overall air defense capacity of the Brazilian Air Force will be modernized with the acquisition of a new generation of fighter bombers, the F-X2 Program. As of the fall of 2012, the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the Dassault Rafale, and the Saab Gripen NG remain on the shortlist.

All three proposals are being considered from a variety of perspectives, of which the dimension of technology transfer to the Brazilian aerospace industry is the priority factor.¹⁸ The current generation of Brazil's fighter-bombers, F-5s, AMX, and Mirage, are being modernized with improved avionics while awaiting a longer term decision as to whether to acquire more than the 36 of the more advanced F-X2 as their replacement. This plan calls for the coproduction of approximately additional 120 fighter bombers, a central feature of this modernization program. Another major aircraft program is the co-production of the EC725

¹⁶ "New Defence Strategy for Brazil – Interview with Nelson A. Jobim, Minister of Defense of Brazil, Military Technology, January 2009.

¹⁷ This national air surveillance system is a national complement to the regional Sistema de Vigilancia da Amazonia (SIVIM) system designed to give Brazil an increased capacity to assert its sovereign control over the Amazon region especially in the tri-border area with Peru and Colombia.

¹⁸ According to a senior Brazilian military officer, Brazil is not interested in purchasing a weapons system; what it wants is to acquire the technology to build the system. Rabasa interview, Washington, D.C., September 2009.

medium lift helicopter to satisfy the joint needs of all three services.¹⁹

To meet near-term attack helicopter needs, the air force plans to acquire twelve Russian Mi-35 Hind-class attack aircraft.²⁰ This is Brazil's first acquisition of a Russian combat aircraft. The other ambitious indigenous aircraft program is the development of a jet propelled equivalent to the C-130 transport and tanker, the KC-390. This is Embraer's most ambitious aircraft development to date. Finally, the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) fleet will be upgraded with the modernization of eight P-3A acquired from the United States and some 50 smaller P-95 and C-95 light patrol aircraft previously acquired from Embraer. A more ambitious plan to develop an MPA derived from the C-190 commuter jet, the P-190 has been shelved for the foreseeable future.

One piece of Brazil's security modernization program has the potential to cause serious distributions in U.S.-Brazil relations. In recent years Brazil's nuclear ambitions have re-emerged via its nuclear submarine program and the recent further expansion of its civilian nuclear program. Some in the U.S. arms control community believe that Brazil is building a nuclear infrastructure that could lead to the creation of a "virtual" nuclear arsenal with a strategically significant breakout capability.²¹ These worries were heightened by Brazil's intervention in the Iranian nuclear crisis in 2010 when it appeared to be protecting its own desire to maintain a robust nuclear infrastructure.

The Brazilian government has strongly argued that the joint Franco-Brazilian SSN program will

conform to the NPT since the French designed naval reactor relies on uranium fuel enriched to 5% much less than the 20% threshold that the IAEA treats a clear pathway toward the enrichment of nuclear bomb making material.²² It has also argued its investments in an indigenous capacity to master the full nuclear fuel cycle are consistent with the terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), bilateral agreements with Argentina on the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which declares Latin America a nuclear weapons free zone. So far, the Obama Administration has remained publically silent on this issue. This is in marked contrast to the United States aggressive attempts to convince Iran that must give up its capacity to manufacture 20% enrichment uranium which is well above the 3-4% requirement for civilian nuclear power fuel.²³

The election of Dilma Rousseff brought about major changes to the military's investment plans. Although the ambitious multi-vector national security strategy as announced in 2008 has not been modified, the tempo of investment in major weapon systems has dramatically decelerated. For the Navy, the technologically demanding joint program with France to develop improved naval construction facilities to build a fleet of advanced conventionally and nuclear powered attack submarines continues on a robust schedule. On the other hand, the program to develop and build two carriers each with an associated fleet of air defense frigates has been stretched out by at least five years. Other less expensive programs including the production of Ocean Patrol Vessels of the Ama-

zonas class continues as scheduled. The Air Force's ambitious F-X2 program has move to the right with a decision to pick one of the fighter aircraft on the shortlist put off several years. On the other hand, the ambitious program to develop KC-390 continues to move a pace now reinforced by a partnership between Embraer and Boeing Aerospace.

The reasons for this deceleration in Brazilian defense spending are unexceptional. First, after weathering the global downturn of the Great Recession rather effectively, the Brazilian economy's growth rate has sharply decelerated over the last year in part prompted by a drop in raw material and agricultural trade with China. The old worry of low growth and much higher inflation has reemerged. Second, the Rousseff government has redirected federal resources to a massive urban renewal effort especially in Rio to make ready Brazil's role as host to the World Football Championship in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. Third, it has become apparent that Brazil must make up for lost time and massively invest in a wide spectrum of major infrastructure projects that includes modernized ports, multi-lane highways, and high speed rail lines, electric power generation, and associated transmission systems. The political importance of fulfilling these domestic priorities have been further heightened by the massive and sustained anti-government demonstrations against the Brazilian governments that rapidly emerged during the summer of 2013. One of the major themes of the protestors was the government's failure to modernize the urban public transportation systems during the build-up to the World Football Championship and Olympics.

U.S.-Brazilian relations while historically not hostile have tended to be characterized by a distant rather than a close friendship. In fact, a previous source of tension was Washington's willingness several decades ago to put pressure to successfully demobilize Brazil's efforts to develop its nuclear and space launch capabili-

¹⁹ Victor Barreira, "Senate approves Brazilian helicopter acquisition," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, September 7, 2009.

²⁰ Robert Hewson, Brazil prepares to accept first Mi-35Ms," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, December 1, 2009.

²¹ U.S. nuclear power submarine use 95% enriched uranium to deal with power and volume requirements as well as assuring long "core" life to minimize the need for refueling. See James Clay Moltz, "Global Submarine Proliferation: Emerging Trends and Problems", Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), NTI Issue Brief, March 2006 at http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_74.html.

²² Unlike the U.S. designed naval reactor that require 90% enriched uranium (bomb making material), the French naval reactor is derived from a civilian power design and its optimized for more frequent refueling than the U.S. reactors.

²³ See Cole J. Harvey, "At Sea Over Naval HEU: Expanding Interest in Nuclear Propulsion Poses Proliferation Challenges", NTI, November 29, 2010 and Greg Thielmann and Wyatt Hoffman, "Submarine Nuclear Reactors: A Worsening Proliferation Challenge", The Arms Control Association, Threat Assessment Brief, July 26, 2012.

ties. Currently, the United States and Brazil share many common interests and values. Both countries want a peaceful and stable South America and see a need to strengthen global institutions such as the UN, World Bank, IMF, and the WTO. Brazil has been an active force for promoting peace in war torn nations. The United States and Brazil have worked together in UN peacekeeping mission with particular attention to Africa and the Caribbean. The two countries also share democratic values with President Rousseff signaling that advancing international human rights will be an emphasis in her administration.

Working toward these common strategic objectives has often been undermined by the two nations differing perspective on how to achieve them. Brazil approach to international relations is characterized by its view that self-determination and sovereignty should be the core values of the international system a central tenet of the BRICS. Although Brazil has long been the strongest power in Latin America it is proud of its long tradition of nonintervention in the internal affairs of its neighbors. The United States has often taken a more direct and interventionist approach to relations with its Southern neighbors. This is reflected in the nation's differing approaches to Venezuela and Bolivia. While not supporting Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Bolivia's Evo Morales anti-capitalist and anti-U.S. agendas, Brazil has tend to see their integration into regional organization as way to defuse tension. The United States on the other hand has been more critical seeking to isolate and discredit the Chavez regime and asking regional organization to be more critical of the democratic failings of the Venezuela government.

Brazil views and how they align and conflict with those of the United States can be seen through the international groupings it has chosen to take part in. On the one hand, Brazil was a pivotal player in the formation of the IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) grouping which unites three large multicultural and multiracial democracies.

At its core this grouping represents the global need to project democratic principles and the desirability of democracy even for developing states. On the other hand, Brazil is also part of the wider BRICS grouping which also includes China and Russia. The BRICS grouping is more in the realist tradition with economic and political power flowing away from the developed nations toward emerging ones. Brazil, especially under President Lulu, has focused on expanding trade relations with the BRICS states seeing them as a way of promoting a more multi-polar, less U.S. centric international system.

While disagreements remain, the United States and Brazil are moving toward much closer security relations. In April 2010 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and then Minister of Defense Jobin signed the U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation Agreement. This agreement laid the groundwork for future cooperation on issues related to defense, intelligence, and security. Post this agreement the Obama Administration intensified its effort to build a dramatically better strategic relationship with the new Rousseff Presidency. The public face of this effort emerged during the April 9 the Obama-Rousseff summit in Washington. The creation of U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation Dialogue (DCD) was announced with a planned follow-on meeting later that month between Secretary of Defense Panetta and Minister of Defense Amorim.

Elements of this bilateral defense agreement include:

- The previously signed U.S. – Brazil Defense Cooperation Agreement
- General Security of Military Information Agreement
- Military Exercises and Exchanges
- Cooperation in Haiti
- Humanitarian and Disaster Response Operations
- The offering of a coproduction agreement of the FA-18E/F Super Hornet fighter bomber²⁴

²⁴ "Fact Sheet U.S.-Brazil Defense Cooperation", The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, April 09, 2012.

The latter item signaled a willingness by the Obama Administration to be more forthcoming on the transfer of advanced military technology to facilitate Brazilian coproduction of the Super Hornet.²⁵ This commitment took on concrete form with the Boeing Aerospace Corporation signing on a strategic business alliance with Embraer to coproduce the Super Hornet, assist in the development of marketing the KC-390 tanker-freighter and the Super Tucano light reconnaissance attack aircraft aka the A-29.²⁶

Overall, there appears to be an opportunity to cement a much more robust geo-strategic and geo-economic U.S.-Brazilian relationship.²⁷ However, Brazil's nuclear plans and its desire to maintain a degree of strategic distance from United States may limit the degree of cooperation possible.

India

Unlike Brazil, India confronts a broad range of serious internal and external security challenges. Meeting these challenges and maintaining a high degree of strategic autonomy are the key drivers behind India's national security strategy and military modernization program.

One major question confronting the potential value of a U.S. partnership with India is whether India's profound social, economic, and political problems will slow its emergence as a great power. In

²⁵ Elements of this wide-ranging industrial cooperation program includes: a) Raytheon identifying Brazilian manufacturing and support opportunities to participate in the Super Hornet's advance radar and electro-optical systems; b) North Grumman plans to develop Brazil's capacity to upgrade its aerospace manufacturing capability including composite materials and c) GE aviation offering the opportunity of Brazilian companies to engage in the inspection, testing and support of advanced military jet engines.

²⁶ "Boeing's SUPER HORNET Offering for Brazil's F-X2 Competition" in "Global Up and Coming Markets, Military Technology, October 22, 2012

²⁷ This may include the opportunity of closer cooperation with Brazil nascent space launch and satellite programs which have faltered due in part to a lack of national funding. See Doug Messier, "Brazil Scales Back Launch Vehicle Plans", Parabolic Reading List, <http://www.parabolicare.com/2013/02/10/brazil-scales-back-launch-vehicle-plans/> for a description of the phenomenon .

the security sphere, India faces at least three internal threats. Perhaps the most serious is the Naxalite movement which has spread to more than two-third of India's states. Originally a peasant movement, the Naxalite/Maoist organization has become increasingly militarized and has broadened into urban areas.²⁸ Another internal insurgency centers around Islamist extremists who under the banner of the Indian Mujahideen have launched attacks killing hundreds in cities across India such as Jaipur, Bangalore, and New Delhi. The longstanding violence in Jammu and Kashmir also continues with increasingly indications that it now originates mostly from local and not international factors.

Many analysts see the multiple rebellions India faces as a failure of its governance and a reflection on India's inability to peacefully bridge its divides. These divides include those between rural and urban populations which have been exacerbated as the process of industrialization arrives in formerly rural communities.²⁹ In addition religious and caste difference continue to provide the fuel for sectarian violence in various Indian regions. The question for India and its potential partners is whether the need to deal with these homegrown problems will sap energy and resources away from India's desire to develop its international capabilities.

India's external security challenges span the full spectrum of conflict ranging from terrorism and insurgency all the way to nuclear war. The two external actors which pose the greatest threat to India are Pakistan and China. Since the 1980s Pakistan has utilized insurgent groups to tie down and weakened Indian military forces. Pakistan supported terror-

ist operations include the December 2001 terrorist assault against the Indian Parliament and the November 2008 attack in Mumbai. Pakistan also continues to pose a conventional threat to India. The most recent incident was the 1999 crossing of the line of control by Pakistani forces in Kargil. India responded to this occupation of its territory with an air and land assault which succeeded in replying the attack without a further escalation of the conflict. Finally, there is the nuclear stand-off between Pakistan and India. India seeks to deter a Pakistani nuclear strike through a minimum deterrent nuclear posture.

As is the case with most Asian powers, the rise of China has heightened concern about India's strategic environment. India as a trading nation has viewed with a degree of alarm, China's development of ports and other infrastructure projects across the Indian Ocean Region. India officials fear what has been described as a "string of pearls" policy which would allow China to use its series of bases and naval forces in India's neighborhood to rapidly cut off its maritime access. A more traditional security concern is India and China's border dispute which was never resolved after the 1962 war between the two countries. India has kept a close watch on the border area which has become more accessible to China's military forces as infrastructure on the Chinese side of the border has improved. In the nuclear sphere India knows it lags behind China in nuclear and missile capability. The challenge for India is the development of a secure second strike capability which can reach high-value Chinese targets.

India's rapid economic growth over the last decade and half has allowed it to put significant resources toward meeting these external and internal security concerns. India's official defense budget almost doubled over the last ten years reaching \$44.2B in 2011.³⁰ By the mid-2020s India is

projected to have a larger defense budget than Britain and France the two largest military spenders in NATO after the United States. Modernization efforts are occurring across all three Indian military services and in the internal security services as well. Between 1980 and 2010, India was the world's largest arms importer with sales totally \$65B.³¹ These efforts are improving India's security capabilities for both regional and global challenges.

In terms of international power projection the Navy and the Air Force are generally regarded as the more important services. The Indian Army has been one of largest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping operations although it has avoided more risky peace enforcement operations since the its' problematic intervention in Sri Lanka. While the Army share of the defense budget has been decreasing in comparison to the Air Force and Navy it still accounts for 50% of Indian defense budgets. This is hardly surprising in light of the land threat posed by Pakistan and China.

The Indian Navy is a formidable force which in many respects equals or exceeds Chinese capabilities.³² Its maritime doctrine is focused on the Indian Ocean which provides transport for a high percent of India external trade and the vast majority of the energy supplies India relies on.³³ In recent years, the Indian Navy has continued to update and modernize its fleet purchasing guided missile destroyers, diesel electric submarines from France, and an amphibious transport ship the former USS Trenton.

The Indian Navy has operated at least one aircraft carrier since 1961. Its long term goal is a three aircraft carrier force which would

²⁸ P.V. Ramana "India's Maoist Insurgency: Evolution, Current Trends, and Responses" pp. 29-45 in India's Washington D.C., 2011. Contemporary Security Challenges edited by Michael Kugelman, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington D.C., 2011.

²⁹ Nandini Sundar "At War with Oneself: Constructing Naxalism as India's Biggest Security Threat" pp. 46-68 in India's Washington D.C., 2011. Contemporary Security Challenges edited by Michael Kugelman, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,

³⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research, SIPRI Military Expenditure database <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (accessed December 28th, 2012).

³¹ Stockholm International Peace Research, SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers> (accessed December 28th, 2012).

³² George J. Gilboy and Eric Heginbotham, Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012) pp.174-190.

³³ For India Maritime Doctrine see Government of India "Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy," Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defense (Navy), 2007.

allow India to have a continual presence in the Western and Eastern portions of the Indian Oceans.³⁴ These plans have suffered a series of setbacks because of the continuing delays in the refitting of the former Admiral Gorshkov, which India purchased from Russia. This incident points out the serious problem India's Navy and other services face because of their dependence on foreign defense suppliers.

U.S. officials have been consistently impressed in exchanges and exercises with the capabilities of the Indian Air Force.³⁵ In recent years it has become a full spectrum Air Force with a precision conventional strike capability, Airborne Warning Control System (AWACS) capability, intra-theater airlifters, UAVs, and the beginnings of a military space surveillance capability. These capabilities have been enhanced through recent purchase from the United States including C-130J and C-17 transport aircraft and P-8A maritime patrol aircraft.

This quick glance across the threats India faces and its modernization efforts indicate why many U.S. policymakers see great potential in a U.S.-Indian partnership. Unlike many of the United States traditional allies India is increasing its military spending and is improving its capabilities to project military power. India modernization program also opens up marketing opportunities for U.S. aerospace companies at a time when U.S. defense spending is likely to decrease.

In terms of the external challenges facing India, the United States shares many of its concerns. The United States and India are both concerned about terrorist groups that are based in Pakistan although the United States is focused on Al Qaida and its affiliates while India worries about a broader set of terrorist groups. India and the United States also share a

similar approach toward China. Both nations are preparing for the possibility that a more hostile China will emerge at some point while at the same time they seek to maintain as much as possible a positive relation with Beijing because of its strategic and economic importance. Another area of mutual interest is maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Like India, the United States seeks to ensure that the free flow of commerce in the Indian Ocean which is vital for global energy supplies and trade.

From a U.S. perspective it is also important to consider some of the international challenges where India and the United States disagree or where they have different approaches to the problem. Nuclear nonproliferation since the end of the Cold War has been one of the United States highest priorities and an area of continuing disagreement with India. The United States promotes a robust approach of using economic sanctions and the potential use of military force against states that appear to be moving toward nuclear capabilities. Although India is against further proliferation it sees deep hypocrisy in the U.S. position of retaining and modernizing its nuclear arsenal until a nuclear free world emerges, while at the same time denying that capability to others. This difference in position on halting emerging nuclear capabilities has played out recently in the differing approaches each nation has taken toward Iran. India believes that engagement is needed to roll back Iran's nuclear program seeing U.S. efforts to isolate and punish Iran as counterproductive.

This division over policy toward Iran points toward a deeper disagreement between two states. India was one of the founders of the non-aligned movement and it remains committed to the concepts of national sovereignty and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states. India despite its own democratic tradition has not supported the emerging viewpoint within the West that the international community has the right to intervene when the dignity

and basic rights of people within a state are being violated. In the U.N. on issues related to human rights violations in "rogue regimes" India generally sides with China and Russia and not the United States. This division between the two countries means that on issues related to national sovereignty such as how to deal with the crisis in Syria or climate change, India is far more likely to side with the developing states of the non-aligned movement than the United States.

While differences remain the degree of improvement over the past decade in U.S.-Indian relations has been remarkable. Between the mid-1970s and the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, U.S. policy toward India was focused almost exclusively on nonproliferation issues. After the nuclear tests, the United States imposed economic sanctions upon India which were in many ways, the culmination of a failed policy to prevent the Indian-Pakistan conflict from becoming a nuclear one. From the India perspective U.S. attempts to prevent India from acquiring nuclear weapons were part of a broader set of U.S. policies that were hostile to Indian interests especially in regards to Pakistan, a U.S. Cold War ally.

Starting around the turn of the century both the United States and India began to reassess their relations. India while not abandoning its previous strategic ties with Russia and the Non-Aligned Movement began to broaden its security relations. Indian leaders realized that adopting a path of "poly-alignment" would put India in a better position to modernize its military and to secure its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean basin and South and South East Asia.³⁶ The United States began to see India as a natural ally due to its commitment to democratic values, desire for the free flow of commerce particularly in the Indian Ocean, and its concerns about terrorism, and its desire to maintain a stable Asia.

³⁴ "Indian Navy Plans Three Aircraft Carriers" Indian Defense, October 29, 2010.

³⁵ See for example the commitments of USAF Chief of Staff General John Jumper in Stephens Hampton, "USAF: Indian Exercises Showed Need for F/A-22, Changes in Training", Inside the Air Force, June 4, 2004, p.1.

³⁶ Brian K. Hedrick, India's Strategic Defense Transformation: Expanding Global Relations, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, Carlisle, PA November 2009.

This reassessment resulted in 2005, in a "New Framework for the U.S-India Defense Relationship" signed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Minister of Defense Pranab Mukherjee which provided a solid footing for the relationship.³⁷ Post the 2005 agreement there has been a rapid expansion in defense ties between the two nations. India now conducts more military exercises with the United States than any other country with the size and scope of these exercises expanding almost every year. The level and frequency of senior defense contacts between United States and India has grown to such an extent that it now eclipses these of all other countries for India.³⁸ India has also become a major arms export market for the United States with over \$8B transacted over the last 10 years.³⁹

Although U.S.-Indian relations remain on an upward trajectory, recent interactions between the two countries also reveal the limitations of the relationship. India continues to pursue a policy that balances its defense relations among global powers. Russia, a defense partner of India's since the early 1970s, remains its primary supplier of defense equipment. This policy of balancing defense relations is likely part of the reason U.S. entrants in the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft competition were not down selected for the final stages of the acquisition process.

On major geostrategic issues such as the civil war in Syria, India has continued to emphasize the importance of sovereignty and a U.N sponsored approach. It has resisted U.S. calls for President Bashar Al-Assad to resign and for economic sanctions to put in place. Finally, India partly for bureaucratic reasons and partly because of its views on civilian-military relations has resisted a

number of U.S. initiatives to streamline military interactions. This has left U.S. officials frustrated with a view taking hold that India is unwilling to reciprocate U.S. efforts that have assisted India's rise as a great power.

Conclusion

Successfully building security partnerships with India and Brazil requires the United States to "think different" than it has in the past about alliances and partnerships. In the near term India and Brazil are highly unlikely to be direct substitutes for the declining military capabilities of traditional U.S. allies. While Brazil and India share democratic values with the United States they are not interested in making these values the foundation of their foreign and security policies. Brazil and India will continue to oppose many U.S. interventions, particularly military interventions, which appear in their eyes as extensions of traditional Western imperialism. As was the case in Syria and Libya, Brazilian and Indian responses will be based upon using the UN as a vehicle to settle international disputes with a great deal of deference to national sovereignty as a core principle.

It is important to remember that Brazil and India are still developing countries. They both need to surmount major economic challenges if they are to alleviate the extreme poverty many of their citizens' toil under. The Indian and Brazilian governments also face internal security challenges which are a complex mixture of the vast territories they govern over and the diverse people who reside within them. Not surprising in the near term these internal challenges will be India and Brazil's priority focus leaving only so much energy for global affairs.

Another factor to keep in mind are the very different motivations Brazil and India have for seeking partnerships with the United States versus those of European and Asian states during the Cold War. Brazil and India view strategic partnerships with the United States as a powerful mechanism for enhancing their efforts to be-

come global powers. Deep and sustained interactions with the United States across a broad range of fields are a very useful method for improving Brazil and India's military, technological and economic capabilities. On the other hand unlike traditional U.S. allies, Brazil and India are not seeking security guarantees from the United States nor are they particularly interested in developing the ability to conduct joint military operations.

From a U.S. perspective while the near term benefits of security partnerships with India and Brazil may be modest, the long term benefits are likely to be substantial. U.S. partnership building efforts should focus on achieving five specific objectives.

The U.S. first objective should be improving India and Brazil's ability to address regional security issues. The ability of India and Brazil to manage major security concerns in their own neighborhoods would allow the United States to focus its efforts on more difficult regions such as the Middle East and East Asia. India and Brazil both seek regions that are stable and peaceful which will enhance their economic and political development. Unlike Russia and China, whose efforts have retarded democratic development in their own regions, Brazil and India are likely to assist and empower democratic governments. Although they may not be as forceful or confrontational as the United States desires in pushing for democratic change, they are unlikely to prop up existing authoritarian regimes.

Empowering Brazil and India to confront regional security challenges will not be cost free. The sale of military capabilities that enhance India's power projection capabilities will continue to swing the military balance in favor of India visa via Pakistan. This could further erode U.S.-Pakistani relations and in the near term could make withdrawing from Afghanistan more difficult. However, this likely is a price worth paying considering Pakistan's failure to confront extremist elements within its own society and its continued as-

³⁷ "New Framework for the U.S-Indian Defense Relationship", June 28, 2005, merln.ndu.edu/merln/mipal/.../US_India_Defense_Framework.doc

³⁸ Hedrick, "India's Strategic Defense."

³⁹ Amer Latif, "U.S.-India Defense Trade: Opportunities for Deepening the Partnership," CSIS, Washington D.C., June 2012, p.13.

sistance to insurgent groups in Afghanistan. A similar dynamic exists in Latin America where some states such as Argentina will resent American assistance in building up their traditional rival, Brazil. Thankfully, great power competition in Latin America is far less militarized than in South Asia and the types of security cooperation envisioned between the U.S.-Brazil would not be directly threatening to its neighbors.

The second objective of the United States would be improving India and Brazil's power projection capabilities in order to offset the increasing military abilities of authoritarian capitalist states such as Russia and China. Unlike during the Cold War, U.S. partnership efforts would not center upon developing the ability to conduct joint military operations. Instead, the U.S. goal should be empowering India and Brazil so they could impose structural barriers to Chinese regional and possibly global dominance. A more capable India that was strategically integrated with other Asia-Pacific powers would present a significant challenge to any Chinese bid for regional hegemony.

A third objective should be improving Brazil and India's military capabilities so they can take a larger role in UN sponsored peacekeeping and stability operations. Both powers are already very active in UN operations with Brazil sending troops to half of the UN's 60 operations since 1948.⁴⁰ Brazil and India's increasingly military capabilities and global ambitions place them in a good position to lead and command future UN operations. The United States could also work with Brazil and India to expand the geographical scope of their peacekeeping operations. Both powers have significant ties to different parts of Africa (West Africa for Brazil and East Africa for India) an area of the world that often doesn't receive enough attention to its security concerns.

A fourth and perhaps somewhat more controversial area the United States could assist India and Bra-

zil with would be maintaining better control over their own territory. Over the last ten years, the United States in its battle against terrorist networks has developed a formidable specialized force to identify, track and target hostile targets in complex environments. While very different conflicts, the U.S. UAV reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities along with some of the operational concepts the United States has employed, could be of assistance to India and Brazil in their struggles against internal security challenges.⁴¹

Finally, in addition to building security relations with India and Brazil, the United States should also expand ties with Brazil and India in the economic and political spheres. Brazil and India as large growing economies represent the best opportunities for export led growth without concerns about the strategic consequences. Concerns about intellectual property rights, technological transfer issue, and enhancing the economic capabilities of state run enterprises, are not significant issues when it comes to trading with India and Brazil.

A key component of the United States grand strategy for the 21st century should be encouraging and empowering India and Brazil to take an increasing role in global affairs. An India and Brazil that are vested in global institutions increases the chances they will see their wellbeing as closely connected to the health of international system. While the partnerships the United States forms with them will be quite different and less structured than the ones it had and has with its traditional allies, this does not diminish their critical importance.

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Opinions expressed in this contribution are those of the author.

⁴¹ This raises the prospect that either Brazil or India might develop with U.S. assistance the reconnaissance strike capacities used by both the United States and Colombia to suppress national and transnational terrorist organizations.

THEMEN

The Pandiá Institute: Ideas and dialogues to improve Brazil's defense system

This article aims to contextualize the establishment of the Pandiá Calógeras Institute, a civilian think-tank linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Defense. It briefly analyzes the framework in which debates on defense issues have evolved in Brazil and argues that the country's long peaceful tradition, in tandem with the pattern of her civil-military relations, deeply influenced the recent restructuring of her defense system. Three aspects marked this process: (a) the professionalization of Brazil's Armed Forces, (b) the modernization of her defense industry, and (c) the improvement of civil-military relations in the country.

Against this backdrop, this text presents the Pandiá Calógeras Institute's *raison d'être* and its main research lines. The Pandiá Institute, as it is known, started its operations in April 2013, with two core purposes: (i) to produce analyses that feed the decision-making process of the Brazilian Defense Ministry; and (ii) to engage the Brazilian society, particularly opinion-makers and Academia, in discussing Brazil's priorities in the realm of international security and her defense policy.

It briefly concludes that the Institute's creation is part of a complex process through which the Brazilian society revisits its civil-military relations as it concludes its transition to democracy, after 25 years of military regime (1964-1989).

Contextualizing the defense debate in Brazil

Two historical aspects influence the debate about defense within the Brazilian society: (1) The country's long peaceful tradition; (2) and the long-term social and political implications of the Brazilian military regime.

In many countries, Armed Forces play important roles in political processes. This is understand-

⁴⁰ "Brazil and Peacekeeping: Policy not altruism" Economist, September 23rd, 2010

able: they are the last resort to ensure order and security domestically, while being responsible for the very survival of the state at the international realm. In Brazil, however, besides their traditional role, they have also historically played important roles in political debates. This partially resulted from the fact that until recently intellectual elites were limited in number in Brazil and the military schools were among the few centers that offered high level education. Indeed, the military influenced key political movements, and helped leading important turning-points, such as the proclamation of the Republic, in 1889, and the advent of the *Estado Novo* ("The New State", after the Revolution of 1930) led by Getúlio Vargas, in 1937.

Through the 19th century, at the operational level the Brazilian military was mostly involved in domestic tensions supporting the Federal Government in its struggle to maintain the country's unit. The Paraguayan War, from 1864 to 1870, was the sole important international conflict Brazil fought in the region in that period – and the last one since. The experience in Paraguay showed the importance of professionalizing the military, which was reinforced, a generation later, during the unrest in Canudos, Bahia, when a group of fanatic fighters led by a charismatic religious leader challenged the authority of the Federal Government.

Throughout the 19th century, the key strategic decisions regarding international affairs were traditionally taken by the political elite, and the military was also part of that elite. The country's borders, for example, were negotiated through complex diplomatic negotiations, a process that contributed to maintain the military concerned mainly with domestic affairs, except for their participation in both world wars, which in any event was operational. Civilian leaders took the political decision to engage in both cases.

Through the Cold War, the Brazilian military focused on fighting the so called "domestic enemy". That

endeavor ultimately led them to promote a coup, supported by a significant part of the country's political and economic elites. At first, the intervention had the purpose of containing communism and was planned to be ephemeral. But the Army itself observed internal divisions, and the hardliners, who wanted to perpetuate their hold, prevailed. The Authoritarian regime lasted until 1989, when the first President was elected by the popular vote.

As a result, the Armed Forces spent over a generation fulfilling the self-imposed mission to run the country. They framed long-term development plans, they filled important posts in the bureaucracy and in public firms, and they focused on huge infrastructure projects. Energy, mining, transportation, and telecommunications were among the priorities. Instead of preparing to fight foreign enemies, the military approached the technocrats, with one eye at promoting the economic development and the other in combatting what they perceived as a communist threat.

Meanwhile, they professionalized their educational processes and their carrier. Because they presumed that the economic development was part of the tools necessary to protect the country, the military focused on their preparation for war and on the management of key economic sectors, filling positions either at public firms or at the public administration. They established a 4-year term for presidents and put a ceiling in the number of years that anyone could stay as a general: 12 years. These measures aimed at preventing the emergence of caudillos and at preparing the military for the transition.

Influenced by the perception that sooner or later they would go back to their compounds, each Force tried to assure its respective budget, a process that has become extremely complex as a result of the disorganization of the economy observed during the years of high inflation, from the early-1980s to the mid-1990s. Once the democratic process pre-

vailed, in the early-1990s, this pattern remained: each Force had its representative before the Parliament, attempting to advance its own interests and to assure the budget for its pet projects.

These historical processes engendered at least two important consequences. The first one was the absence of a culture of defense, since each Armed Force continued to think about itself as an autonomous bureaucracy. This created a path-dependence dynamic that made more difficult for the MoD to harmonize the interests of the Armed Forces.

The second consequence was that scholars resisted analyzing Defense issues, especially if they had a critical perception of the regime. The distance fed the mutual ignorance and enhanced biases, phenomena that still hinder the balanced examination of the Brazilian recent history. A relatively unusual gap in the country's history, even in the period of the Military Regime, which was marked by an intense participation of the technocratic elites on the conduction of the main national policies.

In other words, the democratization process implied a tacit bargain between civil-military elites. The latter maintained part of their political power and some autonomy; the former found greater room for maneuver in establishing the new democratic regime. It was a dramatic process, marked by the death of the first indirectly-elected President, Tancredo Neves, the day before taking office, and by the impeachment of the first directly-elected one, Collor de Mello, a couple of years after his accession to the Presidency. And the transition happened in a context of hyper-inflation. The Armed Forces witnessed these turbulent years with reduced budgets, some autonomy and discipline to lobby their interest through Congress within the existent democratic framework.

At the institutional level, however, little had changed. Five agencies coordinated the defense sector in Brazil at that time, each and everyone working with considerable

degree of autonomy: four Ministries: Navy; Army; Air Force; and Chief-of-Staff; and the so-called Head of the Military house, in charge of the President's security. Only in July 1999, with the establishment of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), this complex structure of several autonomous institutions was reorganized. A new bureaucratic culture, which encouraged their mutual coordination, started to be implemented.

Nowadays, the Armed Forces remain important in Brazilian politics, but they no longer have a deep influence on it. Now they follow the directives issued by the MoD, which are not produced without due consultation with them. The National Defense Policy of 2005 clarified the country's defense objectives, established its strategic surrounding (South America and the South Atlantic) and publicized the key directives for the sector. In 2008, The National Strategy of Defense (NSD) directed the need to create "interoperability in joint-operations", to integrate processes among the three services, especially in the fields of basic industrial technology, logistics and mobilization, and command and control. Joint-operations should be accelerated, and the formulation of new doctrines was seen as a necessity.

The NSD also emphasizes the need to increase the number of civilians working in the Ministry of Defense. The premise is that the national defense system depends not only on well prepared and integrated Armed Forces, but also on civilians who understand the subject and can produce good arguments to orient public policies. According to the document, *"the initiatives to compose staffs of civilian specialists in defense will promote a future increase in the access of civilians to top positions in the Ministry of Defense. All contrary legal provisions will be revoked"*.

Clearly, Brazil has improved its civil-military relations and the capacity of its Armed Forces to defend the country in recent years. But the Brazilian society still holds prejudices towards the Armed

Forces. The distance between the military and Academia, for example, still exists. Few civilians can discuss defense issues with the military personnel, despite recent increases in this figure.

To enhance the quality of the information available and to engage the Brazilian society in discussing defense issues, the Ministry of Defense created the Pandiá Calógeras Institute, a civilian think-tank.

The Pandiá Calógeras Institute: Improving the defense thinking in Brazil

The idea to establish a civilian think-tank at the MoD flourished in the Mid-2000s. After several years of discussions on its structure and degree of autonomy, the idea that it should be composed mainly by civilians and linked to the Minister's cabinet prevailed.

Four controversies marked the debates on it. (1) Should it be responsible only for integrating the international and national academies with the military or should it help develop analyses about the Brazilian defense apparatus and its strategic interests in the international system? (2) Should the Institute be allowed to freely produce its position papers and documents or should it connect its views with the official Brazilian defense positions? (3) Should it be formed by military personnel, by civilians, or both? And (4) How many researchers should the Institute formally engage and with which responsibilities? The idea of a small, relatively independent, and policy-oriented Institute prevailed.

The Pandiá Institute was created by the Decree nº 7.974 of April 1st 2013, which also re-structured the MoD. The Institute is legally defined as an organ of direct and immediate assistance to the Minister of Defense. It is not part of the MoD decision-making process of the Ministry of Defense, which gives its members greater room for maneuver to produce independent research papers and analyses. All public documents records disclaimers, making their authors alone responsible for the

ideas expressed. But the MoD can use the Institute as a Track Two Diplomacy tool, since its members have no responsibilities over policies or access to secret documents.

To accomplish its mission, the Institute defined a substantive thematic agenda, on which its research efforts, as well as the systemization of information and the production of knowledge lie. Among its priorities, it is worth stressing:

- Defense and security in the Brazilian strategic surrounding area: South America, South Atlantic and the Western Africa;
- Defense economy and its relation to national development;
- International cooperation in the area of defense, especially with prior partners (UNASUR, IBSA, BRICS, France, US, Turkey, Sweden, etc.);
- Brazil's participation in the UN-sponsored peace operations;
- Prospective scenarios.

To materialize its intentions, the Institute works on building institutional networks and promotes the collective production of knowledge with its partners. Through these means, it aims at achieving five objectives:

1. To provide the Minister of Defense, the Chair of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff, and MoD Secretaries with analyses to inform their decision-making. Part of these pieces of information and analyses will be available on the Institute's website, which will be online soon. The Institute's main products will be working papers, events reports, research reports, thematic reports, and prospective scenarios.

2. To encourage the Brazilian and South American academia, as well as other opinion-makers, to deepen research on national defense and its conditioning factors. In the last decade, the MoD has fostered, by its own initiative and jointly with other organs, the development of studies and research on national defense. Its main instruments of action are consolidated and have been successful.

But this has not been enough. Hence, the Pandiá Institute contributes to enhance these instruments and to increase their reach.

3. To provide the Ministry of Defense with an agile structure to establish immediate contact with Academia and other opinion-makers. The organization of events on matters that concern the Ministry, the participation in events organized by other institutions and the permanent dialogue with academics and with national and foreign public servants help to achieve this purpose.

4. To obtain, gather and, when it is the case, to publicize national defense information and analyses at targeted audiences. Besides the academic research network, there are civil research centers, ideologically engaged think-tanks, and government employees that operate in the so called "Track Two Diplomacy", which constitutes an environment in which it is possible to freely discuss sensitive issues under the aegis of the so called "Chatham House rules". This mechanism allows actors involved not only to transmit non-official information that explains controversial political positions, but also to gather interpretative information which are usually unavailable at open sources of information. It is also possible in this kind of political environment to sow the seeds of new ideas, eventually influencing the agenda and the political processes since their beginning.

5. To broaden the understanding of the economy of defense and to help improve public policies for the defense industry. Despite the NSD emphasis on the relation between defense and development, studies on these subjects are still incipient in Brazil. The country needs better knowledge about the political scenario concerning long-term budget projections, about R&D associated to new weapon systems, as well as about the best ways to finance the growing contingent of Military Reserve members.

Regarding research activities, the Institute also relies on associate researchers with doctoral and

master levels. It also regularly recruits research assistants.

Final Remarks

By establishing the Pandiá Calógeras Institute, the MoD advanced a further step in the road to improve civil-military relations in Brazil. The Institute already builds bridges between Academia and the military, and its analyses of the Brazilian defense system catalyze other processes, enhancing quality of defense studies in the country.

The Institute may also function as an important political tool for the Ministry of Defense, since it can be used to engage in more sensitive negotiations within track-two processes. In this regard, the Institute's activities are designed to achieve results that meet both the internal and external audiences. In addition to producing inputs for the MoD, Pandiá's activities intend to facilitate dialogues within academic networks and think-tanks and to disseminate information on defense to the Brazilian society.

The Pandiá Calógeras Institute is thus a unique institution in the Brazilian political scene. Hopefully, it will contribute to improve civil-military relation in the country, as part of Brazil's long transition to democracy.

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The authors are fully responsible for the opinions and information contained in this article. It does not necessarily reflect the official position of the Ministry of Defense.

THEMEN

Turkey Trots East to China

NATO member Turkey announced on September 26 that it has chosen a U.S.-sanctioned Chinese firm to co-produce a \$4 billion long-range air and missile defense system. Despite NATO's repeated warnings that such a system would compromise NATO intelligence and therefore not be interoperable with its early warning assets, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan chose to make the deal.

Turkey chose a Chinese firm, China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corp (CPMIEC), which the U.S. has repeatedly sanctioned since 1991 for various weapons proliferation violations including the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act. However, this is not the first time Turkey chose to partner with a U.S.-sanctioned Chinese firm.

In May 2011 Turkey signed a contract with China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC) to launch a Turkish satellite into space. The United States has also repeatedly sanctioned CGWIC since 1991 for various missile proliferation violations, including materiel transfers to Iran which could be used for WMD, cruise or ballistic missiles.⁴² Increasingly at loggerheads with its U.S. and NATO allies, Turkey – under Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) – seems to be pivoting east towards China.

In retrospect, perhaps NATO should not have been surprised at Turkey's missile defense decision, given the burgeoning military cooperation over the past years between China and Erdogan's Turkey. Although Turkey first recognized the Chinese government in 1971, for a long period bilateral relations remained lukewarm and Turkey had no sophisticated strategy towards China. However, the arrival of AKP to power in 2002

⁴² Shirely Kan, „China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues“, Congressional Research Report, RL31555, March 11, 2013, „China launches Turkish satellite“, Xinhua, December 19, 2012.

changed that, and China became a key foreign policy focus for Ankara, including in the realm of military cooperation.

Erdogan first visited China in 2003 as leader of AKP, before formally assuming the position of prime minister. By 2005 military relations began to grow, and the commander general of the Turkish Air Force visited China expressing interest in middle-range missile systems.⁴³ That same year, the Chinese Chief of the General Staff Liang Guanglie visited Turkey, and in 2006 Turkey's interests in missile defense and space technologies resulted in its membership in the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). APSCO is an inter-governmental organization headquartered in Beijing, with eight members of China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Mongolia and Peru.⁴⁴ Around this time, Chinese soldiers began to be included in various Turkish military programs.

Until 2008, Israel was Turkey's main partner in air combat training. However, Turkey revoked Israel's participation in these maneuvers in 2009 due to deteriorating bilateral relations. The following year, Turkey looked east towards the countries of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and conducted joint air combat exercises with China, while cooperating with Iran and Pakistan to provide airspace and refueling for Chinese warplanes en route to the war games in Turkey. In August 2011, Turkey announced it was considering Russian and Chinese missile defense systems, with NATO immediately warning that, should this happen, Ankara would operate them without NATO's intelligence on incoming ballistic missiles.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, Erdogan continued looking east and further cemented

Sino-Turkish relations in April 2012 when he visited China as Prime Minister, the first Turkish prime minister to do so in 27 years. Nuclear cooperation with China topped the agenda, culminating with signing of "The Agreement on Cooperation for the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes."⁴⁶ A few months later in July, Turkey's Defense Industry Executive Committee, headed by Erdogan, announced its decision to build 2,500 km long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), usually associated with nuclear weapons.

According to Turkish NTV and Zaman news agencies, the Turkish Ministry of Defense also began discussing the feasibility of establishing a satellite launch center in Turkey.⁴⁷ This was followed by the successful Chinese launch of the Turkish Gokturk-2 ("SkyTurk" in Turkish) satellite aboard the Chinese Long March 2D rocket on December 18, 2012, from the Jinqan Satellite Launch Center in Gansu Province.⁴⁸

The low-key yet burgeoning Sino-Turkey military relationship finally made its official debut on the international stage on September 26, 2013, when Turkey shocked its NATO allies and made good of its 2011 consideration to select China's CPMIEC to build its missile defense system. A week later U.S. ambassador to Ankara Francis Ricciardone further expressed concern about the involvement of a Chinese winner for a recent Turkish defense contract in nuclear technology, saying "*we are concerned about that [Chinese] company, and its role as a nuclear weapons technology proliferator in*

the world."⁴⁹ Turkey's rift with its western allies seems to grow wider each passing day with new revelations.

Meanwhile, Turkey is trotting closer towards China. Recently Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said that Turkey and China are two "*emerging powers on the Western and Eastern banks of Asia,*"⁵⁰ and in 2012, his think tank, Center for Strategic Research, (SAM) convened a conference in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs with its Chinese counterpart, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) from China's State Council, to discuss their burgeoning strategic partnership.⁵¹

The warm exchanges in this meeting may be a telltale sign of things to come. The Chinese express admiration for Turkey's new eastward-looking foreign policy, which Beijing approvingly calls "Neo-Ottomanism," (a term not met with universal favor in the West). While NATO and the EU tend to see Turkey's behavior as driven from a sense of vulnerability and frustration with the EU accession process, Chinese diplomats and academics see Turkey as an emerging, powerful regional pole in a geostrategic location, and in turn pay it great respect. As such, it is no surprise that Turkey joined the SCO as a Dialogue Partner in April with aspirations for eventual membership. And when that happens NATO should not again be blindsided.

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⁴⁶ „Nuclear Deal Tops Agenda as Turkish PM Visits China“ VOA, April 9, 2012; „Erdogan visit yields Sino-Turkish nuclear energy deal“, Today's Zaman, April 9, 2012; „Turkish PM boosts nuclear cooperation with Cina visit“ France 24, April 9, 2012.

⁴⁷ „Turkey begins work on ICBM“, Hurriyet Daily News, July 24, 2012; Akin Unver, „Turkey to produce ICBMs“, Foreign Policy Association, July 24, 2012; Yiftah Shapir and Gallia Lindenstrauss, „Plotting the Trajectory of Turkey's Ballistic Missile Program“, WMD Junction, November 4, 2012.

⁴⁸ Peter Selding, „Chinese Rocket Lofts Turkish Earth Observation Satellite“, Space News, December 19, 2012.

⁴³ „Envisioning the Asia Pacific Century: Turkey between the United States and China“, Today's Zaman, December 9, 2011.

⁴⁴ „Turkey joins Pakistan, China in joint efforts for Space Technology“, Pakistan Times, June 22, 2006; <http://www.apsco.int>.

⁴⁵ „Umit Enginsoy and Burak Ege Bekdil, „NATO warns Turkey Against Chinese, Russian Systems“, Defense News, August 2, 2011.

⁴⁹ „U.S. frets on nuclear link in Turkey-China missile deal: US Ambassador Ricciardone“, Hurriyet Daily, October 2, 2013.

⁵⁰ „U.S. frets on nuclear link in Turkey-China missile deal: US Ambassador Ricciardone“, Hurriyet Daily, October 2, 2013.

⁵¹ Selcuk Colakoglu, „Chinese Perception of Turkey-Analysis“, Eurasia Review, October 9, 2012.