

Denkwürdigkeiten



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LEADOFF

Liebe Mitglieder,

die Welt sei aus den Fugen geraten, stellte Außenminister Walter Steinmeier unlängst fest. In der Tat, die Ukraine-Krise, der IS-Terror, der Gaza-Konflikt, die Herausforderungen in der Sahel-Zone, der misslungene arabische Frühling, die Errungenschaften in Afghanistan auf der Kippe, Zusammenstöße in Asien, bedenkliche Entwicklungen im ehemaligen Jugoslawien – Wo ist nur die Zukunft hin? Auf dem 50. Deutschen Historikertag am 23. September 2014 stellte Bundespräsident Gauck etwas ketzerisch die gleiche Frage und mahnte zugleich, die Geschichte nicht über die Gegenwart siegen zu lassen. Mit Blick auf den 1. Weltkrieg und das Münchner Abkommen vor dem 2. Weltkrieg fragte er: „Wissen wir es wirklich besser als die Akteure von damals? Oder wissen wir lediglich etwas mehr, nämlich wie die Geschichte weiterging?“

Wir kennen das Phänomen einer Welt in Unruhe zwar auch aus anderen Zeiten. Aber der Cordon der Freunde und Partner, die Deutschland umzingeln, reicht längst nicht mehr, um die Sicherheit unserer Bürgerinnen und Bürger zu gewährleisten. Krieg und Terror rücken näher, nicht zuletzt auch wegen der Kriegsfreiwilligen die aus unseren eigenen (europäischen) Reihen kommen oder auch im Schatten der Kriegsflüchtlinge.

Die Beiträge dieser Denkwürdigkeiten werfen konstruktiv-skeptische Blicke in die nähere Zukunft. Wir alle können uns angesichts von Terror und Schrecken gegenüber Alten und Jungen, Männern und Frauen, Schulkindern und Mitbürgern von nebenan nur dringlich ein friedliches Weihnachtsfest wünschen.

Der Vorstand der pmg wünscht Ihnen allen friedliche und frohe Festtage sowie einen gelungenen Start in ein gutes Jahr 2015.

Ralph Thiele, Vorstandsvorsitzender

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Souverän durch Rüstung

Die Staaten des Golf-Kooperationsrates bauen ihre Eigenständigkeit aus und verstärken damit den Trend zur Neuordnung der Region

Autoritäre Regime, überalterte Führungseliten, Geschlechterdiskriminierung, Missachtung der Menschenrechte – die vorwiegend auf diese Aspekte fokussierende Kritik an der Situation in Bahrain, Katar, Kuwait, dem Oman, Saudi-Arabien und den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) verstellte den Blick dafür, dass sich die sechs Länder, die 1981 den Golf-Kooperationsrat (GCC) gründeten, zu einer „Insel der Wettbewerbsfähigen“ entwickelt haben. Unter den zwanzig wettbewerbsfähigsten Ländern der Welt, so das World Economic Forum (WEF) in seinem Jahresbericht 2014, stehen VAE auf Platz 12 und Katar auf Rang 16 – deutlich vor Frank-

reich (23), Spanien (35) und Italien (49). Im direkten Vergleich mit anderen aufstrebenden Volkswirtschaften liegen beide gemeinsam mit Saudi-Arabien (24) auch vor Südkorea (26), Israel (27) und China (28). Und selbst die etwas schwächer entwickelten Golf-Staaten Bahrain, Kuwait und Oman schneiden in der WEF-Bewertung besser ab als Russland, Brasilien und Indien.

Der wirtschaftliche Erfolg der GCC-Staaten ist auch das Ergebnis von Reformen, die auf eine stärkere volkswirtschaftliche Diversifizierung zielen. Diese erfolgt im Schatten der globalen Abhängigkeit von Öl und Gas. Energie war bislang die Nahtstelle, über die sich die GCC-Staaten in die Weltwirtschaft integrierten. Sie wird zunehmend zur Bruchstelle mit weitreichenden geostrategischen Folgen. Die veränderte Energiepolitik der USA und Europas sowie der Energiehunger in der Asien-Pazifik-Region lenken die Energieströme um und führen zur „Asianisierung“ der Golf-Region. 2013 betrug das aggregierte Import- und Exportvolumen der sechs Länder knapp 1,6 Bio. US\$. Davon entfielen mehr als 40 % auf den Handel mit Japan, Indien, Südkorea sowie China und weniger als 8 % auf die USA. Ob und wie lange die GCC-Staaten den Spagat zwischen sicherheitspolitischer West- und wirtschaftspolitischer Ostorientierung halten können, ist für ihre Stabilität genauso entscheidend wie für die Beziehungen zwischen der transatlantischen Gemeinschaft und den Ländern der Asien-Pazifik-Region.

Komplexe Konfliktkonstellationen

Entlang dieser Bruchstelle stellt sich die Frage nach der künftigen regionalen Ordnungsmacht neu, denn bislang waren die sechs Staaten alleine nicht in der Lage, ihre Sicherheitsprobleme zu lösen. Vielmehr suchen sie die Unterstützung von Partnern, allen voran den USA. Das vertieft die Abhängigkeit, die immer stärker als Bevormundung interpretiert wird. Die Kritik an den USA nimmt zu, so dass die Distanz zum Verbündeten wächst. Daraus versuchen

Saudi-Arabien und andere Staaten politisches Kapital zu schlagen.

Großbritannien und Frankreich stellen sich in der Region neu auf. Großbritannien unterstützt die USA am westlichen Rand der Asien-Pazifik-Region und schützt eigene Interessen, denn Katar lieferte 2012 ungefähr 26 % der britischen Gasimporte. Frankreich

zu Katar und den VAE. Die kleineren GCC-Länder kritisieren Saudi-Arabiens Dominanz und fechten untereinander Feden aus. Innerstaatliche Risiken, die aus nicht erfüllten Forderungen nach politischer Partizipation resultieren, und hybride Gefahren wie Piraterie, Schmuggel, Geldwäsche und Cyberangriffe verstärken den beschriebenen Krisencocktail.




Abbildung 1: Rüstungsimporte der GCC-Staaten von 2000-2013 (gerundet)

bevorzugt unter Präsident Hollande Saudi-Arabien anstelle der VAE als zentralen Ansprechpartner. Daneben drängen Russland, China und die Türkei an den Golf. Die Unterstützung Putins für das Regime in Syrien hatte Russlands Position anfänglich geschwächt, doch inzwischen setzt Riad, auch wegen der Annäherung zwischen den USA und dem Iran, auf Moskau als Gegengewicht. China ist bislang vorwiegend Wirtschaftspartner, doch Saudi-Arabien ist interessiert, sicherheitspolitische Bande durch neue chinesische Waffenlieferungen zu stärken. Die Türkei agiert sehr ambitioniert. Sie profitiert davon, dass den GCC-Staaten ein zusätzliches Gegengewicht zu Israel willkommen ist. Gleichzeitig stößt der regionale Führungsanspruch Ankaras aber auch auf Kritik.

Zwischenstaatliche Konflikte verstärken diese überregionale Konfliktlinie. Saudi-Arabien steht allen Versuchen kritisch gegenüber, die den eigenen Vormachtsanspruch in Frage stellen. Das gilt für das Verhältnis zu Iran und zum Irak ebenso wie für die Beziehungen

Militärische Fähigkeiten stärken...

In der Vergangenheit waren die GCC-Staaten von den USA und anderen Ordnungsmächten abhängig. Daher waren sie kaum in der Lage, militärisch eigenständig zu handeln. Das ändert sich gegenwärtig.

Saudi-Arabien, die VAE und künftig auch Katar verfügen über leistungsfähige Waffensysteme. Diese wurden bislang primär defensiv genutzt. Im Lichte der beschriebenen Gefahren investieren alle drei Länder verstärkt in Waffensysteme, die sie auch zu offensiven Operationen befähigen. Bestes Beispiel sind die VAE. Ihre Luftwaffe soll regional die Führungsrolle übernehmen, so dass ihre Luftwaffenübungen in den letzten Jahren immer anspruchsvoller wurden. Gleichzeitig stärken die Emirate die Kompetenz ihrer Luftwaffe, Operationen eigenständig planen und durchführen zu können – eine Fähigkeit, die sie mit dem Einsatz ihrer Kampfjets gegen Stellungen der islamistischen Milizen in Libyen im August 2014

unterstrichen hat. Zusätzlich wollen die Emirate ihre Seestreitkräfte stärken, um die Straße von Hormuz zu sichern.

Ebenso gewinnt die militärische Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen der Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) an Bedeutung. Diese wurde 1982 als militärische Streitkraft der GCC-Länder etabliert, verfügte jedoch bis vor kurzem kaum über gemeinsame Strukturen. Ende 2013 kündigten die GCC-Staaten an, ein gemeinsames militärisches Kommando für eine GCC-Streitkraft im Umfang von 100.000 Mann zu errichten. Zudem soll das Kommando über zwei Hauptquartiere in Saudi-Arabien und Bahrain verfügen. Analog zu den Landstreitkräften gibt es Pläne für gemeinsame Seestreitkräfte.

...Lücken koordiniert schließen

Kritische Beobachter haben darauf hingewiesen, dass der „Glitzerfaktor“ die Beschaffungsvorhaben der GCC-Staaten stärker prägt als der wirkliche Bedarf der Streitkräfte. Das war und ist ein Problem, denn die Personaldecke der GCC-Streitkräfte ist dünn, weil der Anteil der eigenen Bürger an der Gesamtbevölkerung teilweise sehr gering ist. Das beeinträchtigt den Unterhalt der Waffensysteme und ihre Einsatzbereitschaft.

Die aktuellen Beschaffungsschwerpunkte sind daher ebenso Ausdruck bestehender Fähigkeitslücken wie künftiger Ambitionen. Ganz oben auf der Agenda stehen die Stärkung integrierter Aufklärungs- und Führungssysteme, der Ausbau der Marine, der Erwerb von Kampf-, Transport- und Luftbetankungsflugzeugen, die Raketenabwehr, geschützte Fahrzeuge, der Schutz vor atomaren, biologischen und chemischen Kampfstoffen, unbemannte Systeme und der Ausbau der Cybersicherheit. Gleichzeitig wird aber auch deutlich: Wenn ein Land wie Katar, das flächenmäßig kleiner ist als Schleswig-Holstein, mehr als 60 Kampfpanzer und mehr als 70 Kampflugzeuge beschafft, die Emirate sechs Luftbetankungsflugzeuge und über 4500 minengeschützte Fahrzeuge erwerben und sich ebenso wie Saudi-

Arabien für den Kauf von U-Booten interessieren, dann diese Beschaffungen der nationalen Sicherheit und stärken gleichzeitig die Fähigkeit, gemeinsam militärisch handeln zu können.

Rüstungspolitische Ambitionen

In den Beschaffungsschwerpunkten spiegeln sich auch die Ambitionen der GCC-Staaten und ihrer Rüstungspartner. Wie die beiden folgenden Beispiele zeigen, treten unterschiedliche Ambitionen der Beteiligten immer stärker zu Tage.

Auch wenn einzelne GCC-Staaten für die Raketenabwehr auch auf Produkte aus Russland und China zurückgreifen, reichen diese in ihrer strategischen Bedeutung nicht an den Raketenabwehrschirm heran, den die USA in der Region aufbauen. Für die USA geht es primär darum, die vom Iran ausgehende Gefahr einzudämmen. Das alleine ist aber nicht ausreichend, denn längst nicht alle GCC-Staaten sehen den Iran als Gefahr. Katar und der Oman unterhalten traditionell gute Beziehungen zum Iran. Daher ist die Rolle der VAE von Bedeutung. Sie haben 2010 nach dem Kauf von Raketenabwehrsystemen in den USA vorgeschlagen, einen GCC-weiten Abwehrschirm aufzubauen. 2012 waren die Emirate das erste Land in der Region, das sich für das Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) von Lockheed Martin und Raytheon entschied, das eine Schlüsselrolle beim Aufbau des GCC-Raketenabwehrschirms spielt. Inzwischen beschaffen alle GCC-Staaten Raketenabwehrsysteme. Dass selbst der Oman mit den USA verhandelt wird von Beobachtern als Indiz dafür gesehen, dass das Sultanat bei diesem wichtigen Thema nicht abseits stehen will. Die USA halten beim Aufbau des GCC-Raketenabwehrschirms weiterhin die Fäden in der Hand, denn sie betreiben die maßgeblichen Elemente und versorgen die sechs Staaten mit wichtigen Frühwarninformationen.

Dagegen zeigt das Interesse an unbemannten Systemen, dass sich einzelne GCC-Länder rüstungspolitisch von den USA emanzipieren wollen. Wichtige

Treiber für unbemannte Systeme sind die Personalengpässe der Streitkräfte sowie der aus der Bekämpfung land- bzw. seeseitiger Gefahren resultierende Bedarf, weiträumig aufklären, überwachen und wirken zu können. Hinzu kommen die Erfolge Irans beim Aufbau seiner Flotte unbemannter fliegender Systeme (UAS) und der Fähigkeit, gegnerische UAS zu stören. Mit Ausnahme Bahrains beschaffen aktuell alle GCC-Staaten unbemannte Systeme für den Einsatz in der Luft, am Boden sowie über und unter Wasser. Die Emirate streben den Aufbau der modernsten UAS-Flotte am Golf an. Dazu etablieren sie eine eigene Industriebasis, arbeiten wie Saudi-Arabien an bewaffneten UAS und fördern den Export der Produkte ihrer Hersteller ADASI sowie ADCOM Systems. Exportschwerpunkte sind neben den GCC-Staaten auch Algerien und Russland sowie Italien, das gemeinsam mit den Emiraten UAS herstellt.

Vor allem die wohlhabenderen GCC-Staaten unterstreichen ihre politischen Ambitionen zusätzlich mit der Rüstungsfinanzierung, die Einfluss verschafft. So diskutiert beispielsweise Riad mit Manama über mögliche saudische Finanzhilfen für die Kampfflugzeugbeschaffung Bahrains. Darüber hinaus hat Riad finanzielle Unterstützung für die geplanten Rüstungslieferungen Frankreichs an den Libanon und an den Irak sowie Russlands an Ägypten zugesagt. Geht es um den Aufbau spezifischer Fähigkeiten, sind die Emirate zu signifikanten Investitionen bereit. Sie investierten in den letzten Jahren gut zwei Milliarden US-Dollar in die Entwicklung hochleistungsfähiger Radarsysteme von Northrop Grumman, um damit die F-16-Kampffjets der VAE- und der US-Luftwaffe auszurüsten. Zudem nutzen die Emirate ihre Investitionsgesellschaft Mubadala und die staatliche Tawazun Holding für den Aufbau nationaler Rüstungsunternehmen. Mubadala beteiligt sich auch an ausländischen Unternehmen, um Synergien für die lokale Rüstungsindustrie zu nutzen, wie das Beispiel des italienischen Herstellers Piaggio Aero zeigt, der UAS für die Emirate produziert.

Neuordnung der Region

In einem geostrategisch äußerst anspruchsvollen Umfeld agieren die GCC-Länder zunehmend eigenständig. Sie nutzen Rüstung innen- und außenpolitisch: Nach innen dient der Aufbau eigener rüstungstechnischer Kompetenzen dazu, politische Legitimation bei der eigenen Bevölkerung zurückzugewinnen, die durch den Kauf ausländischer Waffensysteme und die Stationierung ausländischer Truppen teilweise verloren ging. Nach außen sind rüstungstechnische Kompetenzen und ausgeprägte Exportambitionen Ausdruck der politischen Einflussnahme in der Region und darüber hinaus. Hinzu kommt, dass die sechs Staaten ihre militärische Zusammenarbeit ausbauen und ihre Beschaffungsschwerpunkte verstärkt abstimmen. Offensiv nutzbare Mittel und die Kompetenz, militärische Operationen eigenständig vorzubereiten und durchzuführen ergänzen die vorhandenen Verteidigungsfähigkeiten. All dies dient dazu, die politischen Beziehungen stärker zu diversifizieren, um Abhängigkeiten zu reduzieren und den eigenen Handlungsspielraum zu erweitern.

Dies fordert die USA und die Länder der Europäischen Union bzw. der NATO heraus, die den Golf traditionell als Absatzregion sehen. Selbstbewusster agierende Golf-Staaten stellen der bisherigen Deutungshoheit westlicher Staaten eigene Ordnungsvorstellungen zur Entwicklung der Region entgegen und schränken dadurch westliche Handlungsfreiheit ein. Hinzu kommt, dass die ambitionierten GCC-Mitglieder künftig nicht davor zurückschrecken werden, westliche Anbieter zugunsten des Erfolgs eigener Produkte und politischer Beziehungen zu nicht-westlichen Partnern zu verdrängen. Auch deswegen wird es für westliche Rüstungspartner künftig verstärkt darum gehen, neben der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit die PSF als Transmissionsriemen der militärischen Kooperation stärker zu nutzen. Vor allem rüstungspolitisch ambitionierte Länder wie die Emirate werden künftig noch stärker darauf bedacht sein, lokale rüstungstechnische Kompetenzen

aufzubauen und Technologietransfer einzufordern. Daher gewinnt die verstärkte Ausbildungszusammenarbeit an Bedeutung. Schließlich verstehen die sechs Länder ihre rüstungstechnischen Kompetenzen zusehends als Ausdruck politischer Souveränität. Auch deshalb engagieren sich die Herrscherfamilien der GCC-Staaten direkt und sehr aktiv an den entsprechenden Rüstungsprojekten. Daher ist die politisch-strategisch klug fokussierte Unterstützung durch die Regierungen der Rüstungspartner unerlässlich.

Dr. Heiko Borchert

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Der Beitrag gibt die persönliche Auffassung des Autors wieder.

Eine gekürzte Fassung des Beitrags erschien unter dem Titel „Selbstbewusste Monarchen rüsten auf“ am 31. Oktober 2014 in der Neuen Zürcher Zeitung, Seite 7. Siehe auch:

www.nzz.ch/international/naher-osten-und-nordafrika/neue-waffen-fuer-selbstbewusste-monarchen-1.18415203.

THEMEN

Redefining Article Five?

NATO leaders agreed at the Wales Summit in the autumn of 2014 that a large-scale cyber-attack on a member country could be considered an attack on the entire U.S.-led alliance, potentially triggering a military response. As former NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said “Today we declare that cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense”.

Calls to include non-traditional or hybrid attacks as a reason for invoking Article Five are not new. In a speech to the Atlantic Council in early 2010 former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton strongly suggested that attacks on allied cyber and energy infrastructures should be reconsidered attacks under Article Five of the NATO Charter. Her predecessor, Madeleine Albright concluded in 2010 that “the next significant attack on the Alliance may well come down a fibre optic cable”.

The statement made by the former NATO Secretary-General clearly leaves room for maneuver. If NATO were, for example, to strike the word “armed” from the definition of Article Five and furthermore clearly define what is meant by an attack on NATO, it could place the members in a bind. A cyber-attack might then technically meet the definition put forth in advance without the actual circumstances generating consensus for action. A situation could also arise as the risks of retaliation might simply outweigh the damage done by the aggressor. Members might be put into the awkward position of having to choose between the credibility of NATO and their own short-term interests.

There is a value in strategic ambiguity. In the cyber case drawing a line in the sand virtually invites actions just short of casus belli. By simply declaring that there may be circumstances in which NATO will consider a cyber-attack on one of its members an attack on all is a greater deterrence. Given the general reluctance of the voting population in Europe to get involved in any form of kinetic exchange, such ambiguity would also give politicians the degree of freedom they need to retain the confidence of their public.

The current debate on defining what action might be considered an attack under Article Five is, however, more far-reaching than simply a cyber-attack. Besides such attacks we also need to consider sophisticated information operations, psychological attacks, economic warfare, social engineering and proxy attacks.

In part due to the relative weakness of its conventional military capabilities, Russia has focused on such hybrid tactics which are more difficult for NATO to counter and can be employed alongside conventional means of warfare. As the Russian Chief of General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, put it in February 2013: “The very rules of war have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of

weapons in their effectiveness". In his speech he goes on to say that in the 21st century we have seen a tendency towards blurring the lines between the states of war and peace. Wars are no longer declared and, having begun, proceed according to an unfamiliar template. Gerasimov furthermore emphasizes the importance of coordinating the use of traditional warfare with hybrid tactics. Such a strategy has become possible through the advances in command and control systems making military actions more dynamic, active and fruitful.

In the run up to the occupation of Crimea and the eastern part of the Ukraine Russia employed the full gamut of hybrid tactics. Russia and Ukraine traded cyber-attacks during the referendum on Crimea. Reports indicate that NATO and Ukrainian sites suffered DDoS (denial of service) attacks during the vote. As in the case of Russia's earlier confrontations with Estonia and Georgia, the attacks seemed to have come from mercenaries or state backed "patriotic hackers" rather than from the armed forces or intelligence agencies. In other words the job was handed off to proxies thus giving Russia plausible deniability.

The dissemination of false information, known as concentrated information operations (INFOOPS) was and is being used by Russia in the Ukrainian conflict. Russian media keep repeating that the regime change in Kiev was a "fascist plot" and a repeat of the 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. Such disinformation, especially in the eastern part of the country, led to a strong support in the population for the separatist movement. Such information operations have also encouraged the population to undertake subversive activities against the Ukrainian state. INFOOPS is in essence a form of social engineering and Russia is using social engineering to both influence public opinion in the Ukraine and in Western Europe. Such a tactic has resulted in dividing the population in the Ukraine and has had a significant impact on public opinion in the West to the extent that some poli-

ticians have argued to accept the status quo with regard to Crimea. Such moves are very much a part of hybrid warfare and serve to weaken the resolve of the enemy.

Beyond INFOOPS lies the third, most alarming level of cyber conflict: attacks on critical infrastructure, public and private, with the aim of disrupting or disabling essential services. Targets could include the banking sector, energy grids, road signals and certainly military communication networks. If the Ukraine conflict escalates to this level it means the formal onset of cyber war. This would make the onset of a kinetic conflict more than likely.

Besides the current cyber conflict we are also witnessing an increased level of proxy attacks by a combination of regular and irregular combatants. In the case of the Crimean occupation it has since become clear that the "little green men" were Russian Special Forces troops declared as volunteers, much as it was and is the case in the eastern part of the Ukraine. The path Russia is going down is perfecting comprehensive security in order to sow comprehensive insecurity with its adversaries.

Given the level of Russian activity with a strong focus on former member states of the Soviet Union it becomes clear that NATO and the West cannot simply carry on as if nothing has changed. We need a new strategy in the West which reflects the rise of hybrid attacks and threats.

Besides measures which illustrate strategic intent, (prepositioning arms east of the German border, increasing the scale and frequency of exercises, relocation of armed forces, an increase in defense spending), NATO needs to consider taking steps to build an offensive and centralized cyber-attack capability. When the UK announced in late 2013 that it is developing the capability to carry out offensive cyber-attacks against other nations the reaction was mixed. Defense experts warned that Britain risks losing the moral high ground by this announcement and that such a step

would simply give the Chinese and Russians more ammunition. Others fear that this move could turn out to be counter-productive as other actors will simply want to react in kind.

The British announcement is based on the analysis that it is no longer sufficient just to build defenses against cyber-attacks and that an offensive capability is needed to strike back against enemies and put cyber alongside land, sea, air and space as a mainstream military activity. As Carl von Clausewitz aptly observed: "a defender must always seek to change over to the attack as soon as he has gained the benefit of the defense". Such a move towards developing an offensive cyber capability also makes sense when reconsidering Article Five. If NATO is currently subject to a cyber-attack it cannot respond in kind. It can revert to economic sanctions or in a final step can respond kinetically. Such an escalation, however, is a very difficult sell to a population which widely rejects the use of arms. A cyber response to a cyber-attack is an easier sell.

It also makes a great deal of sense given that nations such as the US, Israel, Russia, China and now the UK have developed or are developing the ability to destroy or sabotage other nations internet infrastructure as part of military planning and covert operations.

Brandishing cyber-attack capabilities might also back up a deterrence strategy and dissuade another state from mischief – but it must be credible, much as Mutual Assured Destruction was credible during the Cold War. Redefining Article Five only makes sense if NATO is in a position to act – and is willing to do so.

Maxim Worcester

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THEMEN

Mars vs. Mercury: Germany, America, & the Global Order

Germany and America: Two Reluctant Pivotal Powers

Germany and the United States rank as the two most influential and powerful Western liberal nations in a world challenged by the rise of non-Western and authoritarian powers. It is not an overstatement to argue that the future of the liberal world order will depend to a large degree on Washington and Berlin. Yet both have become reluctant leaders and both represent very different types of powers. Moreover, the publics in both countries are increasingly inward-looking and eschew a larger international role.¹

America has increasingly come to rely on Germany as its key partner in Europe, both due to Germany's rise and to the decline of other potential partners. The old special relationship with the United Kingdom (UK) has become weaker with the decline of Britain's military role and the fading and reluctant role of London in the European Union (EU). France is also regarded as a country to be taken seriously in regard to its strategic role in Africa, but one also in decline. Both Britain and France have had to make substantial cuts in their militaries, reducing their strategic importance to the United States. The EU is seen as an important economic power and a key player in trade and competition policy but hopes that it would take on a larger foreign and security policy role are low given the clear preference of the large countries (including Germany) to conduct foreign policy on a national level. This leaves Germany as the de-

fault partner in leadership for American policy.

Geo-Economic Germany and Geo-Strategic America

While both countries have assets for leadership, these assets are very different and they represent two different models of power. German foreign policy can best be understood as one of a geo-economic power, which follows policies based on a new form of realism: commercial realism. Germany has been primarily an economic power since it emerged as West Germany from the ashes of World War II. However, Berlin's emergence as a geo-economic power is a product of the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, the Bundeswehr was one of the largest armed forces in Europe – and Germany had major strategic concerns in Europe. With unification, Germany is no longer constrained by security dependence on the United States; markets in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China are now open to German companies. The broader strategic dimension that had constrained the economic dimension in German policies has been greatly reduced.

Several traits define this geo-economic model of foreign policy. A geo-economic power defines national interest in largely economic terms. It implies a shift from multilateralism to a form of selective multilateralism or bilateral approaches toward key economic partners. Business and finance, especially export-oriented business, play a predominant role in the shaping of German foreign policy. Economic interests are given priority over such non-economic ones as human rights and democracy promotion. Finally, geo-economic powers use economic power as the principal means of imposing national preferences on others.²

Stability, predictability, and the reliability of Germany's reputation as a stable economic partner are

paramount. Given Germany's great reliance on exports and its dependence on the import of natural resources, it needs to have a reputation as a reliable economic partner. Sanctions, drawing red lines, and employing military force all run counter to Germany's geo-economic interests. In this sense, risk aversion, already a deeply embedded trait in German political culture, is reinforced, producing the *Nein Nation*, a Germany that increasingly says no to policies which might endanger these economic interests.³ Not only has dependence for German security on the United States greatly diminished, but the nature of hard security and of the military as an instrument of state influence have also been transformed. The old roles of protecting the German homeland from invasion or of deploying forces for missions defined by NATO are clearly being downgraded. Given the centrality of economic and, especially, trading interests, security policy has been redefined in economic terms with an emphasis upon the acquisition of raw materials and other natural resources; the need to keep open sea lines of communications; and the growing importance of cyber security. In Edward Luttwak's characterization, "methods of commerce are displacing military methods."⁴

While Germany is not a first tier military power but a first tier economic player, the United States is both a major economic and military power with global security interests. The U.S. has a tendency to look to its imposing military instruments in dealing with foreign policy while Germany, being an economic juggernaut, tends to see economics as a main instrument in dealing with global and regional problems. This has resulted in a major gap between a more military-oriented global power like the

¹ A Pew survey released in July 2014 found that 60 percent of Americans polled believed that the U.S. should pay less attention to problems overseas and should concentrate on challenges at home. These numbers were up from 20 percent in 1964, 40 percent in 1995, and 50 percent in 2004. These tendencies to look inward mirror those in Germany where a 2014 Körber Stiftung poll found that 60 percent of Germans wanted Germany to play a restrained role in foreign policy while only 37 percent wanted a more active German foreign policy.

² See Hans Kundnani, "Germany as a Geo-economic Power," *The Washington Quarterly* 34:3 (Summer 2011), 31-45 and Stephen F. Szabo, *Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geoeconomics* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).

³ Abraham L. Newman, "Flight from Risk: Unified Germany and the Role of Beliefs in the European Response to the Financial Crisis," in *From the Bonn to the Berlin Republic*, ed. Jeffrey J. Anderson and Eric Langenbacher (New York: Berghahn, 2010): 306-318.

⁴ Edward Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics," *The National Interest* 17 (Summer 1990); for broad survey of the concept see Paul Aligica, "Geo-economics As A Geo-Strategic Paradigm: An Assessment," *The Hudson Institute*, 9 August 2002.

U.S. and an economic global power like Germany. Rather than a contrast between Mars and Venus it is one between Mars and Mercury, the Roman god of Commerce.

The American strategic culture is a modern one in contrast to post-modern Germany.⁵ It remains national rather than post-national and views the world in balance of power terms, although it has a stronger ideological component than that of a traditional realist state. It gives force and the threat of the use of force a higher priority than do most EU countries, especially Germany, and has a greater belief in the concept of just war. This view of the world, which emphasized the role of resolution and military strength in the defeat of the Soviet Union and which disparaged negotiations as appeasement, remains an important strand in American thinking about international affairs in general and Russia in particular. This stands in marked contrast to the German approach to the world of engagement, negotiation, and conciliation, which grew out of *Ostpolitik* and is reinforced by the risk averse nature of a geo-economic power.

Thus the legacies of over sixty years of diplomatic experience have led policymakers in Washington and Berlin toward diverging strategic cultures, a divergence reinforced by American military capabilities and Germany's downgrading of military force as an instrument of statecraft. Russia policy provides an example of this contrast. American interests in Russia are almost entirely strategic, ranging from nuclear weapons and Russia's role in areas of key importance to the U.S. – especially in Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus – to the security threats posed by Russia.⁶ Germany has a much deeper and broader relationship with its big

neighbor and German stakeholders in the relationship with Russia tend to be on the economic side in contrast to the American stakeholders in the strategic community. The former benefit from engagement while the latter tend toward threat perceptions.

Adjusting to a Pluralistic and Less Western World Order

The rise of non-Western powers, both anti-liberal and democratic, pose a growing challenge for the transatlantic relationship and for German-American approaches to dealing with this new global environment as the world becomes less Western and less liberal. How do Washington and Berlin accommodate these forces and what can they do to preserve and possibly expand a liberal international order? Thomas Bagger, Head of the Policy Planning Staff of the Foreign Office under foreign ministers Guido Westerwelle and Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has developed the idea of Germany as a "Shaping Power" (*Gestaltungsmacht*) as the conceptual core of a new German strategy. A *Gestaltungsmacht* is a state that has the power to shape outcomes and events. The term reflects the end of a unipolar era when the U.S. dominated the agenda. This thinking reflects the emergence of a polycentric, highly interdependent, world with rising non-Western powers playing a larger role in global and regional decision-making. The official German government paper on this concept puts it in the following terms: "[T]hese countries are economic locomotives which substantially influence regional cooperation and also have an impact in other global regions and play an increasingly important role in international decision making. [...] We see them as more than developing countries but as new shaping powers."⁷ Germany will be a

Shaping Power through the use of networks, fashioning networks with new actors both at home and abroad. Germany has to develop networks alongside its traditional fora of the EU, NATO, and the G-8 to develop the global governance needed to deal with the new challenges of globalization.

The rise of non-Western powers has pushed the U.S. toward a more regional type of trading relations like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its Pacific equivalent (TPP) in the wake of the failure of the WTO Doha round.⁸ This makes Germany more attractive as a partner in a new attempt to promote more inclusive multilateralism through the development of exclusive multilateralism or, failing that, to at least protect core liberal values in a group of like-minded liberal states. Germans have tended to favor multilateral and institutional approaches that emphasize a rule-based system of institutionalized cooperation. As Gunther Hellmann notes, there has been an erosion of multilateralism in both Europe and the U.S. but there still remains a larger preference in Germany for what Hellmann calls "inclusive or universalist" multilateralism over exclusive multilateralism that focuses on bringing together like-minded democracies.⁹

Both the U.S. and Germany have their versions of "Pacific Pivots" in reaction to globalization. The U.S. has reacted to this global shift by rebalancing its strategic focus from Europe to Asia.

Despite Russia's new and aggressive policies in Ukraine, the rise of China remains the key strategic challenge facing Washington for the medium to long term. Unlike

⁵ Robert Cooper, *The Postmodern State*, <http://fpc.org.uk/articles/169>; for a fuller version see *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty First Century* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).

⁶ As Samuel Charap has observed, "The (Russia and the U.S.) national security establishments continue to view each other as adversaries, almost twenty-five years after the Cold War ended," Samuel Charap, "Beyond the Russian Reset," *The National Interest*, July/August 2013.

⁷ Die Bundesregierung, *Globalisierung gestalten- Partnerschaften ausbauen-Verantwortung teilen: Konzept der Bundesregierung* (German Foreign Office, 2012), 4. See also Thomas Bagger, "The Networked Diplomat," *Internationale Politik*, 3 August 2013; and the joint German Marshall Fund, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik paper, *Neue Macht: Neue Verantwortung/ or New Power, New Responsibility: Elements of a German foreign and security policy for a Changing World* (English version),

2013, www.swp-berlin.org/en/projects/new-power-new-responsibility/the-paper.html.

⁸ Thomas Straubhaar, "The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP): From Global to Regional Multilateralism," in *Liberal Order in a Post-Western World*, Trine Flockhart, et al. (Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy, 2014): 25-35.

⁹ Gunther Hellmann, "Liberal Foreign Policy and World Order Renewal," in *The Democratic Disconnect: Citizenship and Accountability in the Transatlantic Community*, Seyla Benhabib, et al. (Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy, 2012): 108.

Europe, Asia does not have an equivalent of the EU or NATO and the U.S. military role remains the key stabilizing factor of the current political and security order in East Asia. Germany's Pacific Pivot is entirely economic as reflected in its growing economic stake in China and other countries in the region, with almost no strategic perspectives or role in this large region.

A major implication of this pivot is that Germany, and Europe, will have to pick up more of the leadership in its volatile peripheries to the east and south. Yet Berlin and Washington cannot afford to leave Asia to the U.S. and foster even further American disengagement from Europe. Germany is now seen by the Chinese as the most important European country in China but Berlin shares with Washington a common concern about China's abuse of intellectual property rights and outright theft of technological and industrial secrets. It will be imperative that both capitals do all they can to avoid a split over China policy and allow Beijing to pursue a policy of divide and conquer.

On global financial issues, Washington and Berlin have diverged in important ways. There is a concern in Washington that Germany continues to benefit from an undervalued currency, the euro, and pursues policies meant to keep the euro undervalued at the expense of both the U.S. and Germany's euro zone partners. This is part of a larger international financial struggle between export giants such as Japan, China, South Korea, and Germany, which want to maintain currency stability, and countries like France, the southern euro zone, and the U.S., which are pushing for more stimulus and a revaluing of currencies to bring adjustments to their current accounts. Given the longstanding and nonpartisan support in Germany for stability, low inflation, and responsible fiscal policies, German governments continue to turn a deaf ear to both European and American calls for stimulating demand.¹⁰

¹⁰ The U.S. administration's view as expressed in the critical U.S. Treasury report in 2014 is that "Germany's anemic pace of domestic de-

Also in the area of information technology and internet governance, Germany and the United States are becoming rivals. The harsh critique in Germany of the U.S. high tech companies in the wake of the Snowden NSA revelations have resulted in calls to create a European or German cloud, which can threaten the lucrative European market for companies like Apple, Facebook, and Google. These firms have lobbied intensely in Washington to limit the damage from the NSA scandal and are a factor in the Obama administration's attempts to heal the rift with Berlin over cyber. German calls for a digital dialogue have still not been addressed by Washington.¹¹

Conclusion

Globalization in all its broad implications has reinforced tendencies for a separation of American and German economic and financial policies. Networks are replacing alliances in this new "Zero Sum World," in which competition for markets, technology, and natural resources has accelerated.¹² A key question for the future is whether the foreign policy of Germany will be one of Germany Inc., with few allies but many customers and suppliers. Developments in Russia and the eastern neighborhood have begun to force

mand growth and dependence on exports have hampered rebalancing at a time when many other euro area countries have been under severe pressure to curb demand and compress imports in order to promote adjustment. [...] The net result has been a deflationary bias for the euro area as well as for the world economy." The Treasury singled out Germany ahead of both China and Japan, the traditional target countries for the U.S., after a long period of concern over the impact of German policies on both Europe and American exports. See Ian Talley and Jeffrey Sparschott, "U.S. Blasts Germany's Economic Policies," *The Wall Street Journal*, 31 October 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304527504579168113091545256>.

This critique was renewed by Treasury Secretary Jack Lew in September 2014 who said the U.S. had "philosophical differences with our friends in Europe" over the need to boost demand. Jamie Smyth, "Lew urges Europe to stimulate demand," *The Financial Times*, 22 September 2014, p. 2.

¹¹ See Annegret Bendiek, "Beyond U.S. Hegemony: The Future of a Liberal Order of the Internet," in *Liberal Order in a Post-Western World*, Trine Flockhart, et.al. (Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy, 2014): 57-70.

¹² See Gideon Rachman, *Zero Sum World: Politics, Power and Prosperity after the Crash* (London: Atlantic, 2010).

Germany to weigh its economic interests against larger strategic ones concerning the security order of Europe. However, this is not the case in regard to Germany's geo-economic approach outside of Europe. With the U.S. ceding leadership to Berlin on the Ukraine crisis and the willingness of Chancellor Angela Merkel to impose sanctions on Russia, Germany is clearly at a decisive point in its international strategy. Its risk averse approach in a more risk prone world may not work and Germany is already being forced to take on a larger strategic role beyond a purely economic one.¹³ The recession of American power and leadership and the decline of France and Britain as reliable partners have increased pressures on Germany to play a more strategic leadership role. As Josef Janning has observed, "*Berlin's foreign policy machine works best when it can support, encourage, help and reward. It struggles when it has to employ dissuasion, sanctions, or red lines.*"¹⁴ Both Berlin and Washington will now have to redefine their relationship in this rapidly changing context.

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¹³ See for example the joint German Marshall Fund, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik paper, *Neue Macht: Neue Verantwortung!* or *New Power, New Responsibility: Elements of a German foreign and security policy for a Changing World* (English version), 2013, www.swp-berlin.org/en/projects/new-power-new-responsibility/the-paper.html.

¹⁴ Josef Janning, "Germany's summer of discontent on foreign policy," European Council on Foreign Relations, 30 June 2014, www.ecfr.eu/blog/germanys_summer_of_discontent_on_foreign_policy.

THEMEN

Strategic Studies as a Science: The Clausewitzian Scientific Research Program

Anyone for whom all this is meaningless either will admit no theoretical analysis at all, or his intelligence has never been insulted by the confused and confusing welter of ideas that one so often hears and reads on the subject of the conduct of war. These have no fixed point of view; they lead to no satisfactory conclusion; they appear sometimes banal, sometimes absurd, sometimes simply adrift in a sea of vague generalization; and all because this subject has seldom been examined in a spirit of scientific investigation¹⁵.

As the Strategic Studies are a late field of research, it presents a significant number of inconsistencies and irregularities. The wicked consequence is its doubtful capacity to point out parameters of scientific progress. The identification of the study of strategy as a scientific field is nowadays questioned as it was by Maurice de Saxe in the seventeenth century because it is still unable to distinguish research agendas from biased expedient commitments, consistent methodologies from fallacious approaches, and scientific contributions from pseudoscience¹⁶.

Although one has to recognize the impossibility of moral scientific neutrality in any field that deals with power, the too intimate relationship between the study on strategy, on one side, and the several agendas of governments and military services, on the other, without epistemological demarcation, has resulted in Strategic

Studies' subordination to normative aims other than scholarship.

The social utility of the Strategic Studies is to provide corroborated knowledge on war and peace. It can better qualify and attend statecraft endeavors by defining clear objects of study, theories, empirical sources and criteria for hypotheses validation¹⁷. Therefore, the quality of its contribution depends on the scientific rigor of strategic scholars.

This paper proposes the field's adherence to Imre Lakatos' Methodology of Scientific Research Programs (MSRP) as an epistemological solution for the improvement of its demarcation, consistency and progress¹⁸. It advances the proposal by exemplifying MSRP's utility in setting agendas of research, specifically when it comes to the interpretation and use of Carl von Clausewitz's conceptual propositions against alternative approaches to the study of war.

In this case, Lakatos' MSRP can convert the endless debate on the contents of Clausewitz's concepts and definitions, due to the tragedy of communication of his writings, to a scientific research program to guide how and which of Clausewitz's concepts should be amended and which should not; which interpretations offer better explanations of historical and current events, and which have been falsified by empirical case studies; and finally, which propositions are additions to Clausewitzian thinking and which pertains to another theoretical framework. Similarly to other fields of studies, it can provide epistemological rigor to foster a positive debate among scholars on clearer and more ordered parameters of inclusion and utility.

Lakatos and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs

Lakatos' Methodology of Scientific Research Programs (MSRP) owns

its origins to the main debate of the philosophy of science in the 20th Century, regarding the demarcation problem between science and non-science, which opposed mainly Karl Popper's falsificationist program¹⁹ and Thomas Kuhn's sociological approach²⁰ to science. Lakatos regarded the naïve or dogmatic version of Popper's program, which urged scientists to immediately abandon their theories in face of experimental refutation, as unsound and unrealistic. It was unsound because the interdependence between theory and facts disqualifies any particular fact as a definitive falsifier of a theory. And it was unrealistic because the actual history of science is made by scientists struggling to save their theories from existing anomalies. However, Kuhn's sociological solution and the notions of paradigm, incommensurability and normal vs revolutionary science that came with it brought an element of irrationality to the scientific process that was unacceptable to Lakatos. A useful epistemology had to fix the deficiencies of Popper's program and yet provide the basis to illuminate science as a rational and progressive undertaking.

Lakatos recognized that scientists constantly try to save their theories from anomalies by theoretically amending them. Evaluating *how* this is done is the way his methodology ultimately proposes to keep science within rational bounds. To be scientifically legitimate (or *theoretically progressive*, to use Lakatos' terms), the new theory, created by a theoretical amendment designed to counter an anomaly, must have excessive empirical content compared to its predecessor – i.e., it must predict not only the facts covered by the previous theory, but also novel facts that were not expected or were even prohibited by it²¹. And

¹⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (1832–4; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 132.

¹⁶ Kapferer, B. 'Old Permutations, New Formations? War, State, and Global Transgression' *Social Analysis*, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2004), pp. 64–72.

¹⁷ Jacek Kugler. "Political Conflict, War, and Peace." In *Ada Finifter, Political Science: The State of the Discipline II*. (Washington: American Political Science Association, 1993), pp. 483–509.

¹⁸ Imre Lakatos, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

¹⁹ Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (Cambridge: International Society for Science and Religion, 2007).

²⁰ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

²¹ Since Lakatos published his MSRP, however, there has been a wide controversy regarding the meaning of 'novel facts'. There are at least four major understandings. Of these, the *heuristic novelty* criterion (or Zahar/Lakatos3, as it came to be known), according to which the anoma-

to be empirically progressive, the new theory must have at least some of its excessive empirical content empirically corroborated. Lakatos also recognized, furthermore, that no amount of anomalies, however great, is enough to definitely defeat a theory. Therefore, a theory can only be 'refuted' – more properly speaking, *surpassed* – by a new theory that has excessive corroborated empirical content.

It is clear by now that the MSRP depicts a scientific world populated not by isolated theories confronted with empirical facts, but by sequences of theories connected and interrelated – or *scientific research programs* (SRPs).

A SRP has two main components and orientations for scholarship. The *hard core* contains the main assumptions and statements that set the theoretical commitments of a program. Any theory that belongs to a SRP must subscribe to them as they are off-limits for change or replacement. Therefore, any scholar effort in that way is a *negative heuristic* because that kind of amendment, by itself, will not result in scientific progress.

The *protective belt* comprises the sequence of theories that share the same core assertions and develop testable predictions and explanations. All its content may be amended if preserved the commitments to the hard core and to a common set of suggestions or hints that guide the evolutionary trajectory of a SRP in developing corroborated content and coping with anomalies. Therefore, the scholar effort adherent to a specific SRP should foster the heuristic power of the protective belt, which is the *positive heuristic* of a SRP.

A development in any scientific field can take, then, one of two forms: it can be *intra-*

programmatic, when a theoryshift happens inside a given SRP and in accordance with its hard core and positive heuristic; or *inter-programmatic*, when the theoryshift violates the hard core and forms a rival SRP. Both types of developments can be theoretically progressive, if they predict some novel facts, and empirically progressive, if at least some of the novel facts are corroborated. Any such developments are considered *scientific* if they are at least theoretically progressive.

The Clausewitzian Scientific Research Program (CSRP)

According to Lakatos, the proposition and adherence of a scientific research is continuous and voluntary by its scholars. Therefore, what follows cannot be taken as definitive, but an invitation to a different track on the development of Clausewitz's approach to war. The only golden rule is the intellectual honesty of interlocutors and their criticisms. A silver rule is harder to accomplish but equally necessary for a program's development: the empirical tests of propositions, which calls for more demanding commitments and research resources.

A second caution mark, in fact an assumption, is that Clausewitz's theoretical contribution goes further and cannot be constrained to *On War*. The distinctions, shortcomings and flaws of several translations and editions of Clausewitz's magisterial work are well known, as is the need to complement *On War* with the rest of his writings in the *Hinterlassene Werke*. Furthermore, the introduction of a CSRP must cope with the fact that Clausewitz's thinking comprises several stages of maturity that are not clearly classified and acknowledged²². To put order to all of this is the promise behind Lakatos' methodology.

Hard Core

The hard core of a SRP provides its identity as a distinctive approach to an empirical realm. The

negative heuristic protects it and any violation of its content means a prompt transition to a different approach. Regarding the CSRP, we propose the following content:

#1 – *The centrality of combat in war*. As Clausewitz puts it, it follows naturally from a definition of war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will"²³ – that in war everything must derive, directly or indirectly, from combat. This is true even when combat does not concretely takes place – that is, when calculations and decisions are based not on a combat's actual results, but on the anticipation of its *results*²⁴.

#2 – *War as a political instrument*. In Clausewitz's theory of war, the essential relation between war and politics is not simply given by definition – "war is merely the continuation of politics by other means"²⁵. It is a logical and empirical conclusion of Clausewitz's profound investigation on war. It is a point of arrival, not departure, that war is a political instrument and not just a continuation of politics – that is, that politics not only brings war into fruition, but controls and directs it in its entirety.

#3 – *The superiority of defense over attack*. The superiority of defense over attack is the single most important factor that explains the differences between real wars and wars on paper (absolute wars). It is also the single most important factor that accounts, therefore, for the return of the political objective once the war has begun, making it a true political instrument. Of course, a proper comprehension of this powerful element on Clausewitz's theoretical construction demands a *full concept* of *defense* – comprising the general level of war and the *strategic* manifestations of the superiority of defense: the culmination points of the attack and of victory –, and not simply its strict (tactical) concept²⁶.

lous fact that provoked the theoryshift cannot count as a confirmation instance for the new theory, is the most tuned to the spirit and purpose of the MSRP. See: Colin Elman and Miriam Elman, *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 33-40; and Zahar, E. 'Why did Einstein's Programme Supersede Lorentz's?' *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 24 (1973), pp. 95-123.

²² A proposal to overcome this critical shortcoming is Eugenio Diniz and Domicio Proença Júnior, 'A Criterion for Settling Inconsistencies in Clausewitz's *On War*'. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 0, No. 0, (2012) pp. 1-24.

²³ Clausewitz, 1984, p. 75.

²⁴ Clausewitz, 1984, p. 95.

²⁵ Clausewitz, 1993, p. 87.

²⁶ It seems obvious to us that the neglect of the full concept of defense is what has kept the Offense-Defense Balance proponents in the wrong course for decades. See: Eugenio Diniz, *Clausewitz, o Balanço Ataque-Defesa e a Teor-*

#4 *The Trinity*. The *wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit* ensues the correspondence between the theory of war's axioms that define war and the others concepts and analytical categories for the study of war. The trinity establishes the cognitive apprehension of the fundamentals of war: passions, the realm of probability and chance, and reason. The effects of their relationships allow one to consider the further aspects between the grammar of the use of force and their possible political purposes. The trinity also instructs the analyst/commander the considerations he has to point out of a given war to foster his judgment: the motivations of peoples; the conditions of commanders and fighting forces; and the political institutions that orientate both sides and set their ultimate objectives.

Protective belt

The protective belt organizes the theoretical content of a research program. It comprises the conceptual propositions, hypotheses and auxiliary theories, which turned to be complementary while sharing the same hardcore. This theoretical content should aim at predicting and explaining facts of reality related to the problems and phenomena demarcated by the hardcore and the program's positive heuristic. Due to constant amendments and expansions, the protective belt is rarely definitive and shall evolve, as the research program progresses. Therefore, what follows are general lines of research stated by Clausewitz in chapter 2 of Book 1, his latest writing, in combination to Book 2, *On War's* notably epistemological and methodological book.

Theories of ends: One mandatory line of inquiry derived from Clausewitz's approach relates to the military objectives through which political purposes can be fulfilled. As "we find that the object of any war can vary just as much as its political purpose and its actual circumstances", the compellence of others will vary by the combination of three broad objectives, "which among them cover everything: the *armed forces*, the

country, and the *enemy's will*"²⁷. The political circumstances vary from time to time and from region to region, but particularly from political relationship to political relationship. Clausewitz points out two kinds of war – unlimited and limited – between which the wars in reality may transit. Therefore, one constant line of research is how the war plans of each polity may serve its political purposes throughout time and in relation to each of its rivals.

Theories of means: The centrality of war is the use of force and it has its own grammar. Therefore, one permanent research agenda according to a Clausewitzian perspective is the grammars of war throughout history and on contemporary time. Clausewitz points out how the means of force result in different types and degrees of engagement and campaigning in attack and defense. And, although they are bounded to the same ultimate purposes on ground, theories of means shall expand as the specifics of environments, modals and related fighting techniques and technologies by which humans wage war are themselves expanded.

Theories of methods: in chapter 2 of Book 1, Clausewitz synthesizes two kinds of strategy – *Niederwerfungsstrategie* and *Ermatungsstrategie* – and they unfold in several methods of war depending on the relative conditions of force and the positive or negative intent of one side over another. "They range from the *destruction of the enemy's forces, the conquest of his territory, to a temporary occupation or invasion, to projects with an immediate political purpose, and finally to passively awaiting the enemy's attacks*. Anyone of these may be used to overcome the enemy's will: the choice depends on circumstances."²⁸. In consequence, much like the distinctions and conditions that apply to the means of war, the methods of war can be an object of scrutiny and critical evaluation. These methods are bound to be specific and related to the dimensions that allow for the conduct of war – sea,

air and space –, provided, war being what it is, they are somehow connected to human social reality on land.

Critical analysis: Clausewitz textually points out that the aim of his contributions was the education of commanders and the design of a framework to think war through properly. Consequently, he proposes the critical analysis as the methodology to educate people to think and take decisions on war, to test the theory and its concepts and, eventually, to broaden the comprehension about past and present wars. Through his several campaign studies, Clausewitz verified not just concepts and understandings, but also critical analysis as a methodological tool. Therefore, the improvement of methods of inquiring and learning about war is a permanent agenda of research²⁹.

Closing remarks

We propose that the Clausewitzian Scientific Research Program should cover the wide range of social phenomena in which *force is employed, actually or potentially, to produce political results*. In other words, the CSRP can be legitimately expanded to deal with any event that could be analytically broken into tactical, strategic and political considerations. In Lakatosian terms, this ought to be understood as the *positive heuristic* of the program.

One might say that the heuristic boundaries of the CSRP are, to follow Colin Gray³⁰, the Strategic History of the world. It is also our understanding, which would be ideal to elaborate if it weren't for the constraints of space, that the CSRP has no peer competitor in the Strategic Studies field. Therefore, it would only be profitable to recognize that the CSRP is, at least to date, the main theoretical framework to uphold Strategic Studies' claim as a scientific field of inquiry, and the heuristic

²⁷ Clausewitz, 1984, p. 90.

²⁸ Clausewitz, 1984, p. 94.

²⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *Campaigne de 1814 en France* (Paris: Ivrea, 1993); Carl von Clausewitz, ed. Walther Shering, *Geist und Tat: das Vermächtnis des Soldaten und Denkers* (Stuttgart: Kröner, 1941).

³⁰ Colin Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History* (London: Routledge, 2007).

boundaries of the program should be properly understood as the main frontier of the field itself.

Furthermore, it is useful to exemplify how the CSRP works to bring about a unified body of studies on strategy. On one hand, we propose that Julian S. Corbett's theoretical work advances an *intra-programmatic* amendment to Clausewitz's thinking, adding an agenda of research and preserving the program's hard core; on the other hand, Michael Handel's proposal to amend the trinity goes beyond the limits of the program's negative heuristic and is an *inter-programmatic* amendment.

Corbett's propositions are among the most progressive developments ever introduced to the CSRP. He presented a clear organization of Clausewitz's theory of war, only to offer his own theory of limited war in maritime strategy³¹, whose concepts and expectations he latter corroborated by the empirical analysis of Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905³². As a result, Corbett expanded the utility of Clausewitz's approach to war, progressively amending the protective belt of the CSRP.

Additionally, by organizing Clausewitz's thinking in theories of ends, means and methods, Corbett recognized and made sense of the distinction of the means of force at sea, and that combining them with land and other types of fighting forces results in new sorts of methods. He was one of the first to realize joint military operations inextricably linked with maritime strategy and the importance of theoretical education to foster synergy and focus among several armed services: an agenda of inquire that is useful, if not appealing, for nowadays defense policy-making.

On its turn, Michael Handel proposed the addition of technology as the fourth term of the Clause-

witz's trinity, as a measure to adapt Clausewitz's theory of war to the Age of Technology³³. Unequivocally, this is a proposition that amends a fundamental assumption of the CSRP's hard core. Therefore, it can only be taken as an alternative research program, distinct from Clausewitz's as well as Corbett's propositions. Adherents to Handel's propositions have to offer an agenda of research that has to be considered an equal or a contender to the CSRP, and they have to advance over Clausewitz's and Corbett's contributions to be accepted as more progressive and eligible to replace them. In other words, Handel and his followers must show that their inter-programmatic theory shift has excessive corroborated empirical content in comparison to the CSRP.

This simple argumentation sustains that Carl von Clausewitz's and Julian Corbett's theories of war and maritime strategy, combined, attend to all the normative requirements of Imre Lakatos' methodology of scientific research program. This allows us to take their contributions as scientific, as well as to distinguish progressive from degenerative uses, additions and amendments of them by others scholars. Hence, it becomes possible to classify and organize further studies on strategy in terms of consistency and utility.

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THEMEN

„Runter von der Leiter!“

Eine persönliche Kommentierung der aktuellen sicherheitspolitischen Lage in Europa

Wer sich noch gut an die militärpolitischen und strategischen Debatten und Entscheidungen in den 1990iger Jahren erinnern kann, muss derzeit fassungslos den Kopf schütteln angesichts des sicherheitspolitischen Szenarios in Europa. Die wohlthuende Entspannung am Ende des Kalten Krieges ist verfliegen. Aufrüstung und Säbelrasseln scheinen angesagt zu sein. Ja, die Lage ist dramatisch geworden. Es geht nicht allein um die Sperrung von Auslandskonten reicher Russen. Mehr noch, es werden neue militärische Operationspläne erarbeitet und erste Stimmen rufen nach zusätzlichen Panzerverbänden für die Bundeswehr. So kann und darf es nicht weitergehen.

Grenzenlose Freude war angesagt, als Politiker und Soldaten aus Ost und West sich die Hände reichten. Der Entspannungsprozess trug Früchte: Abrüstung statt Hochrüstung, gegenseitige Kontrolle der nuklearen und konventionellen Waffenbestände, friedliche Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, Auflösung des Warschauer Pakts, Rückzug aller russischen Soldaten aus Deutschland und ein neues strategisches Konzept der NATO mit einer angestrebten Partnerschaft zu Russland – von der Konfrontation zur Kooperation. Diese erfreulichen Entwicklungen für die Sicherheitsarchitektur Europas führten zu einer Friedenseuphorie. Verführten sie dann zum sicherheitspolitischen Übermut? Offensichtlich ja.

Die Aufnahme z.B. von Polen und den Baltischen Staaten in die NATO ging relativ problemlos vonstatten, denn Russland war in den politischen Prozess einbezogen. Hat man auf EU- und NATO-Seite im Dialog mit Russland nicht erkannt, was man politisch und militärisch Russland – genauer gesagt Russlands Sicherheitsinteressen – zumuten kann? Russlands Veto gegen die beabsichtig-

³¹ Julian Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911).

³² Julian Corbett, *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War: 1904-1905* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1994).

³³ Michael Handel, 'Clausewitz in the Age of Technology', In *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 51–92.

te Stationierung von NATO- bzw. USA-Raketenstellungen in Polen Tschechien war doch quasi als „Warnschuss“ deutlich zu hören. Oder wollten einige ihn nicht hören?

Mit der eingeleiteten Anbindung der Ukraine an die EU und die NATO war dann für Russland offensichtlich die „Rote Linie“ überschritten. Die Nichteinbeziehung von Russland in den Konsultationsprozess mit der Ukraine wurde mehrfach bereits von sachkundigen Experten als politischer Fehler von EU und NATO bezeichnet, doch Konsequenzen wurden daraus nicht gezogen. Den USA kann man vielleicht noch nachsehen, wenn sie auf der globalstrategischen Ebene Russland nicht mehr als ebenbürtig, sondern gemäß Präsident Obama nur noch als „regional power“ ansehen. Doch vor allem in Brüssel hätte in den EU- und NATO-Stäben diese „Rote Linie“ Ukraine mit der Halbinsel Krim in den Fokus rücken und höchste Beachtung in der realen Politikgestaltung finden müssen.

In der Logik dieses strategischen Versäumnisses kommt die Argumentationsführung auf westlicher Seite in eine Schiefelage und verliert an Glaubwürdigkeit. Denn Wirtschaftssanktionen gegen Russland und militärische Maßnahmen der Eskalation EU- und NATO-seitig mit der Annexion der Krim und den Aktivitäten Russlands in der Ostukraine zu begründen, verdreht den politischen Aktions- und Reaktionsmechanismus. Mit Verlaub gesagt, die russischen Reaktionen bezogen auf die Ukraine geschahen nach dem „Warnschuss“ bezüglich der Raketenstellungen und nach dem politischen Überschreiten der „Roten Linie“ in der Ukraine-Politik.

Wo stehen wir heute?

Die Staats- und Regierungschefs der NATO haben Anfang September 2014 ein neues Konzept für einen besseren militärischen Schutz der östlichen Mitgliedsstaaten verabschiedet. Dazu gehört z.B. die Aufstellung einer neuen schnellen Eingreiftruppe mit kürzester Reaktionszeit. Wie die operative Umsetzung aussehen kann, hat jüngst ein hochran-

giger deutscher NATO-Kommandeur in den Medien zum Ausdruck gebracht „Wir haben bisher Großmanöver von 25.000 bis 40.000 Mann nur in den westlichen NATO-Ländern durchgeführt. Ich kann mir gut vorstellen, dass wir das in Zukunft auch in Osteuropa und im Baltikum machen“. Solche Großmanöver sind deutliche Zeichen der Eskalation und sie versprechen nichts Gutes.

Natürlich verdienen die sicherheitspolitischen Interessen der Baltischen Staaten, von Polen und auch der Ukraine die berechnete Aufmerksamkeit und Unterstützung. Da aber diese Unterstützung mit NATO-Großmanövern direkt vor der Haustür Russlands stattfinden soll, wird die militärische Antwort Russlands konsequenterweise nicht lange auf sich warten lassen.

Der Wiederbeginn eines vertrauensvollen, partnerschaftlichen Dialogs mit Russland funktioniert nicht über Manöver hart an der russischen Grenze. Täuscht der Eindruck, dass in jüngster Zeit die Dialoge mit der Ukraine intensiviert werden und mit Russland abnehmen? Die Partnerschaft mit Russland war so gut gededien, dass deutsche und französische Firmen mit politischer Billigung in Russland militärische Ausbildungszentren aufbauten und Hubschrauberträger für die russische Marine herstellen – diese Partnerschaft zerbrach vor unser aller Augen in kürzester Zeit.

Allein die Tatsache, dass maßgebliche und verdiente Staatsmänner wie Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder, Hans-Dietrich Genscher und jüngst auch Michael Gorbatschow großes Verständnis für Präsident Putin und seine Interpretation der russischen Interessenlage zum Ausdruck bringen, müsste doch die Putin-Kritiker zum Nachdenken veranlassen und für politische Mäßigung – insbesondere bei der Wortwahl – sorgen. Wenn sinngemäß diese „elder statesmen“ als Zeitzeugen und Entscheidungsträger davon sprechen, dass der Westen gegenüber Russland zu offensiv, zu aggressiv reagiert hat, dann wäre doch in Brüssel bei EU und NATO

durchaus etwas Selbstkritik angebracht.

Die alles entscheidende Frage für die weitere politische und militärische Vorgehensweise von EU und NATO lautet: Wie kommen von der Eskalationsleiter wieder runter, um den Nebel des Krieges zu vertreiben? Das Vertrauen in die Politik in Berlin und Brüssel ist groß, dennoch seien einige Anregungen erlaubt.

- Worte können zu Waffen werden. Von daher ist es höchste Zeit für eine verbale Abrüstung – in der Politik, bei den Militärs und auch in Teilen der Medien. Bedrohungsszenarien für die NATO sollten nicht voreilig herbeigeredet werden.
- Die Aufkündigung der Sicherheitspartnerschaft mit Russland wegen der Krim, beispielhaft dafür seien die neue EU-Außenbeauftragte und der Leiter der Münchener Sicherheitskonferenz genannt, geschah möglicherweise zu leichtfertig und zu lautstark, vor allem wenn gleichzeitig NATO-Schiffe im Schwarzen Meer Seemanöver abhalten. Von daher sollten alle z.Zt. ruhenden Dialogforen mit Russland unverzüglich revitalisiert werden.
- Die politischen Entscheidungen der NATO zur Verbesserung der militärischen Fähigkeiten gegenüber Russland sind jüngst getroffen worden. Die Geschlossenheit aller Bündnisländer wurde dabei bestätigt. Es besteht jedoch durchaus die Gefahr, dass ein Aufschaukeln der Konfrontation die Folge ist. Von daher wäre eine Aussetzung der operativen Umsetzung der letzten NATO-Beschlüsse eine sinnvolle Option und zugleich ein Signal, die Manöveraktivitäten von NATO und Russland nicht weiter zu intensivieren.
- Die bisherigen Finanz- und Wirtschaftssanktionen zeigen bereits erste spürbare Auswirkungen in Russland ebenso wie in einigen EU-Ländern. Von daher scheinen günstige Voraussetzungen gegeben zu sein, die Wirkung und Konsequenzen weiterer Wirtschafts-

sanktionen gründlich zu überdenken. Eine beiderseitige schrittweise Lockerung bisheriger Sanktionen wäre eine deutliche vertrauensbildende Maßnahme.

- Die Ukraine hat ein Recht darauf, dass ihre legitimen Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsinteressen Berücksichtigung finden, in Russland genauso wie in der EU und in der NATO. Von daher böte es sich an, dass unter OSZE-Regie ein Dialog Russland-Ukraine stattfindet, um eine tragfähige politische Lösung zur Krim und zur Ostukraine zu erarbeiten. EU und NATO wären gut beraten, parallel dazu einen Neuansatz in der Ukraine-Frage zu versuchen und Russland dazu von Beginn an mit einzubeziehen.

Ein „Rückwärts“ gibt es in der Politik nicht. Hinter die „Rote Linie“ kommen EU und NATO nur zurück durch ein vertrauensvolles „Vorwärtsgehen“. Die Chance für eine Deeskalation dieser bedrohlichen Krise in Europa ist noch gegeben. Wenn die letzte Sprosse auf der Eskalationsleiter erreicht ist, ist es zu spät.

Gertmann Sude

Gertmann Sude ist Generalmajor a.D.. MMAS
Der Beitrag gibt die persönliche Auffassung
des Autors wieder.

IMPRESSUM

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